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Abstract: 
The dissertation offers a historically-based critique of the foundations of modernity in 
view of the truth claims it struggled to articulate and which continue to dominate the West.At the 
very core of this problem are the natural sciences, and it is from them that the dominant 
definition of truth in modernity emanates. Since the entrenchment of the Enlightenment in the 
eighteenth century, this definition has extended into an entire "worldview" occasioning and 
determining the modern mode of existence. I argue that to understand the modern foundation of 
science and truth (and by extension, medicine and all theoretically grounded bodies of 
knowledge), it is necessary to turn once again to Descartes' seminal role in the histories of 
philosophy and science. Recognizing Descartes' philosophy as a conceptual point of departure, I 
give a critical re-reading of his formulation of the Ego cogito-ego sum not only within the 
internal history of metaphysics (of which science is a part), but as a cultural-historical 
phenomenon. I further argue that the turn to the Cogito, from which the broader notion of 
subjectivity derives, can be understood only via the cultural horizon of the Baroque within which 
the Cogito's criterion for meaning, significance and truth found the conditions of possibility for 
full expression, which moreover, established the foundation for the natural sciences. 
By raising the problem of subjectivity (via the Cogito), along with its specific criterion 
for truth, I am raising the related problem of self-conception. The Baroque is a fascinatingly rich 
and creative cultural epoch, and reveals a number of possibilities for self-conception, as one may 
find, for example, in the sonnets of Shakespeare, the essays of Montaigne, and the respective 
"autobiographies" of Loyola and Cardano. These examples attest to the confusion and richness of 
such terms as: "subiectum", "self", "anima", "spiritus", "consciousness", "persona", etc., which 
exist not only during the Baroque epoch, but endure into all subsequent historical periods, 
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including our own. The powerful move facilitated by the Cogito formulation, namely the laying 
out of a foundation of mathematical order from which a universal science may be derived, had 
far-ranging and deeply penetrating implications for the modern conception of self. 
On the one hand, the Cogito formulation effectively stabilized the variously and inwardly 
directed, but as yet, not strictly subjectivist conceptions of self in the early modern period, while 
on the other hand, it reduced selfhood to a mere abstraction. The attempt to define a self on the 
basis of strict theoretical terms brings forth a number of problems, not least of all the false 
division between subject and object (on which the sciences operate) and a perpetuation of the 
confusion of the terms self and subject, self and consciousness, etc. Yet, even more 
problematically, the Cogito's legitimating criterion for truth creates in its train an inauthentic 
orientation of self to world as well as poses serious challenges to the possibility of being fully 
human in the modern world.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The dissertation offers a historically-based critique of the foundations of modernity, 
which it does in view of the truth claims that modernity has striven to articulate, and that 
continue to dominate the West. At the very core of this problem are the natural sciences, and it is 
from them that the dominant definition of truth in modernity emanates. Since the entrenchment 
of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century, this definition has extended into an entire 
worldview occasioning and determining the modern mode of existence. Indeed, it was Locke 
who provided the Enlightenment with an explicit method, which depended fundamentally upon 
the Cartesian subject, and which the likes of d’Alembert, Diderot and others fully exploited in 
their attempts to re-conceive knowledge and “to change the common way of thinking.”
1
  
To understand the modern foundation of truth—as exemplified most powerfully in the 
triumph of the natural sciences—it is necessary to turn once again to Descartes’ seminal role in 
the histories of philosophy and science, and specifically his formulation of the Cogito. Descartes 
articulated most forcefully the notion of subjectivity—i.e., the Cogito or a consciousness 
thinking itself—in the mature works of the Discourse (1637) and the Meditations (1641). In 
doing so, he drove home what would become a decisive moment in the history of Western 
thought. These texts, which have long been established as canonical in the history of modern 
thought, serve as the conceptual point of departure from which to advance this critique.   
What I offer here is a critical re-reading of the formulation, Ego cogito—ego (existo) 
along with its attendant assumptions. It must be said from the outset that many of these 
assumptions, if not all, undergird modernity. These assumptions are several and hinge upon a 
                                                          
1
 See the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and the homage given to it in d’Alembert’s 
Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia. Also, Diderot’s entry, “Encyclopedia,” outlines the goals of the 
Enlightenment project as one of utility, technology, and universality. 
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core set of Enlightenment “values” that privilege, if also unthoughtfully, such things as science, 
the economy, equality and democracy, etc. In their various forms, the expression of these 
assumptions reveals in a very complex way how foundational the Cogito has been (and continues 
to be) in determining the modern conception of truth as well as human existence in relation to it. 
Framing the problem of modernity is a difficult one, and yet the question of the autonomous 
individual (making his way within the moral universe) seems to be both fundamental and crucial 
to this problem. The world is in many ways validated by the experience of the individual in terms 
of thoughts, feelings, and indeed, a general disposition to the world in most every sphere of 
activity. And yet, the autonomous individual exists within a rationalized world that has 
determined in advance the limits of activity and, indeed the manner and extent of the expressive 
potential from which an individual may truly be an individual. Chapter 1 thus endeavors to 
explore the question of the autonomous individual as fundamental to the problem of modernity 
as I define it in the dissertation. To this end, it is necessary to engage with some of the post-
modern criticism deployed in relation to the question of individualism. Though there is very little 
disagreement as to the nature and extent of this problem, I want to nuance the question more in 
terms of its historical and cultural foundations. The overriding assumption of the chapter is that 
we continue to be shaped by the Enlightenment’s values and suppositions, which are at the very 
core Cartesian.  
 Indeed, the realization of an array of Enlightenment truths, as with those underpinning 
the autonomy of the individual and the progressive nature of truth, in large part depend upon 
modernity’s understanding of having affected a decisive break with its past. To the modern mind 
such a break makes way for a triumphantly optimistic future. In this sense, the Cogito as well as 
the sciences that generate from it are intrinsically ahistorical. To discover the import and 
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significance of the Cogito as it appears in the mature works of the Discourse and the 
Mediations—and by extension the course that modernity set for itself—it must be read against 
these assumptions to explore the conditions of possibility that at once “ground” the Cogito and 
allow it full expression. Such a reading depends, moreover, that the Cogito be confronted 
fundamentally as a cultural-historical problem. As a cultural historical problem, we are 
emphatically not raising the question of the Cogito as a problem of philosophy, or the history of 
ideas or even a more broadly defined intellectual history. 
As a cultural history, we present “culture” as a heuristic device. As a heuristic, cultures 
allow historians to raise the question of meaning as well as how meanings are created in relation 
to truths; or how meanings harmonize, or conflict or coincide dynamically within the realm of 
moral action. For the purposes of this study, cultures are not understood in terms of “high” or 
“low” culture, but are inclusive of the entire range of human activity expressed by it—thus 
cultures must be viewed as realms of moral action. And as we are concerned primarily with a 
question of meaning, it should be said that cultures emerge within a “horizon” of meaning, which 
is another heuristic device that allows us to understand the dynamics among the various claims to 
meaning that manifest within a culture, and especially how one claim may come to dominance 
over others. Yet, beyond this, the horizon allows us to comprehend the culture as a meaningful 
whole, and within it the various cultural forms that express that meaning. 
A cultural-historical approach to the problem of modernity thus presupposes in the first 
instance the Cogito’s situation within a horizon of meaning; and that the Cogito is itself a 
meaningful expression within the horizon itself. The dynamic within this horizon, which in the 
seventeenth century is both formative and unstable, is integral to understanding the manifestation 
of a Baroque culture as I attempt to define it. In particular, within this dynamic emerges a 
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historically unique understanding of “psychological” interiority, which not only depends upon a 
core-set of values, but also how those values relate in manifold and dynamic ways to a particular 
orientation to life. A value structure, as with one that places emphasis on a particular and 
historically unique type of interiority, is expressed within a cultural horizon, and which aids in 
the comprehension of a culture as a whole. The Baroque is one such horizon. And indeed, it is 
the increased legitimacy of the inner experience that in being deeply value-driven gives to the 
culture of the Baroque its meaning.  
That modern interpretations of the Cogito are in large part determined by the Cogito 
itself, which is to say, by rationalist assumptions; chapter 2 endeavors to suggest the importance 
of a cultural-historical approach to the problem of the Cogito, and especially in a way that is 
authentic to our historicity as individuals and collectives. This is to suggest that we ourselves are 
historical, and that the question of any historical phenomenon depends upon a particular 
interpretative stance that is itself historically conditioned. A cultural-historical approach does not 
attempt to schematize the past in terms of progress, which unintentionally legitimizes the 
present. Rather, in its critically interpretative stance to the present, a cultural history seeks to 
probe into the past to trace the lineage of the present down various pathways to better understand 
the conditional dynamic that shaped the modern moment. As a historical phenomenon, the 
Cogito itself (as with any historical aspect of culture) is an open-site of investigation and 
presents to an historical eye through an array of competing and harmonizing aspects; all of which 
are charged with meaning and significance. The Cogito is in many ways a meaningful 
assemblage of a variety of knowledge traditions, inveterate cultural inclination as well as a 
general and novel orientation toward life. It is with this in mind that we seek to come to terms 
with the Cogito as both a living aspect of our present and our past.   
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What is more, it must be established from the outset that the question of Baroque culture 
is a complex one. To be sure, there is a historiographical problem surrounding the question of the 
Baroque as a cultural designation, and which scholars have struggled to articulate. If the question 
is raised at all, it often directs to concerns of periodization or stylistic attributes and 
technicalities. Moving away from this approach, the dissertation seeks to raise the very difficult 
and elusive problem of modernity by posing it as a cultural-historical problem; and given the 
dynamics by which the Cogito achieved dominance in the determination and grounding of truth, 
it is my hope to initiate a deeper sequence of thought into the dynamics of Baroque culture itself, 
which is I suggested above derives its meaning from an increased legitimacy to the inner 
experience.  
Given this dominant value set hinged on the validity of the inner experience, the turn to 
the Cogito is especially warranted for it is within the domain of the inner-self that the dynamics 
of Baroque culture seem to usher forth. The significance I seek to illuminate is that the Cogito 
formulation represents a particular response to the changing dynamic of the relationship between 
man, world, and God. It was not a foregone conclusion that the Cogito would or should be the 
dominant formulation in what was nothing less than a grand cosmological reorientation. As this 
relates to the Cogito, there are three major lines of inquiry that I seek to illuminate in the 
dissertation: the linguistic/metaphoric; the traditional/philosophic; and the general, value-laden 
orientation that Europeans had towards existence, and as was expressed within a particular 
historical moment. The inquiry into the linguistic and metaphoric aspects of modernity is part of 
a larger essay that addresses Nicholaus Cusanus and Leon Battista Alberti, yet it is perhaps the 
most self-standing section of the dissertation and leads into the question of the Cogito to position 
it within a broader and more inclusive concern of the modern cultural epoch. The second and 
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third lines of inquiry are, in terms of interpretive analysis, not as easily extricated from one 
another. In this sense they are part and parcel of the larger dynamic of Baroque culture whereby 
the inner man attempted to find his way within a world of confused meaning, yet abounding 
possibility. 
The Cogito and Metaphoric Possibility 
I proceed fundamentally on the understanding that the dynamics of Baroque culture are 
thoroughly eidetic, or image-based, which in turn is “re-grounded” in Descartes’ thought in a 
particular way.
2
 This is to say, the problem of the Baroque, and by extension that of modernity, 
hinges upon the problem of the imagination. The larger historical question relates inextricably to 
the dynamics of Baroque culture; and especially as they affect an almost irresistible draw to 
validate the inward experience as it pertained to knowledge and truth. The ways in which this 
took shape in the development of Descartes’ thought from the decade of the 1620s until the 
publication of the Meditations in 1641 is of considerable significance, not least of all because of 
the import it carries for modern science and its claims to truth. The imagination is especially 
significant in these developments, not only as it relates to a derivative form or intuition as 
expressed in mathematical formulae; but also more primordially in its relation to a type of 
openness toward metaphoric possibility.  
Already in the Regulae of 1628, for example, Descartes had begun to work through the 
dynamics of intuition and deduction, and through which he had maintained that knowledge was 
                                                          
2
 It should be stated that I am working within a larger project of major historical change. At the center of 
the project is the question of self-conception, and though those insights should prove fruitful as the larger project 
takes shape, they are too nascent and inchoate for inclusion in the dissertation. I will say that larger project involves 
a more expansive treatment of metaphoric possibility in relation to the vis imaginativa and what I suggest is a radical 
(if tacit) reformulation of the doctrine of the analogia entis. These notions are worked out in the Cartesian 
conception of self, which is itself manifold, complex and confused. In what follows in the introduction, I would to 
briefly present the larger concerns within which the dissertation is a part.   
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intuitively initiated and deductively expanded into a set of principles—which would translate 
effectively into a governing mathesis.
3
 In accordance with this criterion, Heidegger is correct to 
point out that the basic character of modern science is the mathematical, which does not 
necessarily mean mathematics in terms of the strictly numeric. He stresses the significance of the 
Greek terms mathemata and mathesis, by which he understands the two senses of the 
mathematical. He defines these as “that which is learnable” and “learning”, respectively. There 
exists here a dialectic between these terms as well as distinguishable limit. The significance of 
Heidegger’s observation for the modern world is that the learning (mathesis) is no longer a 
thoughtful dwelling on what is learnable (mathemata) as it had been for Plato or Aristotle or 
even the Middle Ages. In this sense the tradition was in thoughtful dialogue with itself, and 
therefore could re-appropriate to itself that which it already knew. Within this act or re-
appropriation the early tradition was thoughtfully engaged with itself. The remarkable 
transformation that modern science affects in this regard is its abandonment of this sense of 
openness to the world so as to redefine the learnable (mathemata) solely in accordance with the 
pre-determinations of learning (mathesis). In other words, the mathesis is projected into the 
world without limit or measure; and not only is openness abandoned, but also the thoughtful 
dialogue between learner (mathesis) and learnable (mathemata). With this formulation, 
Heidegger could say: “Wissenschaft denkt nicht.”
4
 What is more, the projection of the mathesis 
provides the ordering frame of the representational reality, and that truth is now equated (if only 
tacitly) to the ongoing, theoretical manipulation of the representation.  
                                                          
3
 On this point, see Martin Heidegger, “Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics” in Basic 
Writings, ed. David Krell (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 271-310 
4
 “Science does not think.” 
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To return to the Regulae and the question of intuitions as the very basis of a governing 
mathesis, Heidegger’s insights into the mathematical character of modern science powerfully 
suggest man’s reorientation to the world. Insofar as intuitions relate to arithmetical or geometric 
figurations, and which achieve immediacy to the intellect because they are abstracted purely 
from physical bodies (or nature in general), they are nevertheless derivative forms of intuition. 
This is to say that the intuitions that govern the certainty of knowledge in the realm of 
mathematics, fundamentally depend upon the distinctive power of the divine image that dwells 
within us. And though the “idea” of God is known, as it is in the Third Meditation through 
Descartes’ intuitive act of knowing himself as himself (i.e., a res cogitans), it is the power of the 
image that grounds the idea. The image in serving to ground the intuitions that directly undergird 
the mathesis, mediates what Heidegger had called “givenness” (Gegebenheiten), and from which 
the full range of possibility in its finite, human mode is derived. As Descartes remarks in the 
Third Meditation:  
But from this one thing—that God has created me—it is very credible that I have in some 
manner been made in his image and likeness (ad imaginem & similitudinem ejus factum 
esse), in which the idea of God is contained, is perceived by me through the same faculty 
(a me percipi per eandem facultatem) through which I myself am perceived by me: that 
is, when I turn the vision of the mind into myself, not only do I then understand that I am 
a thing incomplete and dependent on another, and a thing indefinitely aspiring to greater 
and greater, or better things, but simultaneously I also understand that he on whom I 
depend has all these greater things in him not just definitely and potentially, but rather 
according to the thing itself infinitely, and thus he is God…[and] in the contemplation of 
God himself, to reflect within me on his attributes and to intuit, to admire and to adore 
the beauty of his immense light, so far as my darkened mind will be able to bear it. For 
just as we believe by faith that the highest felicity of the other life consists solely in the 
contemplation of the divine majesty, so also do we know by experience that the maximal 
pleasure of which we would be capable in this life can now be perceived from the same—
it is granted—much less perfect contemplation.  
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The Cogito, as the ground for knowledge and truth in modernity, presupposes this 
fundamental intuition, which I would like to suggest is a type of poetic intuition and relates to the 
expressive possibility of the metaphoric. This is to suggest further that the formative dynamics 
behind the Cartesian project are purely “poetical,” which is to say that they are eminently 
creative, and thus serve as a type of grounding possibility for thought and action. What is more, 
these formative dynamics manifest through the mediating power of the metaphor, which governs 
and allows a historical world not only to appear, but also allows the vibrant potentialities for an 
authentic human existence to manifest in myriad ways.  
The mediating metaphor in question is that of the microcosm, or parvus mundus, as 
expressed famously in Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s Oratio de hominis dignitate. The Oratio 
reveals such a metaphor at work, and which is (as I maintain) the generative and operative 
metaphor of the modern cultural epoch, which includes not only the Baroque, but L’Âge 
classique (its Enlightenment manifestation) as well as the age of the Renaissance. Indeed, in the 
Oratio Pico illuminates through a type of poetic intuition the means by which man extracts for 
himself the divine image, so as to become a type of “creator god,” and who in turn directs and 
channels those vibrant and creative energies through the full range of human action. It is the 
divine image as impressed upon the souls of man (as the Imago Dei) that becomes operative 
through the modern cultural epoch, and which derives its power through the modes of the 
imaginative faculty; but significantly also, always within a cultural framework. 
The metaphoric dynamic in its generative mode is in many ways a primordial act, and is 
thus done prior to the res cogitans or “the consciousness thinking itself.” Thus the reflection 
upon the intuited idea of God—i.e., the meditative act that traditionally led to full contemplation 
of the divine majesty—is already touched by the original, poetic intuition, and moreover finds its 
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empowerment through the image of the microcosm. This is the purely generative imagination, 
and as such, it is the ground of the subjectivity that equates as the Cogito and makes possible the 
intuitive moves that undergird the method. The essence of subjectivity, which Descartes 
recognizes and defines as finite and non-extended, is effectively made through this primal, 
intuitive image to become itself the horizon to affect the infinite—which is to say, it is the 
ground on which knowledge advances, always in the infinite expansion and perfection of the 
representation. It creates in its own image; it is the subjective inversion of the analogia entis.  
The very possibility not only of the Cogito, but the whole of the modern cultural epoch depends 
upon this linguistic and metaphorical dynamic. 
Re-conceiving the Inner Life 
The critical effort proposed in the dissertation is in large part pursuant to the centrality in 
the modern world of a “metaphysics of subjectivity.” We proceed, moreover, on the 
understanding that the “problem of the subject” (as it is known in certain circles) forms a rich 
sub-history within the metaphysical tradition. With the unfolding of this tradition, the 
hypokeimenon—understood here in the Aristotelian sense as “that which everywhere already lies 
before”—yields to a notion of subject, and thence to subjectivity. This study, however, 
endeavors to move beyond the internal history of metaphysics most notably deployed by 
Heidegger in such a way as to broaden and supplement the ambit of its primary concerns. By 
turning to the problem of culture, and specifically to the Baroque as a unique cultural epoch, we 
are posing the question of modernity in a fundamental way. To pose the problem through a 
cultural-historical heuristic is to acknowledge that there always exists in a specific culture an 
underpinning value structure, which not only determines meaning (as expressed through actions 
and thoughts), but also thereby delineates a specific mode of human existence. These modes are 
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in many ways historically unique. In raising he problem of the subject (Cogito) as a significant 
cultural-historical concern is to be in dialogue with the exceedingly rich (and related) sub-history 
of the interiore homine, or inner man.  The notion of the interiore homine originated with Plato, 
found its most elaborate articulation with Augustine and; and as we shall see, has endured 
through the early modern period into the present.  
The notion of an Augustinian conception of self, which focused especially on the triadic 
powers of the soul—i.e., memory, understanding and the will, and as activated (and in many 
ways realized) through the imago Dei—becomes integral to our analysis. Augustine had 
predicated knowledge of the divine on a detailed and rigorous exploration of the depths of the 
internal (interum aeternum). The exploration takes shape throughout the Augustinian corpus, yet 
it is with De vera religione that he articulated the notion most directly: “Do not wander outside, 
but return into yourself for the truth dwells in man’s interiority” (Noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi. 
In interiore homine habitat veritas). Thereby Augustine established the interiore homine as the 
crucial mediating factor in the striving for and discovery of truth. Descartes and the Cogito are 
thus intimately entwined within a living tradition, which moreover, is conveyed (and in large part 
shaped) by an array of ever-changing cultural dynamics. What is more, by pursuing this path of 
inquiry opened by the interiore homine, we place the Cogito within the broad tradition of “self-
writings,” which occasions (and in a fruitful way, I think) the opportunity to envision a notion of 
selfhood within a particular historical world while taking fully into consideration the motivating 
value structure; its meaning and significance; and the language through which it was mediated.  
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As the scholarship of Gilson, Gouhier, Sirven and Menn
5
 et al have shown, there is no 
question of the significant influence that the writings of Augustine had upon the seventeenth 
century in general and Descartes in particular. And recognizing that there was most certainly a 
tradition of Augustinianism, and with it an array of specific “Augustines” and “Augustinianisms” 
on which to model a concept of self, the Cogito is emphatically not an Augustinian self. The 
differences depend fundamentally upon the cultural-historical manifestation of how a self not 
only envisioned its world (and its place within that world), but also how it oriented to a dominant 
and grounding notion of truth. The resultant understanding reflects also how a particular form of 
self-conception understood and articulated a good life as well as envisioned a path that promised 
the greatest possibility for its fulfillment—namely the attainment of the Good. The way I 
formulate the problem of the interiore homine in the dissertation allows not only for an 
examination of the Cogito vis-à-vis the Augustinian model, which remained significant within 
the tradition; it also allows us to view that model as mediated through Scholasticism etc. so as to 
raise a whole different set of significant questions. In offering a strong definition of culture (as 
shaped by a value structure), it becomes possible to pose questions of meaning and significance, 
which depend fundamentally upon a value-laden orientation toward the world. Descartes’ 
relation to an Augustinian model of self-conception—articulated either tacitly or explicitly—
assumes a new significance that in turn allows for the opportunity to explore the dynamics of 
human existence in a markedly changing world. Despite its success or lack of success, the model 
presents itself in striking ways as Descartes worked through the project of establishing 
knowledge and truth on a new foundation. At one level the juxtaposition of an Augustinian with 
                                                          
5
 Étienne Gilson, La liberté chez Descartes et la théologie (Paris: Vrin, 1913); J. Sirven, Les annees 
d’apprentissage de Descartes: 1596-1628 (Albi: Imprimerie Cooperative, 1928); Henri Gouhier, Les premieres 
pensees de Descartes: Contributions a l’histoire de l’anti-Renaissance (Paris: J. Vrin, 1958); Stephen Menn, 
Descartes and Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 
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a Cartesian notion of self provides a sort of concrete referent, and thus bases our claims within a 
broad range of cultural-historical development. What is more, however, the exploration of the 
Cogito as a decisive moment within this sub-history establishes that the problem of the subject is 
central to the question of the Baroque.  
The movement inward, and thus the validation it carries for the conditions of living and 
thinking, is a hallmark, if not also the underpinning assumption in the general orientation of 
existence during the Baroque epoch. Examples of this trend range from the “spiritual exercises” 
of the Jesuit novitiate, the “poem of the mind” as exemplified by any number of lyrical poets, the 
soliloquy in the dramatic arts, and the sense of deep emotional appeal as affected by a 
Caravaggio; or a stirring moment in the Jesuit street theatre. Of course, the inner validation in 
question extends to more intellectualist approaches as well. The emphasis that the late-
Scholastics placed upon “psychological” processes, i.e., the powers or faculties of the rational 
soul (animus), is a case in point; and the continuity that Descartes bears with this tradition is 
especially significant. For within these late-Scholastic debates, psychological emphases (insofar 
as they related to the powers of intellection) subsumed the traditional language of the subjectum, 
yet in a way that bespeaks transformation of the original meaning.  
For Aristotle, the subjectum—or in his language, the hypokeimenon—assumed two modal 
distinctions: the referential (en hypokeimenon/de re) and the attributive (kath’ hypokeimenon/de 
dicto). The referential mode of a thing dictates that though it predicates of or may be found in a 
subject, it is not affirmed of it. In other words, were talking of a substance as substance. 
Conversely, the attributive mode asserts that both the definition and the predicates of a thing are 
not only affirmed of the subject, they are also, at the level of substance (ousia), inextricable. 
There is, then, with the hypokeimenon, a clear distinction between two modalities: the one 
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categorical and the other substantial. And, though substance is itself one of the categories, it also 
transcends them. The Scholastics, in large part, retained this distinction; yet for them Being was 
nevertheless unified at both the level of the categorical as well as that of substance to the extent 
that it was contained within a theological frame. With increased emphasis upon the intellective 
powers of the soul, the traditional language of the subjectum becomes confused and conceptually 
reconstituted, and to the extent that the attributive mode unified in a particular way with 
questions regarding the intelligibility of things as delineated and determined by the interior 
powers of cognition. The Cartesian notion of the mathesis universalis worked out in the Regulae 
is a case in point; and which is a more thoroughly detailed version of the method that appeared in 
the Discourse. The subjectum as it develops in the Discourse and Meditations presupposed the 
moves deployed in the Regulae in such a way that its defining attribute of “thinking” is more 
definitive in terms of its ability to reason well on the basis of an unshakeable foundation.  
Yet, the learned approaches in defining and characterizing this inward movement were 
accretions, or epiphenomena, of something decidedly more manifold—even primordial. The 
suggestion here is that there was a larger cultural dimension in which these manifestations took 
root; and the specific problematic with which Descartes had begun to engage with in the late-
1610s—namely a question of a unified wisdom in the sciences—was situated very much within 
these larger currents. His writings not only reflect these larger, cultural trends, they assumed an 
exceedingly influential place in the transformation of the intellectual tradition of the West 
wherein the conditions of truth and the principles by which they are established were redefined 
and reasserted in decisive ways. The resultant transformation exhibited itself in manifold and 
diverse ways, as for example: through the novel forms within the plastic and performative arts; 
the new ways of thinking and doing within the realms of the political, social and religious; and of 
15 
 
course in the variously new ways of being human within a world that—if upheld against its 
medieval precedent—found that earlier world no longer to make sense or its truths no longer to 
hold.  
Descartes’ indisputable influence upon the development of philosophy and science, and 
by extension modernity, reveals that he is very much our contemporary, and thus it becomes 
necessary to address the modern mode of existence in light of the Cogito. His contributions in 
the areas of geometry, mechanics, and metaphysics, along with the array of issues discussed with 
his learned correspondents regarding the natural world and its metaphysical underpinnings, in 
many ways set the stage for the course the modern sciences would ultimately take. Yet, the 
significance of Descartes vis-à-vis the overall history of the West extends even further. In the 
Sixth Discourse, for example, he informs us that his newly devised method had allowed him 
some satisfaction in resolving certain difficulties in the speculative sciences (mainly mathematics 
and physics) as well as providing a means to regulate his morals (régler mes moeurs). In what 
would become a complete reworking of the Aristotelian distinction of the theoretical, practical 
and productive sciences, Descartes thereby advanced a notion of method that served as the 
mediating mechanism in the acquisition of truth as well as the unifying structure that lay behind 
not only the multiple and ever-expanding avenues of knowledge, but also it shaped profoundly 
the modern mode of human existence as well as the possibilities for being fully human. The 
success of the method is thus connected intimately to a question of action within the world—
which is to say, it is a moral concern. And as Descartes tells us, the purpose of seeking 
knowledge in the sciences is for the “general good of all men” (le bien général de tous les 
hommes), which again, is fundamentally a moral concern, and which is now tied intimately to the 
question of utility. Descartes in the Discourse, especially, but in relation to the other texts, gives 
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a particular expression of self-conception in the Baroque world. Given the broader tradition of 
life writings, the striking aspect of the Cogito is a particular type to life writing is that it is 
thoroughly confused by traditional precedents for truth, along with traditional models of self-
conception, that couple with a sort of joie de vivre and revaluation of the world as well as man’s 
place within it. In this confusion, the Cogito is also thoroughly misdirected. 
A broader consideration of the sub-history of the interiore homine as it manifested and 
developed within the horizon of Baroque culture reveals that there were a number of 
“subjective,” but as yet, not definitively “subjectivist” notions of self. The somewhat conflicted 
notions of a subjectum (as an essential ground or foundation) and a subjectus (in the sense of 
bringing or being under the control of) manifest in the learned discourse in a way that played 
homage to the traditional concerns of logic. In this discourse there was a strong thread of concern 
devoted to a type of logic that, though fundamentally Aristotelian became critical of the 
Scholastic mode of deductive reasoning as an expository device in elucidating already accepted 
truths. Humanist forms of logic, of which those of Philipp Melanchthon and Peter Ramus are 
among the most famous and influential. The humanist logicians oriented away from a strict 
syllogistic that referred back to established ontological categories deployed mainly as a 
pedagogical and rhetorical devices in the elucidation of truths, and more toward an applicable 
procedure—via what was known as a thema—for the exploration of the constituted structure of 
knowledge and the connections therein. Renaissance and late Scholastic forms of logic were 
intimately wed to a notion of memory, which where oriented to the re-discovery of ancient 
truths, as for example, the Lullist form. This development alone is remarkable for the direction 
the tradition took during a decisive moment in its history. Yet, it must be stated that during this 
epoch the very notion of a subjectum is richly confused and often difficult to delineate; which is 
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again evidenced in the learned treatises—as illustrated through the likes of Ramus, Keckermann 
and Goclenius (and even Cajetan as an earlier member emblematic of these late-Scholastic 
trends).  
These logical-metaphysical concerns (of which he is most certainly a direct descendent as 
well as a contributor) are an accretion of a larger cultural dynamic. As this dynamic pertains to a 
notion of self-conception, however, the hallmark of experience for the “subjectum” is derived 
solely from the fact that the experience is inwardly validated. Of course, much of the Aristotelian 
language of the Categories is retained along with the basic assumptions; namely the en 
hypokeimeno in which the predicate is an individual subject (e.g. man is a mammal) as well as 
the kath’ hypokeimenon in which the predicate assumes the substance of its subject (e.g., the 
mammal is green). In view of the culture dynamics of the modern cultural epoch (and some ways 
before), the traditional Aristotelian notion of the hypokeimenon—as the intelligible substance 
that accidents subject to; and “that everywhere already lies before”—became transformed and 
blurred as philosophers and logicians increasingly came to understand the subjectum as an 
isolated and determinate domain in which to assess and understand things (species) as they are 
objectively (esse obiective) given to the intellect (ut datur de anima).  
Generally speaking for this late medieval and Renaissance world, the objects outside the 
intellect are “real” and constitutive of a metaphysical reality (entia realia).  As such, the object 
as given to the intellect, via a concept, has its own power. Moreover, it moves through aisthēsis 
to determine the domain of cognition to which the intellect conforms. With Descartes—
following this directive and in a decidedly Ramist vein—these distinctions play out in the Cogito 
(as a res cogitans or thinking substance), which collapses the traditional distinction into a 
defining attribute (thought) together with an array of attributive modes (believing, willing, 
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doubting, thinking). Nevertheless, the subjectum, as a substance, remains insofar as it is 
presupposed by that which inheres within it. The question of subjectum is especially interesting, 
and factors too into the larger considerations of Baroque culture; and which should be opened to 
a wider ambit of consideration in order to appreciate the radical moves undertaken through the 
Cogito formulation. With that in mind, Montaigne (and Pascal) are perhaps the leading lights.   
In Book I of the Essays, Montaigne expressed the tension of this movement between an 
inner self and an outer self in the face of traditional modes of action. On the one hand, he 
conveys the deeps sense of obligation he had to public life as a noble dutiful subject of the king. 
On the other hand, he expresses the deep sense of responsibility he had to himself, especially in 
regard to the legitimacy of his experiences as a private person, indeed the inner “subject” within 
which those experiences inhered. In Book II, the relationship between the traditionally “fuller” 
life of the public servant and the privative one of exile (albeit to the contemplative gaze from 
within a library) transforms from tension to harmony. The language he uses illustrates this: “I 
have not made my book any more than my book has made me, a book consubstantial with its 
author” [Je n’ay pas plus faict mon livre que mon livre m’a faict, livre consunstantiel à son 
autheur]. It is, of course, notable that Montaigne employed the deeply significant theological 
term, “consubstantial” to denote the unity of this relationship. In accordance with the theological 
language employed, the unity is achieved because both book and author share the same 
substance, which is to say that the metaphysical “whatness” that “stands” under book and author 
is common to both. Yet, the relationship that Montaigne describes throughout the Essais is not at 
all “static,” but rather, is especially dynamic.  And not unlike the tensions he described between 
an official public role and a deeply stirred private life, Montaigne’s use of the doctrinally 
charged term, consubstantial, reflects very much a traditional world, though one within an 
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exceedingly vibrant flux. The “subject” of the book and the “subject” to which the book 
predicates are meaningfully linked, and almost to the extent that they are interchangeable. The 
realization of the one is the realization of the other. The confused and yet harmonious 
relationship of a man and his world, as expressed through this “consubstantiality” of book and 
author, derives its meaning from a particular dynamic in which there is no fixed center; and thus 
the subject of book and author is constantly made, unmade and remade again.  
The example of Montaigne serves as an alternate form of self-conception, which in the 
extended project serves to show how the invigoration of the faculty of the imagination—in a 
strikingly novel way—transforms in Baroque culture to be the ground of possibility for thought 
and action. The vis imaginativa as articulated in the Regulae had transformed the faculty from an 
imaginative-memory in which knowledge of self and God came from an ordered act of 
recollection, and toward imaginative-intellection where the imagination underwrites the intuitus 
and thereby engenders the possibility for knowledge of self, God and world. What is more, the 
reinvigoration of the imaginative is expressive in the meditative literature of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. These meditative accounts were modeled on a fascinating array of ancient 
and medieval precedents, e.g., medieval saintly and mystical lives, Stoical meditative accounts, 
and Epicurean self-portrayals etc. And yet, these were most certainly not simple imitations of 
antique and medieval precedents. If there is said to be a universality of the Baroque self, it is 
perhaps the magnificent array of particularities by which it is expressed, and which continually 
change and thus force that self to a constant redefinition of itself.  
Thus the Cogito in aligning itself in a particular way with the Augustinian model 
represents one possibility among many. And that there were various possibilities for self-
conception within the Baroque world—as one may find, for example, in the sonnets of 
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Shakespeare, the essays of Montaigne, and the respective “autobiographies” of Cardano and 
Loyola—the suggestion is that the relationship between man and a (cultural) world is 
exceedingly dynamic. Why could there be so many expressive possibilities? How could several 
possibilities co-exist (but only for a short while)? And how could one form become dominant 
over the others? I suggest that this dynamical relationship fundamentally depends upon the 
openness to the possibilities for life as expressed through the vibrant and generative metaphor of 
the microcosm. Among the invigorating forces within the Renaissance and Baroque worlds—
which is to say the modern cultural epoch—the Cogito represents one possibility of self-
conception that nevertheless became dominant; and even to the extent of marginalizing other 
forms, if not consigning them utterly to oblivion. This is to say that through an understanding of 
the in potentia dynamics of the cultural horizon of the modern epoch, we can begin to understand 
and to appreciate not only the Cogito’s criterion for meaning, significance and truth, but most 
especially the conditions of possibility wherein it found full expression. This becomes a fruitful 
avenue to begin thinking of Baroque culture in itself, as well as its comparison to the Italian 
Renaissance. Both are cultural expressions of the modern epoch, and are generated by the same 
metaphoric possibility. Whereas the Italian Renaissance was a cultural totality, the Baroque is 
decidedly not so. Not only should the cultural totality of the Renaissance serve as that by which 
other cultures should take their measure; the question of both cultures’ “proximity” to the 
generative metaphor of the microcosm becomes problematic. In this sense, the differences cannot 
be merely stylistic. There is something much more elusive at work there.  
On the basis of this larger question of self-conception, the final chapter of the dissertation 
(chapter 5) seeks to establish one way through which to examine the dynamics by which a 
uniquely Baroque culture came to phenomenalize. In this chapter, I turn to the dream account, 
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and though I do not offer an in-depth reading of the Cartesian dream of 10-11 November 1619, I 
seek to place it within a larger cultural frame with an eye toward a particular species of 
problematic dream phenomena (the demonic dream) that appeared within the early modern 
world. This dream reflects a larger problem where the entire cosmological edifice had been 
called into doubt along with the sustaining meaning structure. The Baroque world (and certainly 
this is true for Descartes) at once problematizes the dream (as merely an affection of 
consciousness). The problem forces a redefinition of what is meant by the nature of thought; 
which again places in doubt the whole edifice of reality (and with it an array of traditional 
assumptions about truth). The dream phenomenon must be addressed in view of the validity of 
the inner experience as well as the decaying meaningfulness of the tradition—the Cartesian 
dream reveals these tensions.  
With this chapter I have begun to work through dynamics by which the dream brings into 
relief a novel orientation to life (especially in terms of the validity of the inner experience) in 
confrontation with a cosmological order that is not yet entirely meaningless. The dream reveals 
in a particular way the pre-modern confrontation with the primal forces of life in the wake of the 
increasing collapse of the traditional meaning structure. The confrontation occurred in direct 
relation to a particular set of value orientations, which were (and are) mediated through the 
metaphoric possibility outlined and discussed in chapter 3. What the Cartesian dream reveals is 
an array of traditional concerns for meaning and significance that are, alas, fluid and unanchored 
being adrift, as they were, from a traditional ground of truth. The dream becomes for Descartes a 
confrontation with moral inaction, especially as it related to the cultural problem of knowledge 
and uncertainty. The Cartesian dream retains (with considerable confusion) much of the 
significance associated with the general oneiric tradition, i.e, the construal of the dream as a 
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mirror, or a vision, or a portal to deeper meanings and deeper truths. Yet, when the undergirding 
cosmological reality was called into question—as it was with Descartes—the dream itself is left 
unanchored, and becomes part of the incoherent flux of the Baroque world. The dream for 
Descartes may or may not be of divine origin, but he certainly gives us to understand that the 
dream contains within it a deep-seated angst, perhaps even a particular type of tragic vision, 
which forced him to confront his deepest fears and desperations in the only way he saw fit to do 
so.
6
  
What I seek to show is that the dream is a conflicted space where traditional meaning 
structures appear in tension against novel motivations and possibilities. The early modern dream 
emerges most forcefully in either of what I call a theatrical or a meditative mode, both of which 
had bearing on the ontological problematic as it manifested in early modernity, but in different 
ways. Descartes’ dreams, as one might expect, are more meditative, and thus the dream 
problematic presents here more intimately within the tradition of the interiore homine.  
The significance of Descartes’ dream experiences hinges not only on the fact that he 
found himself amid ambiguity, which is itself unsettling and disconcerting (a fact not surprising 
considering the taxonomical class of dream Descartes experienced); but also that within the 
ambiguity and obscurity of the dream state, Descartes’ struggled to reveal and play-out cultural 
tensions as to the definition of truth; how that truth is known; and how knowledge of it directs 
thoughts and actions. For Descartes, these early experiences seem to reveal that dreams continue 
to occupy for him an ontological middle ground, just as they had for his medieval predecessors. 
This is something that should fully call our attention.  
                                                          
6
 Note: I have no intention of offering a psychological reading. 
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The problem of the dream thus occasions the opportunity to think our way through those 
difficult and mysterious depths amid a moment of cultural crisis. On the one hand, and as some 
of the best scholarship on Descartes’ dreams attests,
7
 it is the dreams themselves that occupy a 
somewhat emblematic place in considering the foundations of modernity. Dreams are subsumed 
within a moment where rationalism in the form of the Cogito is seemingly awakened and the 
new conditions of truth are confidently, if inchoately asserted. On the other hand, the power of 
the dream lay not as much within its function as an emblem than as an allegorical representation 
that attempts to reveal how one should act within a confused world that in many ways no longer 
made sense. As Benjamin has shown in his treatment of the Trauerspiele, the concept of the 
allegorical in a Baroque mode is especially apt; and it is the relation of this notion to the dream 
that certain markedly epistemological concerns come into striking relief amid the broader 
cultural dynamics surrounding it.
8
  
Benjamin’s concept of the allegorical derives in the first instance from his criticism of the 
Romantic notion of the symbol. The Romantic notion of the symbolic requires some sense of a 
unified totality between the material and the transcendental realms. In contradistinction to this, 
                                                          
7
 On the general approach to dreams, see for instance, Siegmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, 
trans., James Strachey (New York: 1965); Carl Jung, “General Aspects of Dream Psychology” and “On the Nature 
of Dreams” in Collected Works (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); for the historical approach to dreams, 
especially in relation to the dreamer’s “inner life,” see the collection edited by Daniel Pick and Lyndal Roper, 
Dreams and History: The Interpretation of Dreams from Ancient Greece to Modern Psychoanalysis (New York: 
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Modern Philosophy (Lexington Books: 2004); Gregor Sebba, The Dream of Descartes (Carbondale, Illinois: 
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or the Awakening of the Philosopher,” in Cartesian Questions: Method and Metaphysics (Chicago: 1999), 1-19.     
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 Benjamin, The Origin of the German Tragic Drama in the Baroque. 
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Benjamin endeavored to show the dynamic of the allegorical at the temporal level, and not 
necessarily as a mediator between the material and the transcendental. This, in some ways, is a 
reformulation of certain, old religious impulses that are given new meaning. This meaning 
derives not vis-à-vis a transcendent reality, but within a worldly and historical context, and 
especially one fraught with death, suffering and melancholia. The aura of transcendence and its 
relation to truth and Being, as it pertained to Dante’s Beatrice, for example, is lost; and in its 
place, as Benjamin suggests, the “gaze” now finds in its view the facies hippocratica; or in other 
words, the petrified, fallen and sickly face of a dying and death-ridden world.
9
  
Placed in relation to the tradition of the interiore homine the allegory pertains to the 
dream in a complex and dynamic way. Though the Olympic dreams present traditional 
allegorical signs (and often with their associated traditional meanings), they are nevertheless 
disjointed and diffuse being disconnected from the traditional edifice of meaning. Yet, what is 
most striking about Descartes’ dream sequence is that, in retaining its medieval heritage, the 
dream becomes an allegory itself in instructing the youthful Descartes to right, moral action. 
Indeed, unlike a symbol, the allegory directs towards the world and commands a certain moral 
action. With this in mind, the Olympic dreams serve an allegorical-poetic function in what will 
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 Benjamin, 103. I agree fundamentally with Benjamin as to this basic shift; though with qualification, as 
shall become apparent below. The dream calls into question, and in a direct way, the epistemological problem 
specific to the early modern period, and thus establishes its significance as a direct heir to Parmenides and the 
inextricable relationship of knowledge to being. This is the path my own analysis takes given the significance of the 
history of metaphysics with which Descartes is not only an integral part, but thoroughly engaged. The question of 
aesthetic ideas and their expression in phenomena—dramatic or otherwise—as Benjamin observed in the Ursprung 
is tied at one level to the epistemological, especially when formulated in terms of a Crocean aesthetic, which places 
an aesthetic intuition not only at the basis of the practical and expressive forms of art forms per se, but also at the 
core of reality itself. However, the pervasive power of Benjamin’s analysis lies deeper still—namely in the 
primordiality of language, which undergirds these more derivative expressions. For Benjamin and the cultural form 
of the Trauerspiel, the Baroque phenomenalizes itself in a particular way, and similar to the dream it also brings 
forth a particular reality—a reality which is at once confused, opaque and yet oddly familiar vis-à-vis the traditional 
elements contained within it. The function of the allegory in the Baroque empowers old forms in decidedly new 
ways. Most fundamentally, it does so as a worldly phenomenon, and serves not as a referent to a grounding supra-
sensible reality or to a transcendent other. The confused world is the medium through which poetic power and 
potential is conveyed. In this sense, this reality—this mundus ambiguum—creatively lives and thrives im Wesen des 
Wortes.     
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develop as a creative confrontation with an uncertain world. And thus, the dream represents a 
complex and confused dynamic—a mundus ambiguum—that is worked through and resolved on 
the validating terms offered and demanded by the inner experience.  
The Discourse and the Meditations will incorporate the dream within the “fable of 
modernity” as a sort of triumphal moment whereby the uncertainties expressed by the dream are 
overcome by the Cogito and its new foundation for truth. Yet, the youthful dreams relay more of 
a sense of a tragic vision that includes within it contradiction and uncertainty, as well as what 
Benjamin had described in relation to the Trauerspiele as montage, pastiche, and irony. The 
dream as a contested space presents for Descartes as a vexed attempt to reconcile the demands 
for certainty with particular aspects of the traditional past. The dream becomes the battleground 
on which to find a foundation for moral purpose, and thus occasions a definitively poetic act to 
overcome and save the dreamer from utter despair. The poetic act thus yields one illusion to save 
itself from another—the mathesis of modern science.  
To give the reader a sense of the argument of the dissertation, the general flow of the 
chapters will proceed as follows. The first chapter attempts to raise the question of modernity by 
turning to the notion of the modern, autonomous individual. Both autonomy and individuality are 
among the constellation of Enlightenment values that have shaped the modern world. The 
undergirding assumption in this first chapter is that the individual is a theoretical abstraction, the 
basis of which in large part determines the modern mode of existence. The turn to Descartes in 
chapter two seeks to pose the problem of modernity by formulating the Cogito as a cultural 
historical problem, which it does, first, by defining the heuristic of a culture, and second, by 
situating the cultural-historical approach within the historiography pertaining to the Baroque. 
Chapter three turns to the modern cultural epoch as a whole to position the Cogito within the 
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larger cultural dynamic of the Italian Renaissance. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s Oratio 
serves as the site of inquiry to open the question of possibility as mediated and actuated by the 
metaphor of the microcosm.  
Chapter four returns to the Cogito in placing it within the history of self-conception, and 
particularly the influential sub-history of the interiore homine as most powerfully associated with 
Augustine. The tentative conclusion of chapter four finds that though the Cogito is expressive of 
the metaphorical dynamic of the microcosm, it is nevertheless not a self (but rather a 
subjectivity) insofar as it denies itself reciprocity with its world. The lack of reciprocity and the 
emergence of a hyper-subjectivity seem to force the question of a shifting cultural dynamic. 
Chapter five turns to the problem of the dream in early modern Europe by also looking at the 
specific sequence of dreams Descartes experienced in Ulm during November 1619. By raising 
the question of the dream, we seek not to view it at as part of a rationalist overcoming as 
mandated in the Meditations, but a particular moment in the opening of the Baroque world.  
Given this introduction, I hope to have offered the reader a general sense of my larger 
historical concerns to rethink the Cogito in view of the problem of modernity, which in many 
ways equate to one another. By opening those concerns to the cultural problematic of the 
Baroque, I hope to arrive at a fuller explanation of the ground of possibilities operative within it, 
and which occasioned the modern self as the ground of science, truth and the modern mode of 
existence as a whole.
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Problem of Modernity 
I have no more made my book than my book has made me—a book 
consubstantial with its author, concerned with my own self, an integral 
part of my life; not concerned with some third-hand, extraneous purpose, 
like other books. 
—Montaigne
10
 
 
Wrangling with the Question of Modernity 
Despite the efforts of over two centuries of criticism, the dominance of the modern, 
scientific definition of truth (and indeed the whole of the Enlightenment project itself) remains 
largely unshaken.
11
  This dominance not only serves to illustrate the persistence, but the 
pervasive depth to which the sustaining truth claims of modernity have penetrated the Western 
mind. Such claims to truth presuppose certain fundamental assumptions on which the legitimacy 
of those verities is determined. These assumptions are so thoroughly entrenched that together 
with the typically addressed modalities of the modern (rationalism, the nation state, the sciences, 
capitalism, etc.), it is safe to assume that the very notion of modernity seems exceedingly 
obvious. Whether we choose to endorse it, vehemently attack it, or merely observe it, the notion 
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 Essays, II.18. All references and citations from the Essays derive from The Complete Essays of 
Montaigne, trans. Donald M. Frame (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976). 
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 One need only turn to the work of Weber, Heidegger, Derrida and Foucault et al to get a sense of the 
form these criticisms of have taken in the twentieth century. Of course, a critical note is readily discernible with 
Johann Herder, Goethe, Hegel, Marx and a host of others long before the postmodern criticism took form.    
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of modernity enjoys an uncritical familiarity.
 12
 Quite simply, we know already what modernity 
is; and with this complacency comes the usual recirculation of arguments either glorifying the 
benefits or condemning the detriments of the modern age—both of which, it must be said, 
unwittingly justify an arguably over-determined notion of truth.  To illustrate this, one may turn 
to any number of current academic debates where considerations of what is viewed as the 
“dominant paradigm” of modernity are widely pervasive.
13
  These considerations are supported 
by an array of theoretical approaches, especially vis-à-vis the recent investment in such 
categories as globalism and multiculturalism, and are employed not only to discredit the term 
entirely, but to lay siege to the normalizing, totalizing and homogenizing tendencies within the 
narrative of modernity itself. Despite the interrogation of modernity and the deployment of 
sophisticated and well-intentioned criticisms against it, the majority of recent scholarship has 
been unsuccessful at both defining modernity and establishing it as a problem beyond the usual 
and familiar formulations.  The mounting criticism against modernity, especially what appears to 
be an effort to assault and dismantle it, remains quite ironically, an unwitting employment of the 
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 The scholarly literature addressing modernity and its various aspects is, not surprisingly, vast, and is thus 
far too expansive to list, yet what is seen as the “dominant paradigm” of modernity is typically understood in the 
negative and usually in reference to those cultures, geographical areas, or even historical epochs that have been 
victimized, subordinated, or made to conform to western models of thought and practice. This is true, and in a 
number of ways; but I question both the depth of these analyses and the post-colonialist rhetoric in which it is often 
couched. See for example, Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, ed., Alternative Modernities (Durham: Duke, 2001) and 
Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, ed., Multiple Modernities (New York: Transaction Publishers: 2002).  The essays collected in 
these volumes represent an attempt to go beyond the standard concerns of periodization and to demonstrate both the 
heterogeneous and global character of modernity, and from this perspective to reconsider the normative claims of 
the traditional, western conception of modernity.  In exploring the various “guises of modernity”, it seems that both 
of these collections are post-colonial attempts to attack a strictly western notion of modernity, which in its various 
ways, has bedeviled the rest of the world.  These analyses have not questioned modernity on a fundamental level nor 
have they endeavored to reassess the category beyond their multicultural agenda. In the end, the problem of 
modernity has not been raised, and moreover, the conventional category of modernity, under which these analyses 
operate, has been obfuscated and perhaps needlessly trivialized.        
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general theoretical apparatuses of modernity, which, again derive from a complex of 
fundamental assumptions that lay at the very core of the modern mode of existence.  Modernity 
thus becomes justified in the very terms of modernity.
14
  This is to say the problem of modernity, 
whether formulated in terms of history, anthropology, sociology, literature etc., effectively 
reduces the problem to an object of scholarship, whereby data and information are gathered and 
collected and, furthermore, made to conform to the theoretical assumptions at work (though not 
always consciously realized) within the various bodies of knowledge in the modern world.  
What is more, modernity in its hyper-concern for the present moment and, moreover, for 
the realization of the possibilities within it, orders the world—indeed, reality—by dissecting and 
categorizing it in accordance to strictly formulated theoretical principles.
15
  At first glance, this 
by itself is not especially unusual.  Where the European mind of the seventeenth century is 
distinctive derives in large part from a summoning of desire to dominate, subjugate and possess; 
yet more significantly, the “summoning” is here understood as an act of will grounded in a 
subjectivist epistemology, which is further underpinned by theoretical principles of its own 
devising through and by which all ordering actions within the world are justified. Moreover, the 
driving concern for this subjectivist epistemology is the endeavor toward an objective and 
unbiased knowledge, the attainment of which, problematically depends upon the subject taking 
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 On this point especially, see Benjamin Sax, The Question Concerning Modernity (forthcoming).  
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 This is less a problem of categorization and ordering, at least in a general sense, than a problematic 
directly concerning that which undergirds the ordering process (mathesis).  The ancient concept of theōria (θεωρία), 
which Plato in the Republic and Aristotle in the Ethics define in relation to praxis, exists in modernity not only in 
truncation, but assumes a highly aggressive form.  Aristotle understood theoria as an action derivative of nous, and 
thus the best of all actions disposed in the attainment of arête (excellence) and eudaimonia (as a type of human 
flourishing).  As Hannah Arendt has shown (see below, Human Condition), modernity completely divorces theōria 
from its ethical dimension, and moreover, reduces theōria to hypothesis (ὑπόθεσις), which is effectively a 
methodology, a set of axioms or a conceptual framework to which phenomena must now conform. It is no longer a 
question of us conforming to phenomena, i.e., as an act of phronesis, or practical wisdom; but rather an act of 
dominance and subjugation.  
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itself out of the world, viz., a retreat to the proverbial and “transcendent view from nowhere.”  
This is a distanced and alienated worldview and certainly requires qualification. That modernity 
holds the somewhat striking conceit of its privileged status as an epoch, i.e., as historically 
distinct from the epochs preceding it is especially telling.  The Latin term modo, from which the 
respective Latin and English words, modernus and modernity derive, yields a seemingly equal 
array of meaningful notions qualifying this conceit: the “recent” the “lately”, or the “just now.” 
Though the significance of the sentiment of absolute novelty, along with the sense of a 
complete break with tradition, would not blossom fully until the eighteenth century, the general 
contours of such a sentiment can be felt early on.  Of course, neither Petrarch nor Luther nor 
even the stalwartly progressive Bacon saw themselves as divorced from the tradition; but there 
was nevertheless something there which allowed them to see the world and themselves 
differently.  Novelty seems a derivative concern for the problem hinges more on modernity’s 
fundamental reflexivity, which carries with it two of modernity’s most distinctive hallmarks—
distance and alienation.  The distance, of course, is not merely a temporal or historical distance, 
but is ontologically rooted and thus factors into the entirety of the modern existence from which 
follows, alienation.  In terms of the historical age or epoch, modernity becomes a type of 
referential point where everything refers back to it; but this translates not only to historical 
epochs, but also to natural phenomena, other cultures and other peoples. Moreover, it is the 
standard, the gauge by which everything must be measured—but what is this measuring? 
Notwithstanding these trends, recent scholarship raises, albeit indirectly, important concerns 
about the assumptions of truth and being in modernity, and which bear heavily on any attempt to 
not only define it conceptually, but to reflect fruitfully on the human condition within this…the 
modern cultural epoch.  
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A Question of Meaning 
As the scholarship would attest, the problem of modernity is an exceedingly difficult one 
to define. Despite attempts to criticize and think through the problem, we so often reaffirm 
modernity and its basic assumptions. An alternative approach is raise the question not of truth 
per se, but of meaning, and how it defines and shapes the modern world. Nietzsche and Weber, 
had established approaches to the question of modernity along these lines. This approach not 
only emphasized the significance of values or mores (Sitten), but viewed them as central to the 
life of a culture or society.
16
 With Nietzsche’s work, especially, we find that Sitten function on a 
preconscious level, and to the extent that they have become habitualized and integrated (in a 
thoroughly practical way) into the thoughts and actions of a culture. Indeed, Sitten comprise the 
very core of a culture, its ethos, its spiritual germ; and which moreover make actions and 
thoughts meaningful. They are the very determiners of meaning to which specific modes of 
moral action are linked and expressed. Thus, what Nietzsche (and later Weber) has done is to 
challenge the ubiquitous autonomy with regarding to questions of culture, value and meaning. 
This challenge directs most forcefully not only toward the rationalized tendency for abstraction 
and homogenization, but also the assumption that reason can stand outside of the realm of moral 
action and to adjudicate according to the theoretical standards it has established for itself. As 
Aristotle reminds us in the Ethics, moral action itself as well as its ends are not (and cannot be) 
derivative from theoretical reason; but are fundamentally a value concern—viz., Sitte.  In other 
words, moral actions are inextricably tied to meaning. Moreover, moral actions—as with the 
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 Nietzsche, Notebook, 19[39], Writings from the Early Notebooks, ed. Raymond Geuss and trans. 
Ladislaus Löb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). “Practical morality will suffer greatly from every 
collapse of a religion. A metaphysics of punishment and reward seems indispensable. If we could create custom 
(Sitte), a powerful custom! We would then also have morality. But custom is created through the example of 
powerful personalities. I do not count on goodness awakening in the mass of the wealthy, but one could lead them to 
a custom, to a duty towards tradition.” 
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various and complex ways a good man may act in the world—are not executed according to 
some theoretical precept, and to think that is the case is to restrict, if not diminish entirely the 
meaning of these actions. To move outside the realm of meaning, as a theoretically rationalized 
form of inquiry does, is to subordinate meaning to a theoretical truth, and to confine moral action 
and moral purpose to an abstract and universal theoretical standard. Modernity attempts to do 
just this. Any number of rationalized domains in the modern world, e.g., the political, the social, 
the economic, etc, have as Marx suggested, estranged and alienated us from ourselves. The 
problem here is that self-alienation leads to meaninglessness and ultimately to nihilism. A 
rationalized system such as the one that undergirds modernity—and perhaps is modernity—
forms the basis for its own existence, and to the extent that it becomes its own purpose. In other 
words, moral action and its orientation to any notion of the good life are predetermined, self-
generative, and increasingly meaningless and nihilistic. Within this framework not only are the 
wondrous and myriad possibilities for being fully human severely delimited; but perhaps also is 
the possibility in the first instance for a dignified human existence.  
This is not to imply that a rationalized world is meaningless; indeed, this is emphatically 
not the case. The values that undergird modern forms of rationalism, and by extension science, 
e.g., objectivity, transparency; distinctiveness, are by definition meaningful. The problem, 
however, stems from the fact that these values comprise the dominant value set in modernity, 
and thereby determine meaning within an array of other meaningful domains—e.g., the moral. In 
taking an objectivist stance, modern rationalism denies other horizons of meaning, and given 
that’s its own meaningful domain is cast within the relatively narrow ambit of theōria, and 
through which its constructs itself and its world, modern rationalism paves the road to an 
increasing meaninglessness vis-à-vis the human condition. 
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The following analyses of the Cogito and its relation to the problem of modernity 
thoroughly depend upon a question of meaning. In order to advance into the depths of that 
question, it is necessary to establish some parameters. I wish to pursue the broad problem of 
modernity primarily through the question of individualism. Individualism, and especially as it 
relates to a notion of autonomy, is a foundational assumption in the modern world. As an 
Enlightenment value the notion of individualism is further undergirded by an array of rationalist 
assumptions that play out in the modern world in a complex and problematical way. 
Individualism is buttressed by ideology, and vice versa, which as Marcuse has observed, denies 
the possibility of dialectic, and thus the possibility of transcending the stagnate rationalism of the 
modern world. This is but one troublesome aspect of the representational reality that we have 
inherited from the seventeenth century, and shall serve as the entrepôt to the historical analyses 
that follow.      
The Question of the Modern Individual 
Though the modern definition of science and truth is central to the dissertation’s main 
thrust of inquiry, the crucial significance of the problem extends more deeply into the very core 
of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century European culture.
17
 There can be no doubt that this culture 
was exceedingly vibrant in its creativity, and through a sort of restless movement that culture—
the culture of the Baroque—unfurled and revealed itself in almost endless ways. What I offer 
here is an attempt (an essai) to probe into the creative dynamics of this culture; dynamics that are 
both elusive and labyrinthine in their complexity. Yet it is through them that the modern truths 
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 Within historical studies, especially, the term “culture” is rife with ambiguity with any number of 
approaches being deemed “cultural-historical” solely on the basis of the content they seek to interpret. An alternative 
approach—as the one employed here—is to raise the question of culture within a horizon of meaning. Thus, it aims 
to interpret a particular culture with respect to how meanings and practices cohere or don’t cohere; but in any case, 
are expressed in and through a variety of cultural forms. I will more fully articulate this approach along with its 
various heuristics below.   
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are justified and which gave and continue to give them their animating force. This is to imply 
that the significance of the question extends beyond Cartesian concepts strictly considered, and 
thus to move into a realm of understanding operative on a more fundamental level. Furthermore, 
in framing the problem as a historical critique we not only acknowledge a history and a tradition 
to which we all belong, but recognize that we our engaged with it in meaningful ways. The 
project thus seeks to gain understanding of the historical tradition that has occasioned our 
present, but does so from a critically engaged fashion so as to at once affirm our absorption 
within the tradition and to attain a reflective distance from it.   
This approach in certain ways follows a path initially opened by Gadamer in his work on 
philosophical hermeneutics, and which was further developed by Paul Ricoeur.
18
  In this view, 
and to put it simplistically, the tradition is understood as a totality of “meanings,” meanings that 
are operative in complex and subtle ways (as understood conceptually or metaphorically, and as 
mediated through thought or language), and which have a conditioning effect on the various 
historical moments within the tradition. The critical consciousness, to use Gadamer’s words, 
allows for an authentic awareness and understanding of the anterior influences of that awareness; 
yet it’s only through this critical understanding of the tradition as a living transmission, as 
Ricoeur might add, that we can embrace and engage it in the fullness of creative possibility. 
There are perhaps no accidents in history; yet almost paradoxically, there are no necessities. 
Rather, there is an array of conditions, possibilities and alternatives that combine in dynamically 
creative ways to form the historical moment. With this in mind, the historical critique here 
employed is both a reflective and a re-collective endeavor. As reflective, it appropriately 
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 See, for instance, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans., by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. 
Marshall, (New York, Continuum, 2004) and Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary Studies of the 
Creation of Meaning in Language, trans. Robert Czerny (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977). 
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acknowledges the historical richness and complexity of the problem at hand, while seeking to 
understand the reciprocity of the various concepts, influences and conditions that have together 
combined to create “modernity.” As re-collective it seeks to provide some stability to our 
understanding of the crisis of our own present as that crisis relates to an authentic awareness of 
our past. Moreover, it seizes the opportunity to reassess ourselves as “moderns” in light of 
certain fundamental assumptions; assumptions that in their silence are exceedingly powerful, and 
perhaps even more insidious.    
The underlying assumptions in modernity are several. Among them one might include the 
following: an almost undiminished faith in Enlightenment “values” such as tolerance, autonomy, 
secularism and universal rights; a utopian sense of progress to which is applied the understanding 
that humanity is and will be increasingly emancipated from the woes of its historical existence; 
an essentialist-rationalist conception of truth that can be “instrumentalized” in the direct access 
of reality; and the related and underpinning assumption that truth is ordered according to the 
principle of representation, or in other words, the tacit and unshaken belief that the more accurate 
the representation, the more thoroughly accurate our understanding of the truth.  And yet, these 
assumptions—some of which manifest in consciousness more readily than others—are 
nevertheless united by a common thread. The thread in question is that of the individual, i.e., the 
very notion of individualism itself, which enlarges and amplifies what it means to be “modern.” 
In many ways the notion of the individual is the decisive and determining factor of all that is 
meaningful, legitimate and true in the modern age.
19
 Though I have no intention of raising the 
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 The notion of “individuality” is a somewhat loaded term with a rich semantic history.  Karl Mannheim 
noted that “the same word, or the same concept in most cases, means very different things when used by differently 
situated persons.” See, Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (London: Harcourt, 1960), 245.  For a treatment of this 
history and its varied development as it manifested in modern Europe and America since the eighteenth century, see 
Steven Lukes, Individualism (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1985).  What I contend here is that the notion of 
individualism (or indeed individuality) is deeply problematic, and not only for being especially imprecise.  There 
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problem of individualism directly—as there are several first-rate texts and monographs that have 
done so already—I am nevertheless drawn to the term, on the one hand, because of its vagueness 
and nebulosity, and on the other, because in this vagueness the notion is so thoroughly 
penetrating into so many facets of modern life.
20
  As an integral feature of the modern world, 
individualism conditions the general patterns of modernity, and even to the extent that a “proper” 
and “good” life can only be thought-of in “individualistic” terms, even when such a life is 
reduced to a litany of wants and desires as well as approvals and aversions. 
Part of the problem with the modern notion of individualism—and especially insofar as it 
is linked to Enlightenment notions of liberalism—is that it is exceedingly edified by ideology.
21
 
This particular ideology is historically linked to the French Revolution and finds an especially 
lucid expression in the 1788 pamphlet by the Abbé Sieyès,“Qu'est-ce que le tiers-état?.” (see 
below) As an ideology, and as all ideologies do, it invokes a particular reality.
22
 The ontological 
ground on which ideologies function—as they can only do in modernity—enables not only that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
was certainly something approaching “individuality” in the antique and medieval worlds, yet the shape it assumes in 
modernity, dangerous for a variety of reasons, announces itself through the full power of ideology.  The ideological 
dimension of the problem is significant in its own right and awaits a fuller treatment elsewhere, but for the purpose 
of the introduce the problem at hand, I seek merely to suggest how thoroughly pervasive is the notion in our modern 
world, which in turn establishes the conditions not only for how we can “be,” but what we can “be.”   
20
 Consider, for example, the array of layered complexities in such spheres as the social, the political and the 
economic, all of which derive their force—if only through ideology—by tacit appeal to the value of the individual. 
Most often there is no questioning of what individuality means; or how it relates to these spheres of action; or how 
and to what extent the dynamics between individual and collective play out. 
21
 In the opening lines to the Second Book of Democracy in America, Tocqueville writes: “I think that in 
the civilized world there is no country less interested in philosophy than the United States. The Americans have no 
philosophical school of their own and are very little bothered by all those which divide Europe; they hardly know 
their names”…[and yet] “they possess, without ever having gone to the trouble of defining the rules, a certain 
philosophic methodology common to all of them…I discover that, in the majority of mental processes, each 
American has but recourse to the individual effort of his own reason. America is thus one of the countries in the 
world where the precepts of Descartes are least studied and most widely applied. We need not be surprised by that.” 
[Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Gerald E. Bevan, (London: Penguin, 2003), 493-4] 
22
 Following Marx’ larger point as advanced in the German Ideology, see Louis Althusser, On the 
Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, trans. G.M. Goshgarian (London: Verso, 
2014). It would seem that the modern notion of individuality as an outgrowth of a particular type of ideological state 
apparatus (though I dislike the term) at the same time essentializes what we mean by an individual, and thus negates 
its possibility.  
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we live in that particular “reality,” but also, as its creators, to continue to edify its deepest 
assumptions and thereby reduce escape from its unreflective clutches. The problem of modernity 
is a many-headed hydra, and this is one avenue down which to raise that question and its larger 
historical implications. To that we shall now turn.     
That so many presumably “know” what an “individual” is, the notion of individuality 
nevertheless remains strange in its familiarity, a sort of terra incognita; and thus serves as a 
“point of entry” into the problem this dissertation seeks to address.  There can be no doubt that 
people have always had some intuitive understanding of themselves as “individuals,” as 
distinctive from other human beings and other things; yet the contemporary understanding of this 
distinction extends beyond a simple “otherness,” as experienced between one individual and 
another, and now connotes, almost surreptitiously, the raison d'être of human existence.
23
   To 
illustrate this, one need only glance at the modern notion of the political insofar as it, on the one 
hand, connotes how individuality in the modern world is conceived prima facie, and, on the other 
hand, serves in that vein as the aegis of possibility for other modes of individuality to the extent 
that they are conceived and developed.
 24
  In large part this is attributable to the hegemonic 
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 Related to this, Norbert Elias observed throughout a career devoted, in many ways, to the development of 
social configurations in modernity, the primacy of the “I” in relation to the “We” in questions of personal identity.  
Though he develops these observations in Court Society, translated by Edmund Jephcott (New York: Pantheon, 
1983) and The Civilizing Process (New York: Blackwell, 2000), he most clearly and directly articulated this idea in 
The Society of Individuals, translated by Edmund Jephcott (New York: Basel Blackwell, 1991), 156-162, et passim.  
24
 To a large degree this is attributable to that “grand event” of modernity, the French Revolution, which 
among other things, has conditioned our reality in one of its dominant modes, and furthermore, and rather 
intrusively, determines in large part our perception of other modes of reality, i.e., in political terms.  The locus 
classicus for this, in my opinion, is the Abbé Sieyès’ famous pamphlet,“Qu'est-ce que le tiers-état?,” which 
provided what would become a blueprint for the Revolution itself, and indeed a veritable manifesto for modern 
trends yet to follow.  Sieyès envisioned France not as a realm of corporative estates, as was the traditional precedent, 
each with its own obligations and duties, and in the specific cases of the First and Second Estates, its specific 
privileges. Rather, he proclaimed France a nation of individuals, and specifically an association of free individuals 
possessive of rights—in contradistinction to privileges—who live under common laws of their own making.   The 
association of free individuals Sieyès described was, in fact, comprised of the same individuals who allowed the 
nation to not only survive, but to prosper.  In this way Sieyès justified the nation almost exclusively on the basis of 
utility.  Its claims to legitimacy depended upon the degree of usefulness assessed of private individuals, and to the 
extent that the fruits of their labors manifested in publically beneficial ways, i.e., at the level of the nation. Gone 
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influence of liberalism, especially its identification in the nineteenth century with 
constitutionalism, which in its wake has brought the question of individualism to an almost 
universal consciousness, and in a most formidable way.  
The politicization of certain Enlightenment values, namely autonomy and the emphasis 
on natural rights, serves to rationally justify the individual at the level of the law, yet perhaps 
more importantly, it preserves and protects the individual’s actions in all other spheres, which are 
perhaps those most significant from the modern point-of-view—the economic, the social, the 
religious, etc.   For example, in view of the problem of the individual, and certainly as cast 
within the vein of liberalism, it is arguable that modern man is first and foremost a homo 
economicus, and by extension a private individual set to the task of his own comfort and well-
being.  To the extent the political justifies the individual at the level of the law, so does the 
economic justify the political at the level of utility and material gain, which is to reduce, rather 
problematically, politics and the individual to the terms of each other, and in a most limited 
way.
25
   No longer does the political constitute that realm of the vita activa whereby an 
individual citizen measures and is measured by a collective sense of justice;
26
 and moreover, no 
longer does it constitute a realm in which he is engaged with, and in the fullest way possible, the 
Good, the True, and the Beautiful.  Rather, the political and the individual are both reduced to 
policy, and indeed a rationally conceived policy that is in turn rationally administered so as to 
affect the most utilitarian ends possible, especially as they are understood economically.  Yet, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
were the traditional, institutional frameworks of meaningful association, together with the oaths and honors, duties 
and obligations that had once sustained them and gave them meaning in a way that transcended the individuals 
themselves.   
25
 On this point, see Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2
nd
 ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1998). 
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 On the question of justice, and its relation to the good life, for example, see Aristotle’s Politics 
(henceforth Pol.), III.1278b-1281b., Loeb Classical Library, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2005). 
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process continues only to manifest in other social spheres, which increasingly standardizes, 
homogenizes and otherwise delimits the possibility of human moral action and creativity.  In 
these terms, the whole of culture has seemingly entered into a sort of ideological stagnation.  
If the liberalist strand within modern culture has reduced the political and the individual 
to policy, and especially a policy consonant with the tactics and maneuverings of a laissez-faire 
economics, Herbert Marcuse has offered a similarly damning picture with respect to the 
technological-productive apparatus of modern industrial society.
27
  The two are most certainly 
not unrelated, and together present two sides of the homogenizing and leveling tendencies of 
modernity; and especially in terms of reductionism, raise significant questions for the individual, 
and on a variety of levels. That liberalism has seemingly cast the individual as a homo 
economicus, Marcuse’s analyses of modern industrial society would have him a homo 
technologicus.
28
  What is striking about Marcuse’s analyses of industrial society is that he casts it 
as an ideological critique, which takes as its theme the “instrumentalized rationality,” often 
identified with the Frankfurt School of which he was once part, and carries it to its logical 
conclusion: whereby the process of rationalization finally becomes “irrational.” In this view 
modern industrial society—both as institution and as individual—becomes a creature of the 
rationalized processes that underpin it; caught up in and determined by a technological 
framework of domination. Marcuse demonstrates that though this society is rational, and even 
recognized as such, the very acceptance of the rationalized structure on which it depends (and 
which is often an unwitting acceptance), is ironically irrational.   
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 Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1991). 
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 What is significant here, as will become clear below, is that there is no marked difference between the 
homo economicus and the homo technologicus as they represent two variations of what Hannah Arendt called the 
homo faber, or the “man that makes things.”  In both instances, man is confined to that realm of action that focuses 
on utility, and furthermore maintains that utility is the ultimate source of value.   
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At this point Marcuse can raise the question of ideology, which he sees not necessarily as 
a distortion of reality, but in many ways constitutive of reality itself. The reality he describes vis-
à-vis modern industrial culture is status quo, or in stat, which is to imply stagnation, and further 
suggests that the repressive dominance of its characteristic one-dimensionality, i.e., the reduction 
of individuals and society to the concerns of production and consumerism (on the basis of which 
thoughts and actions are coordinated), negates the possibility of revolution. Not surprisingly, 
Marcuse understands this process historically, and if the current ideology is unsurpassable in its 
stagnation, he maintains that it is so because the rationality of modern industrial society is 
sufficiently advanced to drift into irrationality, which consequently stagnates the dialectical 
process and furthermore denies the possibility of transcending the present historical moment.
29
 In 
other words, modern society is an automaton reduced to the processes by which it ceaselessly 
and meaninglessly reproduces itself in the name of utility. Caught in its desire for the latest 
technological gadget, or other utile object that seemingly makes life easier, more efficient or 
even more novel, modern industrial society becomes objectified by the same processes it thinks 
it controls. If individuals within this ideological orientation perceive limitations, they are 
perceived merely as obstacles solvable within the framework of technology—which always 
implies more technology. A society that employs technology for the sake of technology is both 
automatonic and irrational; yet the difficulty, as Marcuse astutely perceived, relies on the fact 
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 In terms of history, Marcuse reads this problem from a Marxist, and ultimately a Hegelian perspective, 
which placed emphasis upon the notion of contradiction in the dialectical process. Since there is no negative or 
contradictory rational element within modern industrial society, at least one that is not either immediately repulsed 
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172.   
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that modern society is its own closed, experiential dimension within which the only frame of 
reference is itself and the technological apparatus it employs. Modern society is thus both 
solipsistic and ahistorical, which makes it difficult to achieve a critical and reflective distance 
from which to overcome it. The root of this difficulty for Marcuse is again ideological. 
Whereas the traditional Marxist interpretation of ideology (as superstructure) is 
understood as detached from reality (as means and modes of production), and thus a distortion of 
that reality in false consciousness, Marcuse denies this clear-cut distinction, and understands 
ideology as an operational concept working within the process of production itself.  With this 
move Marcuse refrains from a mere inversion of the traditional Marxist formulation of ideology, 
while allowing it a foundational role insofar as it is functionally constitutive of the social reality 
with which it is merged.  Moreover, as an operative concept ideology now can be understood as 
coterminous with reality; however, because its functionality is foundational, ideology governs, 
and even dictates, thought and expression within the social reality, and to this extent is 
totalitarian.
30
 Yet, the modes by which the ideology manipulates and controls society are not 
heavy-handed or repressive in terms of terrorism. Rather, we are to understand the totalitarian 
character of modern industrial society as entirely homogenous, and this homogeneity becomes 
justified ideologically through action, i.e., the various ways it governs the 
productive/technological apparatus and thereby determines the attitudes, needs and aspirations of 
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individuals. In this sense, Marcuse saw modern industrial society not only as hegemonic and 
imperious, but uncritical and self-perpetuating; it extends imperiously into all realms of human 
discourse and action, shaping and determining the entirety of the world and the individuals 
within it, while at the it same time it repulses or absorbs the alternatives and possibilities that 
stand against it.  Individuals thus become one-dimensional, and are fettered from the possibility 
of realizing themselves in any way beyond the technological apparatus.   
Tocqueville’s astute observations of America in the 1830s gave him occasion to reflect 
deeply on the ever-increasing condition of social equality and its relation to individualism while 
directing his eye toward specific concerns for the perversion that an individualist-inspired mode 
of living threatened to become. When men are no longer bound to something transcendent to 
themselves as individuals, e.g., an institution, a tradition, a set of customs, the attendant lack of 
duty and obligation implicit here thus degenerates into a most abject form of isolation, and 
perhaps even tends toward utter meaninglessness. And, though men may be creators of their own 
destinies, often in a most insignificant way, they remain imprisoned “in the isolation of their own 
hearts.”
31
  The danger here, as Tocqueville understood so well, is that modernity understands 
everyone as an individual, each possessing and in turn expressing that which is ostensibly unique 
and special to this individuality.
32
 Thus, a type of egoism overtakes and replaces anything 
positively associated with individualism, from which it degenerates further into a perversion of 
self-interestedness.
33
 The basic mode of being and living in the modern world hinges on the 
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 Ayn Rand’s egoistically formulated doctrine of the “virtue of selfishness,” is perhaps the most 
contentiously famous version of the extreme individualism against which Tocqueville had so earnestly warned.  
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importance of individuality qua individuality, and is a notion so entrenched in the “collective 
Western unconscious” that it occasions no need for reflection, questioning or criticism.  Modern 
individualism simply is and thus is left as an “un-thought-of” assumption.  Beguiled by the 
simplicity of the question of individuality, it becomes relegated to the status of an “academic 
question”, or worse still the status of a “non-question. Yet in the midst of this beguilement the 
complex, intimate, and perhaps even necessary, relation of individualism to modernity subtly 
begins to reveal itself to us, along with its deeper theoretical difficulties.         
Depending on which side of the epochal line they privilege, historians conventionally 
address the question of individualism, as either a definitively modern phenomenon or one with 
various and definite medieval precedents.
34
 In any case, the question of the individual is a deeply 
cultural concern and certainly one with a meaningful historical dimension. From this one might 
inquire: what is this modern notion of individualism, exactly?  Why is it significant historically, 
and what makes it unique from others, e.g. the medieval or ancient?  Moreover, how and by what 
means does the modern manifestation of individualism understand itself, and how is that 
understanding determined and justified?  On one level, the modern formulation of 
individualism—and certainly in its classical Enlightenment expression—places itself in 
opposition to the traditional, holistic understanding of society, and to the extent that this abstract 
notion of individualism recognizes itself as the very ground of possibility for personal 
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independence and self realization. I would add that individualism, so conceived, further 
manifests not only through relations of power and influence, i.e., the general patterns of our 
world, but is enrooted in the very fabric of modern existence, and translates in some way or 
another into almost every facet of human thought, action and sensibility. Through his work on 
comparative anthropology, Louis Dumont observed, rather interestingly, individualism as a 
problem of values (a significant problem to which I will attend below), and specifically one 
involving the relation of values to ideas and vice versa.
35
 Dumont’s observations of modern 
societies revealed what he described as a “configuration of ideas and values” centered on 
individualism, and from which he concluded individualism to be the “cardinal value of modern 
societies.”
36
 The dominance of this value, as with all values, is attributable to its fundamentality, 
which operates not only at the level of social practice, but also on that of ideology.
37
  Dumont 
understands ideology as a social set of representations or a set of values and ideas within a 
society that are configured in a particular way. In the case of modernity, as Dumont notes, the 
ideological configuration depends upon the dominant and valorizing feature of individualism, 
which is a point perhaps beyond dispute. Yet, his understanding of the modern notion of 
individualism raises some very important concerns, namely the treatment of modern 
individualism in accordance with a rise in ideological power, and second, his tracing of the 
historical roots of this relationship to the nominalism of the fourteenth century.  
The Question of Ideology 
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In terms of ideology, Dumont is correct to stress the inseparability of values and ideas, 
and certainly as they manifest in modern cultures. Yet, ideology is itself a derivative concern, 
and as such is a distinctive and defining feature of modernity with a decidedly rational basis. 
Though it has various meanings, the broad definition of ideology is often considered as a 
subjective dimension of social life, or as a type of “social consciousness,” and in accordance 
with this broad understanding, the articulations of Marx, Durkheim and Althusser have proven 
influential.
38
 Durkheim understood ideology as a social representation, or a collectivity of 
representations which he further understood as “social facts” insofar as they had “real” effects, 
i.e., the manifestation and development of social forms such as institutions, patterns of action and 
social habits etc.
39
 The individual, though important in its role as the material basis, or the carrier 
of these collective representations, is nevertheless subordinated in significance to the 
representations themselves.  In other words, the representations emerge through the interrelation 
of individuals but are significant only at the level of the collectivity or when they become “social 
facts.”  As such, they regulate the actions of individuals; and though, on a certain level, these 
actions may be free and autonomous, they gain their “real” significance only insofar as they are 
expressed collectively in a variety of social forms.
40
    
In many ways, Durkheim’s understanding of social representation stands opposed to what 
would later become known as methodological individualism.  This doctrine originally emerged 
                                                          
38
 Karl Marx, The German Ideology, (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1998); Emile Durkheim, 
Rules of Sociological Method (New York: Free Press, 1982) and The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. 
Karen E. Fields (New York: Free Press, 1995); on the creation of the individual in a capitalist, ideological image see 
Louis Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, trans. G.M. 
Goshgarian (London: Verso, 2014); Also, Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989); 
Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness (London: Merlin Press, 1967; For an interesting overview, though 
ultimately one with which I disagree, see Herman Schmid, “On the Origin of Ideology” Acta Sociologica 24 (1981): 
57-73; also, H.M. Drucker, “Marx’s Concept of Ideology” Philosophy 47 (1972): 152-61.   
39
 In toto: values. 
40
 Durkheim, Rules of Sociological Method. 
 46 
in the work of the Austrian economist, Carl Menger, who endeavored to understand complex 
economic phenomena—and the laws that explain them—in terms of an atomistic methodology, 
which in simple terms emphasized the fundamentality of individual action in the economic 
sphere.
41
  Weber applied this notion to sociology, which allowed him to see, in contrast to 
Durkheim, that social action and the complexes (or in Durkheim’s language, social 
representations) that are its products, can only be understood in terms of individuals acting in 
particular ways.  And, though social forms as institutions, social habits, or “individual types” 
etc., may be understood as real, in the sense that meaning is applied to them, for Weber it is the 
undergirding individualism of this dynamic that properly constitutes the “real.”
42
   
The construction of ideologies, no matter if they are viewed as anchored in social 
structures or formations, or individual consciousnesses, nevertheless share a common thread that 
dissolves the apparent opposition—consciousness.
43
  For both Durkheim and Weber, their 
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understanding of what constitutes “realness” in society depends upon consciousness, which 
moreover privileges the relationship between subject/object, internal/external, ideal/material, 
individual/collective, etc. Though he underscores the significance of structures in the formation 
of a social reality, Durkheim’s formulation is still reliant upon a general theory of 
representation.
44
  Similarly, the patterned action in society Weber seeks to understand is 
inclusive of the subjective meaningfulness as understood and justified by individuals in specific 
groups.  To this end, and in true Kantian fashion, Weber employed the “ideal type” as a heuristic 
to aid in the interpretive understanding of social action and the subjective meaning on which it 
depends.   
As a representation, ideology exists at the level of theōria, which in its modern 
formulation (and to some extent in the ancient) not only implies adherence to an abstract 
structure of ideas, but also marks a certain distance and detachment.  Ideology, and in Dumont’s 
analyses, an “individualist ideology,” denotes a theoretical abstraction, which at once 
complicates the problem of individualism and makes exceedingly dire its implications. At the 
very least, theory treats of the individual as an object; itself the recipient of the calculating and 
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measuring determinations of modern science, which in turn poses serious challenges to and 
delimits the possibility of being fully human.  
Yet, such a path to ideological abstraction of the individual was not a necessary or 
forgone conclusion. The celebrated poetical and charismatic descriptions by Goethe and 
Burckhardt demonstrate resistance to this path and an embracing of the possibilities to what an 
individual might be otherwise. In their texts, one may find the individual variously characterized 
in terms of Bildung and self-formation as well as dignitas, autonomy, and privacy.
45
 Despite the 
remarkable and wonderful ways a Burckhardtian or a Goethean notion of individualism focuses 
on and celebrates the potential by which an individual can exude and express his own unique and 
creative individuality, the modern individual by contrast, especially in its most recent 
manifestations, is predominantly—and even first and foremost—reduced to an abstraction. The 
political and by extension, the economic, representations of individuality (as abstractions) are the 
most notable and forceful in modern culture, the significance of which is brought out through the 
power of ideology. Indeed, and as I suggest above, much of this emanates from the French 
Revolution, and specifically the Abbé Sieyès’ classic pamphlet of 1788-89, “Qu'est-ce que le 
tiers-état?” [“What is the Third Estate?”], which continues to influence the Western world in its 
understanding of the individual, and by extension the political and economic reality in which 
they take part. In this formulation the individual is by and large considered to be autonomous, 
i.e., a fundamentally rational individual endowed with the reflective and critical capabilities so as 
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to realize his condition as fully as possible.  Again, the autonomous individual here represented 
is limited to the political and the economic spheres, and when analyzed in reference to European 
industrial society of the nineteenth and twentieth century, as Marcuse has done, we quickly 
realize autonomy means the ability to freely participate in any number of stupefying activities be 
they political, economic, social or otherwise.
46
 As Marcuse noted, this type of autonomy is only 
deceptively liberating, and can be made into a powerful instrument of domination.  
The development of the human sciences during the nineteenth century certainly serves as 
a powerful explanandum for the increased tendency to treat of the individual abstractly in all 
realms of action and knowledge.
 47
 This begs the question: out of the all the wondrously 
multitudinous ways in which a human can be human, why does our understanding of humanity 
drift so far from the concrete, and into the realm of the abstract? Aristotle had understood politics 
as a realm (the polis itself) of “just” action that not only allowed the good to manifest, it enabled 
a citizen to measure and to assess himself freely in relation to the good so as to live the fullest 
life possible.
48
 Modern politics, by contrast, looks to the good only insofar as it is conceived on a 
utilitarian foundation, which is to advance from the idea that politics is a human science, i.e., a 
body of theoretical knowledge that assesses man vis-à-vis his social and historical reality. For 
politics to function in terms of utilitarianism, and indeed modern politics in general, an 
individual must first be reduced to an abstraction where he can be assessed on the basis of value 
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and utility, affirming, in part, Foucault’s technology of domination. Furthermore, to conceive of 
the individual in terms of politics, religion, the economy, and even morally and 
epistemologically, is to place him on an abstract plane effectively bound by this notion of 
individualism. Furthermore, the ideology translates quite powerfully into society’s various 
realms, e.g., the political, economic, and religious, which in turn determines and justifies 
knowledge and action within those realms.
 
Thus, the problem gains an epistemological and 
ethical dimension, which Dumont acknowledges, but does not fully exploit in his analyses. In 
any case, the significance of the political, and by extension the economic, is powerfully stated 
insofar as it creates widespread and deeply pervasive ideologies.  
 Theōria and the “Abstracted” Individual   
Individualism in the modern world is perhaps an irresistible force enchanting us with 
promises of our own self governance and possibility of great progress without odious submission 
to tradition and collective belief.
 49
 One need only glance at the commonplace understanding, or 
rather misunderstanding, of the modern, autonomous individual. The modern understanding of 
the autonomous individual is somewhat of a platitude, and certainly runs counter to Kant’s 
original formulation of the same. Kant’s enthusiasm for the possibility of human action in the 
moral sphere expressed a similarly normative, hopefulness to place morality on a firm foundation 
not unlike that which he had placed the natural sciences in the First Critique. The realization of 
this possibility addressed directly a concern with self-interest and self-absorption; and it was 
upon this concern that Kant’s understanding of the autonomous individual holds its crucial 
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significance. Though not a ground in itself, the notion of autonomy presupposes rationality and 
thus becomes regulative not only for ethical action and the possibility of a science of morality, 
but it significantly underpinned his idea for a universal history of mankind.
50
 He asserted that 
humanity is an end-in-itself, and thus each individual at once has a rational obligation to himself 
as an individual, and a meritorious obligation—first as an idea and then as a universal law—to 
humanity as a whole.
51
  Rather significantly Kant’s rationalized autonomy delimits any one 
man’s freedom of action insofar as he willingly submits to the “idea” of a universal law 
commanding benevolent action on behalf of his fellow man.  The modern understanding of 
individuality, at least in more recent expressions, drifts far away from this Kantian sense of 
obligation, and has collapsed thus more and more into self-absorption, self-interest and 
entitlement. Kant’s placement within history—at a distinct moment in the German Empire 
during the late eighteenth century—could still occasion, if only in an idea, an understanding of 
autonomy such that individuals through their various obligations to themselves and each other 
could exist meaningfully within the world. Though influenced by the Enlightenment ideal, Kant 
was sufficiently medieval in his understanding of the moral universe to still see obligations as the 
sustaining sinews of that universe. With that understanding, the significance of the whole of 
humanity, as a moral and historical totality surpassed that of any one individual.  
Not so long ago Hannah Arendt reassessed the problem of the human condition in view 
of the tragic reality of the mid-twentieth century.
52
 For Arendt the question hinged largely upon a 
historical treatment of certain modes of human action—labor, work, the social and the 
political—which she observed as increasingly overtaken by and redefined in terms of theōria.  
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By way of a long and detailed historical trajectory, she viewed the original Platonic and 
Aristotelian separation of a contemplative life (vita contemplativa) from an active life (vita 
activa) as culminating in modernity through an abject form of world alienation. The significant 
problem of world alienation subsumes the concern for individuality insofar as contemplation, as 
theōria in its various forms, effectively occasioned a retreat of the world into the individual 
where all worldly activities, mundane and beautiful, obtained both their possibility and their 
value solely in terms of care and prosperity of the individual self.  What is more, individuals and 
the broader notion of individuality became “objectified” within a larger structure of process and 
utility underpinned, as they are, by the various applications of theōria. Man is thus left utterly 
alienated and, even the supposed attempts that appear to save him from a despairing isolation, 
viz. the internet, the process of globalization and networks of association more generally, only 
further divorce him from fully living, moving and acting in the world. As Arendt correctly 
observed, the hallmark of the modern age is effectively a type of “worldlessness” occasioned on 
the one hand by this retreat of the world into the individual, and on the other, by an eagerness to 
escape the world and into a transcendence expressed in the infinite possibility of life as 
guaranteed by modern science.
 53
 In other words, life is reduced to the hegemony of an abstract 
and theoretically infinite process.  Life effectively becomes an idea, or theoretical conception, in 
which the highest good is understood in terms of attaining the everlasting life of the genus 
                                                          
53
 With respect to the second instance, Arendt saw the launch of Sputnik in 1957 as a culminating moment, 
which along with the destructive potential of the atomic age in general, ushered forth new ways in which to reflect 
on the capacities of human reason.  Here, The Human Condition extends Arendt’s concern previously articulated 
almost a decade before in the Origins of Totalitarianism that “Progress and Doom are two sides of the same 
medal…,” which is to suggest an undergirding existential significance vis-à-vis the human condition as understood 
in terms of theoretical possibility.  See the Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, 1976), p. xii.  The 
hopefulness of this modern age expresses the belief that a notion of infinite progress will overcome the possibility of 
unimaginable doom; modernity does not see that both paths lead to nihilism. As this sentiment is expressed through 
the vision of medical science and the possibility of extreme longevity of life, Arendt notes that “[t]his future man, 
whom the scientists tell us they will produce in no more than a hundred years, seems to be possessed by a rebellion 
against existence…” (The Human Condition, p.2) Thus, we’ve exchanged the finitude of meaningful human 
existence for odious nihilism insofar as quantity of life substitutes for quality and the full embrace of all the 
dimensions of human existence.       
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humanity as gradually realized through the progress of science.
54
 Thus, the world as the realm in 
which all human relationships and affairs are entwined—the very topos from which all human 
action and thought derives meaning—presents a concern for humanity only insofar as it is a 
creature of modern science, subordinated to its theories and processes.   
Arendt’s historical and phenomenological analysis of traditional forms of human 
activity,
55
 i.e., her delineation of how these modalities originally appeared historically and, 
moreover, how they transformed and ultimately were misrepresented by the modern age in 
frightfully stirring ways, serves as a powerful exegesis of the realities of modern existence. The 
questions to emerge from her analyses are as rich as the descriptions she provides, and though 
we may know the general contours and even the specific details of the historical transformation 
by which the capacity for action became hopelessly separated from the capacity for thought, we 
need to proceed deeper into the constituent necessities on which these transformations depended 
and which continue to derive their animating force. Fruitful thought and reflection on the cultural 
complexities to which alienation and worldlessness redound is perhaps only an initiating stage, 
and therefore demands inquiry into the hidden dynamics of this transformation, especially as 
these dymanics are fundamentally operative.  
Indeed, this is to probe into the mathesis, or the ordering schema by which knowledge 
and action in modernity are grounded and regulated, and by which the modern notion of 
individuality, for example, derives its meaning.  Foucault’s stratagem in the Order of Things, 
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accordance with their specific conditions are: labor/life; work/world; and action/plurality.  In the last instance, she 
means the political and social realms as modeled on the ancient polis.  Moreover, the polis is the realm of the bios 
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 54 
arguably his most insightful work, attempted to do just this.
56
  In what he called an “archaeology 
of the human sciences,” Foucault endeavored to describe how empirical knowledge within a 
given time and culture attained regularity and consistency, i.e., through a relationship between 
facts and the ordering, yet historically varying, structure of language.  To this end, his notion of 
the episteme was central, which he understood as a foundational structure that not only grounds 
reality (as the order of things), but determines how we reflect upon that reality.   What is more, 
the episteme exists as a “positive unconscious,” which at once eludes consciousness and is 
integral to it, and through its various modalities allows the ordering structure itself, i.e., the 
episteme, to be experienced in a powerful and unmediated way.
57
  In the Order of Things, 
Foucault is concerned primarily with shifts in epistemic structures from the period of the 
Renaissance, in which knowledge was ordered by theories of correspondence, to the schemes of 
natural orders and theories of representation, as typified in l’Âge classique, and finally to the 
birth of the human sciences in the nineteenth century where man, in his current form (as both 
subject and object), makes his emerge 
Foucault did not merely pose a question of changing knowledge structures and the 
discursive regularities occasioned by them. Rather, his project was first and foremost an 
historical reflection upon the emergence of modernity as expressed, especially, in the threshold 
between l’Age classique and the nineteenth century. For Foucault, the question of modernity 
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centers on the “recent invention” of man, which finds him as both the foundation of knowledge 
and the object of that knowledge.  As opposed to the classical episteme where knowledge 
proceeded on the basis of a universal mathesis through which perceived variances are ordered 
and homogenized in terms of mathematics and taxonomies, Foucault saw the modern episteme, 
and moreover, its implications for man, as decidedly more problematic. With the advent of the 
modern episteme the ordering dynamic shifts from what Foucault saw as an “ideal of perfect 
mathematicization” to one that, by comparison, is exceedingly complex, impure and confused.
58
  
We’re given to understand that much of the confusion stems from the intermingling within the 
episteme itself of various domains of thought, i.e., theoretical schema within a limited range of 
inquiry from which knowledge is obtained.
59
  These domains of thought include the purely 
mathematical; the applied mathematical; the scientific insofar as the sciences are established 
upon principles that in turn establish causal relations between actions and things; and also, the 
domain of philosophical reflection. In other words, the modern episteme represents a realm 
where the domains of the mathematical and the philosophical combine in a problematical way, 
especially insofar as the most significant questions as they relate to man. This is to say that the 
philosophies of life and action are understood within a confused theoretical domain 
overwhelmingly influenced by the standards of truth imposed by the empirical and mathematical 
sciences. As Foucault notes, it is the complexities of the modern episteme, and especially those 
intermediary realms within the various domains of knowledge that comprise it, that the danger of 
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the modern episteme makes itself known—the “anthropologization” of all knowledge.
 60
  
Within these “dangerous intermediaries” the human sciences emerge, each 
anthropologically centered and each presumably finding both stability and justification through 
the scientific—which is to say, theoretical—domains of knowledge.
61
 As man first armed 
himself in the seventeenth century with the appropriate methodologies through which to 
investigate, dominate and possess the world, and thus to become effectively the measure of all 
things, it is the later expressions of this modern man who finds himself irresistibility contained 
by the same rigorous standards.  Within this troubled realm of the human sciences, not only does 
man at once become both subject and object to all knowledge—which again is to stress man’s 
foundational role in the truth standards by which the world is judged and understood as well as 
his containment, manipulation and discipline by the same standards—but more distressingly still, 
it delimits the wonderful array of possibilities through which man can be fully human. Quite 
simply the world is a mathesis, cast in accordance to a radically reformulated notion of theōria 
with the concern of practical utility at its core.  It is not merely that theōria has left behind its 
traditional meaningful association with a “contemplative glance” into truth and reality as given,
62
 
but that its practical, Baconian orientation is both aggressive and willful, determining those 
distinctive modes of human being—e.g., the ethical life—that were traditionally beyond its 
general domain.  Also, it is not that mathematics and the sciences more generally cannot 
effectively serve as tools (organa) in man’s various modes of action or within his general mode 
of being—life, labor, and language; but that he cannot be reduced to them and be operative on 
their terms. This is effectively a mis-positioning of man vis-à-vis the sciences whereby man risks 
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the danger of completely losing himself in a world of complete and utter meaninglessness. The 
crystallization of Enlightenment values in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries marked a 
decisive historical moment where in becoming both subject and object, man has unwittingly 
decried his alienation from himself and his world as well as his subjugation and even erasure by 
the sciences, if though by the very standard of truth he created.  
Somewhat pessimistically for modern tastes, I’m sure, Foucault maintained that until man 
“disappears” into a new form of knowledge, there can be no hope of overcoming the problem of 
modernity, which in its way, has turned upside down the optimism associated with the 
Enlightenment project along with the autonomy of the individual and the fullness of human 
expression. With that in mind, the Order of Things forces to acknowledge if not confront the 
problem of misrepresentation in modernity as it pertains to man and world as well as that which 
effectively constitutes “reality.” Thus by raising the problem of modernity we are implicitly 
raising the problem of misrepresentation. This means reformulating the problem with Descartes 
at the core, yet not in a way that limits the query only to the philosophy of Descartes; but rather 
opening it up to the broader significance of his cultural milieu. This means also a wrangling with 
the tradition; and in the particular way I pose the problem, it raises the question of what was the 
sine qua non that would allow certain aspects of this tradition to emerge in force, if also in 
particular dominance.  The problem of our individuality—especially insofar as it relates to a 
broad history of self-conception—is a deeply rooted and inveterate concern in the history of the 
West. That individuality has become essentialized and abstract, the problem is especially 
significant for the modern epoch. To that extent, it harbors in its wake significant existential 
implications, not least of all the problem of an increasing isolation between individuals as well as 
within communities, countries and the world as a whole. By formulating the problem in a way 
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that centralizes the role of Descartes and his cultural milieu, we are at once wading into the 
troubled realm of Cartesian scholarship, yet wandering off many of its well-trodden pathways.       
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Cogito and Modernity: A Question of the Baroque 
‘There is thinking: therefore there is something that thinks’[cogito ergo sum]: this is the upshot 
of all Descartes’ argumentation. But that means positing as ‘true a priori’ our belief in the 
concept of substance—If one reduces the proposition to ‘There is thinking, therefore there are 
thoughts, [cogito, ergo cogitationes sunt]’ one has produced a mere tautology: and precisely that 
which is in question, the ‘reality of thought,’ is not touched upon—that is, in this form the 
‘apparent reality’ of thought cannot be denied. But what Descartes desired was not that thought 
should have, not an apparent reality, but a reality in itself. 
                                 —Nietzsche, Wille zur Macht,No.484  
 
Having identified the parameters within which to raise the problem of modernity—i.e., as 
fundamentally a question of the rational and autonomous individual—I would like to refine the 
question further as a historical and cultural problematic. Namely, I wish to re-pose the problem 
of the Baroque, which is a term that though not always contested, nevertheless lacks consensus 
as to its meaning and significance. Lack of an established consensus relates not only to the 
Baroque as an aesthetic phenomenon; but also, and perhaps more importantly to how it functions 
as a cultural dynamic; or with regard to what cultural truth or truths it speaks. I wish to raise the 
question of the Cogito so as to more deeply probe into these latter two considerations. To that 
end, this query is not a purely philosophical one, or even one cast within the frame of intellectual 
history; but rather as a culture-historical phenomenon; and indeed one that will hopefully enable 
more fruitful thought into the Baroque as a cultural designation insofar as it manifests within a 
horizon of meaning from which it truth generate. To this end, it is necessary to define my 
approach, and to situate it properly within the larger vista of Cartesian scholarship.  
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The Question of the Cogito 
Stephen Gaukroger has recently reopened the scholarly debate on the meaning of 
Descartes’ thought by re-examining it historically and biographically. His intellectual biography 
of Descartes examines the development of Cartesian thought while revealing the cultural 
environment in which his subject lived and worked.
 63
  Within the context of Ramist and late-
Scholastic logic, Gaukroger has examined in a previous work Descartes’ conceptions of 
deductive inference and intuition in relation to his work on method so as to illuminate the 
Cartesian position that knowledge is based on an analytic (as opposed to a synthetic) foundation, 
i.e., an order of discovery of causes or explanatory principles derived, ultimately, from a type of 
intuition.
64
  By employing what may be termed a psychologico-contextualist approach to 
Cartesian thought, Gaukroger has challenged more traditional approaches to the history of 
science and philosophy (and Descartes), especially the tendency to reduce scientific development 
to epistemology.
65
 
In addition to historically contexualized approaches, such as Gaukroger’s, the notable and 
recent philosophical scholarship relating to Descartes is immense, detailed and often brilliant. 
The Cogito formulation, in particular, has drawn considerable attention, and Martial Gueroult 
                                                          
63
 Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes: An Intellectual Biography (Oxford: 1995). 
64
 Gaukroger, Cartesian Logic: An Essay on Descartes’ Conception of Inference (Oxford: 1989) 
65
 What may be termed the “rationalist-realist” approach has fallen into disfavor in history of science 
circles. The remarkableness of the various feats of reason, which are the trademark of internalist histories of science 
and medicine are no longer sufficient, and require, it seems, a social, institutional or even a cultural “context” to 
convey the complexities and richness of the various developments within these histories. The contextualist approach 
in general is not without its own problems and limitations; yet, Alexandre Koyré and Pierre Duhem, though certainly 
highly respected within the field, are among those figures whom the current orthodoxy views as too broadly 
intellectualist, and thus often marginalizes these works in favor of historical studies in the sociology of scientific 
knowledge or more specific micro-historical concerns.  See, for example, Koyré’s From the Closed World to the 
Infinite Universe (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1957), Newtonian Studies (London: 1965), and 
Galilean Studies (Hassocks: 1978).  For Duhem, see Le Système du Monde: Histoire des Doctrines cosmologiques 
de Platon à Copernic, 10 vols. (Paris: Hermann, 1913-1959). 
 61 
was among the first to recognize and to understand the philosophical significance of the Cogito 
relative to the entire Cartesian system.
66
 In particular, Gueroult offered an analytical reading of 
the Meditations elaborating on Descartes’ own analysis of the so-called order of reasons, which, 
quite significantly, is an order established by “reason for knowing” (ratio cognoscendi).
67
  From 
this order, as Gueroult attempts to show, the foundation of truth (Cogito), based upon the 
objective validity of ideas that have both clarity and distinctness, serves to ground the certainty 
of the self, God and the material world.  Gueroult’s reading of the Meditations comes in part as a 
response to more contextualized approaches, namely that of Ferdinand Alquié, who argued for a 
psychologico-historical reading.
 68
 Alquié emphasized the historical development (narrowly 
understood) of the Cartesian corpus, which forced him to deny, for example, the presence of a 
worked-out metaphysics in Descartes’ earlier writings, and certainly not before the Discourse 
and the general, theoretical project originating in the late 1620s. 
Gueroult’s treatment of the Meditations remains the starting point for many philosophers 
addressing the problem of the Cogito. Following his lead, more recent scholarship has sought to 
establish a deeper truth (or what is perceived to be) vis-à-vis the Cogito and what it intends to 
express.  They have done this in accordance with Austin’s speech-act theory analysis whereby 
they challenge the notion of the Cogito as a strictly defined intellectual act.  Thus, they interpret 
it as more inclusive, as exhibited in the formulation sum res cogitans, which may allow for all 
cognitive states, e.g., willing, sensing, seeing, etc.  Jakko Hintikka and other analytic 
philosophers, such as Jim Stone, have made the case that the Cogito must be understood non-
                                                          
 
66
 Martial Gueroult, “Le Cogito et la notion 'pour penser il faut être,” Travaux du IXe Congrès International 
de philosophie, Congrès Descartes, (Paris: 1937). 
67
 Martial Gueroult, Descartes selon l’ordre des raisons, vol 1., l’âme et Dieu, (Editions Montaigne, 1952).  
68
 Ferdinand Alquié, La découverte métaphsique de l’homme, (1950). 
 62 
inferentially, which seemingly is an attempt to avoid reducing the Cogito to a simple logical 
formulation.
69
 Their readings attempt to probe the relation of cogito to sum allowing for both 
verbs to maintain as broad a semantic field as possible.   
In a similar attempt to expand the significance of the Cogito formulation, not merely 
semantically but conceptually, Hiram Caton has offered a corrective to Gueroult by employing a 
hermeneutical approach to the question of foundations as deployed in the Cartesian philosophy.
 
70
  In accordance with Gueroult, Caton maintains the Cogito served as a single foundation for 
self, God and world, yet Caton sees beyond the Cogito to the broader concern of subjectivity, 
from which a dualist physical theory is established and mediated.
71
  Moreover, Caton’s 
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hermeneutical analysis not only illuminates the question of foundations in terms of subjectivity, 
but reveals how the notion of subjectivity gives meaning (“as the fundamental unifying motif”)
72
 
to the entirety of the Cartesian corpus; a point not fully recognized by the likes of Gueroult, 
Gouhier, Alquié, Gilson, Liard and others.
73
 
Despite obvious strengths in traditional philosophical and intellectual-historical 
approaches, including Gaukroger’s and Caton’s, they are nevertheless limited. For one, they 
cannot adequately explain the Cartesian response to the threat of skepticism, especially the all-
important move to question the entire tradition of thought up to that point; and, moreover to put 
in its place an alternate definition of truth grounded in the subject. Martin Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Descartes, which he develops in a number of essays, is perhaps the most 
powerful account of the Cogito, and the most damning. 
74
  Heidegger not only reads Descartes 
philosophically, but historically. His historical reading peers into the long, Western metaphysical 
tradition where he sees Cartesian subjectivity (Cogito) as a distinctive moment in the waning 
stages of that tradition.
 
For Heidegger, the Cartesian formulation, “ego cogito ergo sum,” reveals 
an ontological structure of meaning where the subject (subiectum) is both reality (in Heidegger’s 
language, Being) and the ground of reality for the external world. The primacy of the subiectum 
in the Cartesian formulation reduces the “ego cogito” to “sum” and vice versa, from which 
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follows a characterization of the ego (as subiectum) strictly on the basis of epistemic certitude.
75
 
As Heidegger well understood, the modern understanding of science and truth is reliant upon the 
notion of a willful subjectivity endeavoring to dominate and possess the world. His 
understanding of the problem of technology is a case in point where the modern form of τέχνη 
(technê) is understood less as a type of “making” and more as a “standing reserve” (Bestand) 
existing in “readiness for”
 
(Bereitschaft) the use and manipulation by a willful subjectivity or 
subjectivities.
76
   
By introducing the problem of subjectivity (Cogito) as well as its placement within the 
history of metaphysics, Heidegger is poised to ask much deeper questions, which other 
approaches are incapable of answering or otherwise elude altogether. For instance, Heidegger 
clearly saw the problem of the Cogito as ontological, as a definite moment or happening 
(Ereignis) in the history of metaphysics, and to engage this problem is to think seriously about 
the question of reality and the condition of human beings within that reality. As his treatment of 
technology shows, these queries wrangle with fundamental questions that speak to our particular 
(modern) mode of existence in the world. Engaging the Cogito contextually, as Gaukroger has 
done, is an ontic concern, i.e., a highly complex and derivative consideration that presupposes 
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the fundamental meaning structure of the Cogito, yet neither realizes nor addresses that structure 
directly. Though the contextual relations he describes may be descriptively correct, they 
ultimately never penetrate into the deeper realm of meaning and significance that Heidegger’s 
approach has endeavored to do. Though Heidegger offers an historical approach with very 
powerful observations on the Cogito and the problem of modernity more generally, his approach 
is nevertheless limited largely because he sees the problem of the Cogito cast within an internal 
and necessary history of metaphysics.  
The Question of Culture  
Gaukroger has recently expanded his work on Descartes to address the gradual 
assimilation of traditional Western “cognitive values” into scientific ones, which he sees (not 
incorrectly) as the rationale and model for all other cognitive domains.
77
 Moreover, he sees this 
transformation within a long trajectory of development, beginning in the thirteenth century with 
the introduction of Aristotelian natural philosophy into university curricula, and culminating in 
the scientific triumphs of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  Central to his argument is the 
Scientific Revolution, which as a unique Western phenomenon triumphantly shaped all cognitive 
values in accordance with its own. As the scientific enterprise took shape during this period 
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together with changing conceptions of nature and the goals of natural philosophy, so also did the 
persona of the natural philosopher, a notion which factors heavily into this and other of 
Gaukroger’s works.
 78
  
For Gaukroger, Descartes is representative of this larger cultural transformation.  To 
return briefly to the intellectual biography, Gaukroger does not offer a contextual reading of the 
Cogito per se, but builds upon his previous work on Cartesian logic to see that the Cogito is one 
aspect in a broad web of meaningful relations, which, in turn, illuminates the whole of Descartes’ 
life and world. In particular, Gaukroger’s reading argues for the development of later Cartesian 
thought in relation to the condemnation of the Galilean system in 1633. Science was always at 
the heart of the Cartesian project, or so Gaukroger maintains. On this basis he concludes that 
Descartes’ later concerns for epistemological certainty, grounded in the Cogito, were directed 
less at the threat of skepticism and more as a tactic of obfuscated elucidation to legitimize a 
contentious natural philosophy.
79
 The emergence of the scientific culture Gaukroger describes, of 
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which Descartes is integral, was in large part dependent upon the persona of the natural 
philosopher, especially his concern with objectivity, impartiality and credibility (traditional 
scientific values), all of which shaped the general cognitive domain of the Western world. 
Gaukroger’s argument and the conclusions he draws from it are problematic, not least of 
all because of a very limited understanding of culture. First, what he understands as culture is 
largely dependent upon a contextual reading. His contextual approach, though it assumes the 
contrary, ultimately collapses into a species of reductionism that is ultimately a-historical.  The 
context becomes the source of meaning, which is itself dependent upon a network of causal 
relationships that are mutually reinforcing. Second, and perhaps more significantly as it relates to 
the historical epoch of which he is interested, Gaukroger has no clear notion of the Baroque as a 
cultural phenomenon. This opens another set of significant problems, not least of all those 
centered on the historiographical problem surrounding the Baroque as a cultural designation, 
which scholars have struggled to articulate.   
The Question of the Baroque 
There is a historiographic problem surrounding the Baroque as a cultural designation, 
which scholars have struggled to articulate. Though the Baroque is unchallenged and widely 
accepted in certain disciplines, namely art history, architecture, and music; in other scholarly 
areas it lacks consensus. This is most evident in the areas of literary and historical studies. Yet it 
was Wölfflin who in articulating the degeneration in style of the Renaissance into the Baroque, 
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also gave us the chief characteristics by which to assess and understand the Baroque.
80
 In terms 
of style, Wölfflin’s evaluative schema continues to be useful, especially in the area of art history. 
Among these characteristics, Wölfflin observed a supplanting of the more geometrical and linear 
style by the openly fluid and moving style of the painterly; the play of light and shadow 
(chiaroscuro) with the effect of revealing not what something is, but what it appears to be; the 
disposition toward monumentality, grandeur and a new sense of space; and the feeling of 
perpetual, undulating movement, often directed upward.  What is more, Wölfflin was the first to 
define the baroque as an historical problem.  Through his assessment, he came to view the 
Baroque style as dissonant; but perhaps more significantly, he understood it as the visual 
expression of the epoch’s Lebensgefühl, or the aspiration of life. The emergent Lebensgefühl, he 
maintained, could only be understood vis-à-vis the collapse of the classical ideal of concinnitas 
together with its attendant sense of perfection and harmony.  Thus, the manifestation of the 
Baroque is fundamentally a change in sensibility, and moreover, a sensibility that confirms and 
accords with its own sense of corporal presence, which it renders stylistically via materials, 
method and technique.    
Literary critics such as René Welleck have suggested the Baroque to be a period 
designation dominated by certain changing literary norms; as they might pertain, for example, to 
marinism, gongorism, or conceptism. In the end, the Baroque for Welleck was a general and 
complex European movement.
81
 Other literary scholars have probed deeply into the question of a 
Baroque poetics. Louis Martz has explored as the particularized vision of the soul (Donne), or 
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meditative action and the projection into the world of a dramatized version of the self (Loyola).
 82
 
Frank Warnke has observed a hallmark in Baroque writers the hallmark tendency toward an 
examination of an inner world placed in opposition to the deceptive and illusory outer world of 
appearances.
83
 The truth of the inner life emerges through a turning away from the world of 
appearances as well as an emphasis on personal experience, which jointly formed the basis not 
only of a writer’s manner of expression (which was often idiosyncratic and eccentric), but also 
the personal vision itself to which these expressions accorded.
84
 Beyond this, literary debates 
seem to center on the question of changing styles and attributes movements such as the 
Mannerist, Baroque and Classical. Other broadly aesthetic approaches such as that of Buci-
Glucksmann, have attempted to frame the Baroque in relation to the tensions between modernity 
and tradition, and especially insofar as that dialectic plays out through a culture of the 
spectacle.
85
 
William Bouwsma’s recent cultural history of Europe for the period 1550-1640 addresses 
the themes of Renaissance creativity and freedom as a counter pose to the classically dignified 
sense of order that came in its wake.
86
 For Bouwsma, this is an angst-ridden period, and though 
he does not define it in terms of the Baroque, the broad cultural phenomenon he describes is very 
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much a Baroque world.  He directs the main thrust of his argument to the creative exuberance of 
the Renaissance, which he correlates with the liberation from medieval modes of existence. He 
maintains that this creative impulse was short lived on account of the angst and uncertainty it 
occasioned, only to redound quickly in a search for order and stability.  Bouwsma characterizes 
this world in terms of change and flux, and perceives an almost constant “tension between the 
fundamental needs for both freedom and order,” only to suggest that there was no clear 
resolution between them.
87
  Though tensions were significant, and in certain ways 
fundamental—as between the conception of man advocated by the Schools and that which newly 
confirmed the freedom of the human spirit—it is important to note that an array of harmonies, 
discordances and contradictions constituted the moment of the late Renaissance.   
Though he proceeds from Jacob Burckhardt’s understanding of the age’s creative 
possibility, Bouwsma’s portrait of the late Renaissance is seemingly too reductive in its depiction 
of a sequence of vacillating and opposing movements—i.e., order and stability as situated in 
sharp contrast to freedom and creativity.  Though this notion of oppositions offers a “contextual 
center” Bouwsma’s argument seems incapable of plumbing the depths of late-Renaissance 
creativity and the inherently contradictory aspects of the creative impulse insofar as they reflect 
its characteristic variety and richness. Yet, what Bouwsma sees as a definitive expression of the 
late Renaissance is really an epiphenomenon, and is reliant upon a more decisive set of 
developments, namely a reconfiguration of the medieval ideal of the whole and within it the 
traditional relationship of man, God and world.        
 Another influential “cultural” approach is that of the Spanish historian, José Maravall. 
Maravall’s seeks to understand the Baroque’s operability, which he suggests worked on a level 
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of psychological motivation that stemmed from internal conflict, i.e., a struggling against self or 
an internal state of mixedness.
88
  
Related to concerns originally addressed by Wölfflin, Gilles Deleuze has attempted to 
define the Baroque through Leibniz’ Monadology and, specifically the dynamic interplay of the 
inner and the outer monad.
89
  In doing so, he reintroduces the Wölfflinian notion of the fold.  For 
Wölfflin, the fold served as a stylistic device, distinctive of the painterly, which gives way to a 
sense of layering, movement and elusiveness.  Deleuze, in reference again to the monad, 
capitalizes on this notion with the full force of metaphor. He envisions two orders of folds, i.e. 
the pleats of matter (les replis de la matière) and the folds in the soul (les plis dan l’âme). These 
two orders are separated by yet another fold, designated by Deleuze as the Fold proper, which 
effectively mediates the tensions between the outer and the inner folds. In an effort to overcome 
the Cartesian separability of mind and matter, Deleuze sees a unity between the infinitely 
complex and highly individualized expressions of the two folds, and moreover understands this 
unity as achievable only through the mediation of the Fold. It is here that Deleuze affirms 
Wölfflin, and to the extent that he envisions the Baroque Fold as an operative function from 
which the creative possibility of the Baroque is expressed.  As operative, the baroque is thus seen 
as an “infinite work or process,” and one that is both expressive and impressive, determining and 
determined, etc.        
In Deleuze’s though-provoking approach to the Baroque, it remains a concept, and indeed 
the “Baroque has no reason to exist without a concept that forms this reason itself.” What is 
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more, Deleuze’s approach, which is largely phenomenological, cannot account for historical 
change.  
By not formulating the problem of the Baroque historically, as Wölfflin had done 
previously, we’ve improperly distanced ourselves from it, which opens up the possibility to a 
whole host of pitfalls.  On the one hand, efforts to define what differentiates the styles of the 
Baroque from the Renaissance, or for that matter, the Baroque from the Mannerist, collapse 
ultimately into a type of techne and reduce these and any artistic movement to mere categories in 
which facts and technical points regarding style and description are addressed.  On the other 
hand, these stylistic and other similar queries, though perhaps correct and illuminating, fail to 
pose the crucial question: NOT what is the Baroque?; but rather, how does the Baroque generate 
meaning, and by extension truth?
90
   
 What I would like to suggest is that the Baroque cannot merely be a response to a 
philosophical, or even a social crisis; but rather a response to a general crisis of culture where 
traditional thought and institutions no longer held. By establishing validation inwardly on the 
basis of individual experiences, thoughts and desires, the Baroque offered a new sense of order. 
Owing a debt to Heidegger’s initial insights on subjectivity, as well as those of Deleuze and 
Maravall on the question of the Baroque, I maintain that the problem of subjectivity has been 
poorly posed, if posed at all as a cultural problem. In order to do, so we must turn to a particular 
form of cultural history that seeks to explain how meanings are generated and expressed in a 
variety of practices within specifically designated realm of human existence.  
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The Turn to Cultural History 
As it is perhaps now apparent to the reader, the question of culture in general, and of the 
Baroque specifically, together form a major thrust of inquiry in this dissertation vis-à-vis the 
significance of the Cogito and its emergence historically. Indeed, I must here again prevent any 
misunderstanding stemming from a prima facie concern that what is before us is merely a 
problem in the history of philosophy; or the history of ideas; or even a more broadly conceived 
intellectual history.
91
  Rather, I must stress this is a cultural-historical problem.  As such, the 
problem concerns the historical manifestation of a cultural whole, i.e., the various ways of life as 
they exist within a horizon of meaning.
92
 Within this horizon, there is a core set of moral values, 
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which moreover are dominant and relate to how meanings are generated and expressed to give 
the sense of a culture as a relative whole. The horizon is first and foremost a heuristic that allows 
the culture in question to be comprehended as a whole. The whole provides a type of background 
(Hintergrund) against which interpretations of the manifold range of meanings with a culture can 
be read and understood.
93
  
Understood in this way, a cultural history is both synchronic and diachronic in its 
emphases. In terms of the synchronic, it attempts to understand culture on the basis of the various 
interrelations of government, religion, the genres and sub-genres of art and literature, modes of 
intellectual activity etc., all understood as an expression of as a cultural whole. The diachronic 
dimension of a cultural history is in many ways dependent upon the synchronic, especially 
insofar as questions of synchronicity, i.e., cultural interrelations, must be understood before 
framing questions pertaining to the historical movement of a culture.   
Thus, the cultural historical approach endeavors not only to articulate how a particular 
cultural manifestation gives itself meaning, but also poses questions of how the present 
understands this meaning. To formulate the problem of the Cogito culturally-historically is 
therefore to enter effectively into this realm of meaning and significance for it is on this basis, 
especially, that questions of values are supported and empowered.  Since a concern with meaning 
lies at the center of cultural-historical inquiry, the truth of a cultural history, as Nietzsche 
reminds us, relies largely upon the art of interpretation, and not a science of facts. To be sure, it 
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is the interpretative act itself that offers unity to questions oriented both toward the synchronic 
and the diachronic aspects of a culture.  The interpretative act thus presupposes at least two 
things: 1) humanity’s own historicity and 2) the fact we are part of a tradition or a cultural whole 
(with both synchronic and diachronic dimensions) that transcends any one individual; and 
moreover, any attempt to determine the meaning structures of a previous cultural manifestation 
are always limited by our own culture as a mode of interpretation. As Jacob Burckhardt noted 
long ago, “what belongs to the past is at least more likely to become associated with our spiritual 
nature.”
94
  In speaking thus of the classical sources to which he tendered the deepest admiration, 
Burckhardt framed the problem of cultural history as an open-ended concern, which rather 
significantly, suggests the integrality of humanity to the totality of its history—i.e., to the 
tradition—and vice versa.  The textual sources Burckhardt mentions in the introduction to the 
Griechische Kulturgeschischte (as is true with any text or past cultural form) are themselves 
meaningful representatives of the “spiritual essence” of the tradition, and to engage critically 
with them is always to assume a meaningful role within the tradition itself. Similarly, in The 
Autumn of the Middle Ages, Johan Huizinga formulated the task of cultural history as a type of 
engagement with “the essential content that rests in the form.”  Yet, with both Burckhardt and 
Huizinga, engagement with the tradition presupposes that we are part of the tradition, and jointly 
comprise the totality assumed by the cultural-historical approach, i.e., both the synchronic and 
diachronic dimensions.  Our inquiries, as cultural historians, must always maintain, as 
Burckhardt suggested, “sympathy for the whole,” not only for an individual epoch or epochs; but 
also for the entirety of the tradition of which they form part.   
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To frame the problem of the Cogito in terms of a cultural history is obviously to proceed 
with the understanding that Western culture is itself historical, which is to deny a delimiting of 
the Cogito to a closed history such as that of metaphysics or philosophy more generally.  Rather, 
the manifestation of the Cogito forms part of a larger epochal transformation whereby certain 
concepts, principles, orientations, etc. assumed prominence while occasioning others into the 
recesses of relative obscurity. We must ask ourselves: what were the conditions of possibility, 
i.e., the “driving forces” within this epochal transformation that allowed not only for certain 
concepts, principles and orientations to emerge, but to manifest themselves in a particular way? 
What is more, what were the dynamics involved—morally, linguistically, ontologically— that 
allowed not only for a meaningful reception of these certain aspects, but for certain of them to 
gain complete dominance and to the extent that they become the very source of meaning? Take 
the notion of theōria, for example, which did not always connect to the type of theoretical life 
(βίος θεωρητικός) that Aristotle famously articulated in Book X of the Nichomachean Ethics, 
and which maintained that that life was constitutive of complete happiness (τέλεια εὐδαιμονία) 
insofar as it actuated the divine in us.
95
 With variance to this, the earlier Greeks participated in 
the spectacle of the tragic vision as given within the confines of the theatron (or seeing place); its 
truths revealed in the “ocular center” of the orchēstra (or dancing place) where the action itself 
played out. With Aristotle as with the early Greeks, the activity of theōria connoted a type of 
disconnection from the full participation in life, where only then the truth could be viewed. Yet, 
it is not merely a question of withdrawal from a fuller participation in the spectacle itself, 
whether through the contemplation of the tragic vision of primordial life (as with the early 
Greeks) or of the rational vision of metaphysical truths (as with Aristotle and the medieval 
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tradition). Rather the manner in which the withdrawal is characterized reflects a changing notion 
of truth and reality as well as a general orientation to life, which is a preeminently historical 
concern.  
The notion of theōria is apt in that as Burckhardt reminds us in the World Historical 
Observations, the approach to historical life (das geschichtliche Leben) is perhaps fundamentally 
a contemplative one, which is to say, the historical itself relates to a type of seeing, or to the 
specific way cultural phenomena appear within a historical moment.
96
 As Burckhardt tells us, the 
grand task of the historian is to reconstruct “whole spiritual horizons of the past,”
97
 but not in the 
sense of capturing the reality of the past in terms of some essence or formal aspect. Rather, for 
Burckhardt, the approach to the historical, though fundamentally contemplative, really directs 
itself in two fundamental ways that are at once distinct and identical. This is to say that the past 
presents to the historical imagination in two aspects: a spiritual aspect and one temporary 
(Vorübergehendes), which only appears to change.
98
  
With these two aspects, Burckhardt wants to show a relationship between deep-seated life 
forces and the way those forces translate in historical existence through the appearance of 
cultures and the cultural forms within them. To that end, the chief heuristic that he offers is the 
notion of the spiritual continuum (gestiges Continuum or geistige Continuität).
99
 The spiritual 
continuum is for Burckhardt a power (eine geschichtliche Macht) in the sense of potencies or 
possibilities; and from the depths of the continuum all forms of cultural life emerge, thrive and 
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decay. To approach the historical in a way that is mindful of the spiritual continuum is also to 
acknowledge that the past is open-ended. The historical, when understood in the cultural terms 
Burckhardt suggests, is to recognize it as a central phenomenon (Hauptphänomen), and not 
merely within a particular time and place, but also with respect to the whole of historical life as it 
exists in a “thousand forms” (tausendgestaltig) within the continuum.
100
 Thus, a cultural history, 
as defined as a contemplative approach to the broad range of the historical (Hauptphänomen) is a 
spiritual and mental possession of cultural-historical epoch, and as such, is the highest possession 
of any culture authentically oriented towards its historical past. Such thinking does not position 
the past in opposition to the present (as a scientist does with the object of his study); but finds in 
the continuum a living past, part of the present.    
A fundamental notion that relates to the spiritual continuum is that of the Kulturepoche, 
which represents as a dynamic and interrelated moment of competing and harmonizing forces, 
and which further represents the condition of possibility from which cultures emerge and are 
constituted.
101
 Burckhardt conceived of this notion of a Kulturepoche in a very novel and 
interesting way, and through it portrayed the unity of the Italian Renaissance culture as a 
dynamic and creative whole. As the conditio sine qua non, this heuristic served for Burckhardt as 
the basis from which to interpret the cultural phenomena of the Renaissance and moreover to 
determine the general character and contours of modernity. As I argue, the same forces that 
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shaped the Renaissance world Burckhardt described so vividly were fundamentally operative 
within the Baroque as well, and though they manifested in decisively different ways,
102
 together 
form part of a larger whole—the modern Kulturepoche.    
A Kulturepoche is a heuristic device, and as I understand it articulates a limited 
meaningful horizon in which exist the conditions of possibility for a world as a culture to 
manifest in particular and distinctive ways. As the name implies, a Kulturepoche is a type of 
“suspension” or a “holding back.” It is a device that allows historians of culture to bracket off 
questions, if just initially, such as those of reality, or of an overall diachronic movement, to 
explore a particular horizon of meaning as an intrinsic totality. Though dynamically complex and 
manifold, a Kulturepoche is also a limited and determinate moment within the broad spectrum of 
the historical, and within which a specific mode of human thought and action is articulated and 
defined.
103
  
A Kulturepoche represents a whole with respect to itself, yet it is also part of a whole of 
all temporally expressed epochal transformations, and thus retains a historical relationship with 
the specific cultural worlds these epochs generate.
104
  In other words, as limited horizons 
Kulturepochen are also permeable and thus allow for an individual Kulturepoche to be in 
dynamic engagement with its past. This dynamicism exists not only between Kulturepochen, but 
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of a race is transformed into deliberative action (Können)]. 
104
 In this sense, Burckhardt can speak of an unconscious accumulation of the vestiges of culture, 
[Unzähliges lebt auch unbewusst weiter, als Erwerb, der aus irgendeinem vergessenen Volk in das Blut der 
Menschheit übergegangen sein kann],WB, 276.19-20. This is fundamentally a Herderian notion, which Burckhardt 
articulated with respect to the spiritual continuum; but also Hegel in the general sense of Geistesgeschichte. 
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is expressed within each Kulturepoche through a fullness of dynamic possibility and the 
interplay of harmonies and disharmonies, agreements and contradictions. And though the 
Kulturepoche is a determinate historical moment, it is also “in-potential-to-be-expressed,” and 
thus retains an elusive and indeterminate character.
105
 This dynamical aspect—the particular way 
a culture transforms potency into act— effectively the culture’s formative principle, its Bildung. 
Through this indeterminateness—which is to say its dynamical possibility—cultures manifest in 
distinctive and sublimely differentiated ways, which are also the concrete manifestations or 
expressive modes of the Kulturepoche itself. This is not to say that the Kulturepoche is an 
animating force, as in a metaphysical sense; but rather the spiritual continuum itself, which is to 
say the ground of possibility from which a cultural totality may be expressed concretely. As a 
totality, a Kulturepoche must be understood to be coterminous with its modal expressions and is 
thus all-pervasive in its allowance for cultures to reveal themselves as cultures.   
In this way it is possible to speak of a “Renaissance culture” or a “Baroque culture” in 
terms of their respective styles, mannerisms and, indeed, the specific ways actions and thoughts 
are expressed and articulated; yet at the same time to understand their existence as part of the 
same Kulturepoche. The particular ways a culture manifests depends upon a dynamical 
relationship between culture as Bildung, i.e., a formation or concrete expression, as in any 
cultural form or structure of meaning; and the Kulturepoche as the horizon in which actions and 
thoughts are possible in the formation of a culture in it specific and concrete manifestation.
106
   
Through this dynamical relationship, and moreover the possibilities that emanate from it, a world 
may appear.  Thus, on the one hand, we may speak of a “Renaissance” or a “Baroque world” as a 
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 Cultures can be said to be in a constant striving to fulfill themselves as cultures relative to the dynamical 
processes at work within them. 
106
 In a Nietzschean sense, the Kulturepoche mediates life and how a specific world is actualized. We can 
never know these life forces directly, but only through the mediation of culture as a distinct historical moment 
within a Kulturepoche. 
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concrete “fact,” e.g., with respect to Castiglione’s understanding of self in his “autobiography,” 
and on the other hand, as a conglomerate of dynamic possibilities, e.g., the potential for self 
expression in multitudinous, if even sometimes contradictory ways.  Culture (Bildung) must 
always be understood in relation to the totality of the Kulturepoche, which is to say the 
dialectical relationship within the Kulturepoche itself as expressive of the generative potential of 
a cultural world.  In this way worlds are allowed to appear, disappear, and reappear as in a 
condition of “perpetual modification and disintegration.”
107
  The question now emerges: what 
were the general conditions of the modern Kulturepoche that, in their relation to certain 
subsisting elements within the tradition as a whole, allowed for a Baroque world to shine forth in 
a particular way?  How did these general conditions shape and, in turn, be shaped by a core set of 
values that came to be expressed in a variety of cultural forms?  Of course, the task before us is 
not a search for the “origins” of the Baroque, nor does it assume the validity of an originary 
historical approach. As a heuristic, the Kuturepoche presupposes a profoundly manifold 
historical continuity. 
Such an approach is obviously to move against empiricism—in all its various guises—
where historical truth is determined on the basis of hard evidence, especially the consistency of 
brute facts in their adherence to a theoretical framework. The notion of a cultural totality that 
Burckhardt gives us, is obviously theoretical, though its employment is merely a heuristic for the 
interpretation of a core value-set together with its attendant meanings and significances. To 
probe the question of meaning vis-à-vis values is, in my view, among the chief tasks of the 
historian of culture, and it is from here that questions can be posed, especially with respect to 
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 WB, 276.5-6. Burckhardt understood two constants (stabilien Lebenseinrichtunen) in the life of any 
cultural world, “unaufhorlich modificirend und zersetzend auf die beiden stabilien Lebenseinrichtunen.” Nietzsche 
will pick up on this in his understanding of the cultural life of a people as either life affirming or life denying.   
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what these values engender and create. For example, one may turn (as I do in the dissertation) to 
the role assumed by values in the creation of a culture’s dominant notion of truth, which is to 
address concomitantly the subordinating and even conflicting notions of truth coexisting within a 
cultural totality.  Furthermore, concerns for value and truth must be addressed in exploring not 
only the creation of, but the interrelation of any number of legitimate meaning structures or 
cultural forms, e.g. the arts, institutions, technologies, etc.  
In a recent treatment of Jacob Burckhardt’s The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, 
Benjamin Sax has addressed the problem of cultural history in view of the question of the 
theoretical status of a cultural totality, which he sees “both as a heuristic device that makes 
cultural interpretation possible and as an ‘idea’ that allows the truth of a particular type of reality 
to emerge.” In addition to the interpretive schema given by this heuristic notion of a cultural 
totality, and through which values are illuminated, the historian of culture further employs the 
heuristic to “phenomenalize” the culture, which he does initially by the act of writing. In 
phenomenalizing a culture, the historian creates from a unique perspective a picture that pays 
tribute, as it were, to the particularities of a culture (i.e., events, persons, cultural forms, and 
phenomena more generally) as well as to its vital and creative forces (i.e., the culture itself as a 
vitalizing power, and in turn, the values and truths that it engenders).
108
 Though sympathy for the 
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 On the creative act of phenomenalizing a culture, especially in view of the Goethean notion of 
Anschauung, see Benjamin C. Sax, “An Acute and Practiced Eye”: Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the 
Renaissance in Italy,” in Cultural Visions: Essays in the History of Culture, edited by Penny Schine Gold and 
Benjamin C. Sax (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000), 111-150.  
On the notion of “vital forces” as that what shapes and forms a culture, see Jacob Burckhardt, Weltgeschischtliche 
Betrachtungen, op. cit., 254-91. Burckhardt focuses on the three historically formative and influential powers and 
their interrelationships: the state, religion, and culture.  Though culture is here designated as one among three 
powers (drei Potenzen), it is evident that Kultur is the dominant of the three powers of which the other two are 
forceful expressions. Indeed, Burckhardt will develop the notion of Kulturepoche, and the generative powers 
associated with it, more fully in The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, and more fully still in the Griechische 
Kulturgeschischte. As I will develop below, it is the Burckhardtian notion of Kulturepoche, formulated as “the 
Baroque” (and in a related sense, modernity) that is the generative potential behind a specific value-set and its 
legitimating truth claims.     
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cultural whole is retained, the act of phenomenalizing, again, does not imply the capture of some 
past reality. As Sax notes, the theoretical status of a cultural totality, as expressed in Burckhardt, 
parallels Kant’s understanding of a regulative idea, which as a transcendental principle of 
cognition, provides a schema for reflective judgments to be made “as if” there were such a 
concept as a cultural totality.
109
 The heuristic or regulative “idea” here is at once the 
“phenomenalized” cultural totality brought to the text through writing, as well as the interpretive 
schema on which the phenomenalization depends.  n the end, as Sax suggests, the text allows not 
only for a concrete articulation of a particular reality (the world of the text), but from it opens 
questions of possibility for this world, this reality, this present.  
To understand history in terms of culture and values in dynamic interplay is to place the 
concerns of cultural history (Kulturgeschischte) at the very core of what it means to be human, 
not only at a given time and place, but also within the totality of the successive moments of the 
cultural tradition where history is allowed to unfold.  By “unfolding” I mean neither to suggest a 
sort of linear necessity to history nor the operation of a strict logic within a broad or narrow 
chronology; but rather the dynamic interplay between cultures as they appear historically and the 
cultural-historical continuum of which they form part. In this sense, a cultural totality is not 
without logic, not without determinism. Yet, the crucial distinction to be made here is between a 
notion of cultural determinism and that of a notion of causality, and strictly speaking, a scientific 
causality. Though values are culturally determined, and furthermore, as human beings we exist 
within a culture that is historically conditioned—there is never a proverbial “view from 
nowhere.” In the language of metaphysics, I understand values to “animate” and to “inform” the 
vitality of a culture from which meaningful structures are created and whose patterns can be 
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 Sax, 143. 
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illuminated interpretatively, which is to say hermeneutically.
110
   
To problematize the Cogito hermeneutically is resolutely not an archival-type excavation 
rendered merely to accumulate information about the Cogito within some sort of historical 
context or theoretical framework, nor is it a task, launched from a limited philosophical 
perspective, to analyze and assess the Cogito as emblematic of a certain phase in scientific 
thought.  Quite simply, when formulated within the purview of a cultural totality where the 
question of values is brought to the fore, along with the attendant concerns for meaning and 
significance, the problem of the Cogito, as with any authentically formulated historical problem, 
becomes an attempt to understand the forces and conditions at work within our own time, and 
thus becomes a hermeneutical project.
111
 As Johann Gottfried Herder observed over two 
centuries ago, the move to culture enables us to articulate the basic experience of modernity, and 
proceeds on the understanding that we ourselves are historical beings and are thus shaped and 
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 On the cultural historian and the project of cultural history, see Karl J. Weintraub, Visions of Culture: 
Voltaire, Guizot, Burckhardt, Lamprecht, Ortega y Gasset (Chicago: University of Chicago: 1966), “The historian 
of civilization is interested in the total way of life, in the style of life by which men gave unified expression to their 
manifold activities” (p. 2); and “he sees culture not as a mere aggregate of traits but as forming an intricately 
interrelated pattern” (2). Also, on the question of cultural totality, though not necessarily a morally centered totality, 
see Wilhelm Dilthey, Pattern and Meaning in History, ed. Hans P. Rickman (New York: Harper and Bros., 1961), 
“Like the individual, every cultural system, every community, has a focal point within itself. In it, a conception of 
reality, valuation, and production of goods, are linked into a whole” (129-30).  Also, see Johan Huizinga, “The Task 
of Cultural History” in Men and Ideas: History, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance (Trenton: Princeton University 
Press, 1984), 17-76. 
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 Regarding the question of a philosophical hermeneutics, though not a cultural hermeneutics, see Hans-
Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans., by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, (New York: Continuum, 
2004).  In terms of hermeneutics my approach is fundamentally Gadamerian, especially his development of the 
Herderian notion of a cultural horizon. Philosophical and historical interpretations, which are to say cultural 
interpretations, of another cultural-historical horizon are always cast within a horizon themselves.  To be sure 
horizons may converge, and in a way not unlike that depicted in a Venn diagram, though interpretation is always 
limited by the horizon in which the interpretation is cast.  To take this one step further, as Nietzsche did, the 
horizons are determined by the culture, which is to say by the sub-set of values in which they are manifested 
culturally. Most trenchantly in Nietzsche, see On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic, trans. By Walter Kaufmann 
(New York: 1989); and for a recent interpretation, especially as it relates to Nietzsche’s problematization of moral 
values to truth, historically, see Benjamin Sax, “Genealogy and Truth” (forthcoming).     
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conditioned by the cultural forces that give form to that history.
112
  A cultural historical 
approach, then, attempts not only to explore the “spiritual contours” of the modern epoch, but 
employs in the process a critical assessment of modernity by summoning into action a particular 
perspective or interpretative stance toward the modern experience vis-à-vis the cultural and 
historical conditions of possibility from which it derives.  
The Question of the Modern Self 
In employing a critical re-reading of the classical formulation, Ego cogito—ego sum, and 
in a distinctly Heideggerian vein, it also endeavors to explore the larger and enduring 
ramifications of this formulation by opening it to the question of the culture of the Baroque,
113
 
which I maintain is a broad and still-operative cultural phenomenon. The Cogito’s rise to 
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 On this basic point, see Benjamin C. Sax, “Truth and Meaning in Cultural History”, in Cultural Visions, 
19. Among other things, the cultural-historical approach, as employed by Jacob Burckhardt, Johan Huizinga and 
Walter Benjamin, for example, becomes a type of Oppositionswissenschaft (an oppositional form of knowing) not 
only in its attempt to break free of the hegemony established by social and political history, but to offer an aesthetic 
expression that resists the atomizing and simplifying tendencies common to modern approaches to history.  For 
analyses of Oppositionswissenschaft and the aesthetic articulation of a cultural totality in Burckhardt’s The 
Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, see John Hinde and Benjamin C. Sax, respectively, in John R. Hinde, Jacob 
Burckhardt and the Crisis of Modernity (Montreal: McGill, 2000) and Benjamin C. Sax, “An Acute and Practiced 
Eye”: Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, and the Problem of Cultural History”, in 
Cultural Visions, 111-150.  For models of this approach to cultural history from which my own is inspired, see 
Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, trans. S.G.C. Middlemore (Penguin: 1990); Johan 
Huizinga, The Autumn of the Middle Ages, trans. Rodney J. Payton and Ulrich Mammitzsch  (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996); and Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne (London: 
Verso, 1998). 
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 As I shall argue below, the Baroque is not only the conditio sine qua non for the Cogito formulation, but 
the undergirding cultural dynamic of modernity itself. Yet, the problem of the Baroque is fraught with difficulty—
the proverbial “can-of-worms”; and, if it is problematized at all, it is oftentimes formulated in technical terms, the 
efforts of which painstakingly detail the stylistic differences between the Baroque and the Renaissance, the 
Mannerist, or the Neo-classical.  In addition to the plastic arts, such comparative analyses extend to the literary and 
performative arts with near equal ardor and enthusiasm.  However, formulating the Baroque as an historical problem 
is somewhat less a concern.  Historians typically manage to avoid, or at least, skirt around the problem of the 
Baroque and its various complexities, all of which defy facile and traditional historical categorizations.  Yet even 
more disconcerting is the outright dismissal in certain historical circles of the Baroque altogether, which has 
redounded in its relegation to the status of a non-problem.  In any case, there is no historiographical consensus as to 
the Baroque and how to define it.  In working through the problem of the Cogito, I will engage deeply with the 
question of the Baroque while formulating it as a cultural-historical problem.  
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dominance must be understood in terms of the history of culture, which the forces in which 
provided the conditio sine qua non for the Cogito to achieve full expression together with its all-
important criterion for meaning, significance and truth. Moreover, it is from the Cogito that the 
broader notion of subjectivity derives, and which directly undergirded, informed and influenced 
the formation and development of modern science, and by extension the very possibility of 
modernity itself, at least as we have come to know it since the eighteenth century.
 114
  
By raising the problem of subjectivity (via the Cogito), along with its specific criterion 
for truth, I am raising the related problem of self-conception. The Cartesian move to the Cogito 
cannot be understood, as Heidegger did, merely as a fated development in the history of 
metaphysics where the path to nihilism is pre-inscribed; rather it should be understood also as a 
complex and dynamic cultural movement. The Baroque is a fascinatingly rich and creative 
cultural epoch, and reveals a number of possibilities for self-conception, as one may find, for 
example, in the sonnets of Shakespeare, the essays of Montaigne, and the respective 
“autobiographies” of Loyola and Cardano to name just a few.  These examples at once attest to 
the confusion and richness of such terms as: “subiectum”, “self”, “anima”, “spiritus”, 
“consciousness”, “persona”, etc., which manifested not only during the Baroque epoch, but 
endure into all subsequent historical periods, including our own—as the problem of 
individualism in modernity would seem to make clear.  Yet, a common strand uniting these 
conceptions of self is the emphasis upon the value and legitimacy of the inner experience, along 
with a deepening notion of the possibilities of a truth gained through reflection and the widening 
of this “inner space.” The powerful move facilitated by the Cogito formulation, namely the 
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 This is not to argue in a simplistic and causal fashion whereby it is maintained that Descartes, through a 
succession of well-articulated and highly persuasive treatises, created the modern world. Moreover, it seeks to 
challenge the distinctly modern notion of absolute beginnings, personified as they are, in the figure of Descartes.   
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laying out of a foundation of mathematical order from which a universal science may be derived, 
had far-ranging and deeply penetrating implications for the modern conception of self.  On the 
one hand, the Cogito formulation effectively stabilized the variously and inwardly directed, but 
as yet, not strictly subjectivist conceptions of self in the early modern period, while on the other 
hand, it reduced selfhood to a mere abstraction.  The attempt to define a self on the basis of strict 
theoretical terms brings forth a number of problems, not least of all the false division between 
subject and object (on which the sciences operate) and a perpetuation of the confusion between 
self and subject, self and consciousness, etc.   Yet, even more problematically, the Cogito’s 
legitimating criterion for truth creates in its train an inauthentic orientation of self to world and 
vice versa as well as poses serious challenges to the possibility of being fully human in the 
modern world. The problem of the Cogito must be posed again. 
As a Baroque formulation, i.e., a general inward validation of experience, thought, etc., 
the Cogito—or a mind thinking itself—effectively represents Descartes’ attempt to conceive a 
notion of self and in the process allay uncertainty while providing a firm foundation for 
knowledge. The move to the Cogito, though emanating from a more generalized and fluid, 
Baroque conception of self, effectively negates the idea of a self in denying reciprocity between 
self and world. This is to say, that a rational and willful subjectivity sees the world purely in 
objective terms and in so doing, removes itself from the world. The question of the subject, as 
formulated in the Cogito, its stance toward reality and the definition of truth on which it depends, 
all must be reconsidered not only in light of the postmodern criticism, but fundamentally as a 
cultural problem. In understanding the Cogito as a cultural construct, we are better poised to 
understand it as the ground of reality in modernity; its characterization in terms of epistemic 
certitude; and its privileged values of objectivity, clarity and distinctness. 
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By eschewing a strictly causal-based or reductionist reading of the Cogito and its relation 
to the emergence and consolidation of the natural sciences, I argue that the complex element of 
the “inner life,” and specifically that which would eventually flower into subjectivity, was 
accentuated for a variety of reasons within the cultural horizon of the Baroque. Only by revealing 
the cultural dynamics through which the Cogito—and by extension the broader ambit of 
subjectivity—was operative, i.e., values, mores, discursive practices, etc., can we hope to 
understand not only its emergence, but the force and power given it by the culture itself, which 
together continue to dominate the modern epoch with significant existential implications. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
A Metaphor for Modernity: The Microcosm and Pico’s Oratio de hominis dignitate 
 
Ancient ontology...is fundamentally not unimportant and can never be overcome, because it 
represents the first necessary step that any philosophy at all has to take, so that this step must 
always be repeated by every actual philosophy. Only a self-complacent modernity lapsed into 
barbarism can wish to make us believe that Plato, as it is tastefully expressed, is done for. 
—Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology 
 
While the men of the Middle Ages look on the world as a vale of tears, which pope and emperor 
are set to guard against the coming of the antichrist; while the fatalists of the Renaissance 
oscillate between seasons of overflowing energy and seasons of superstition or of stupid 
resignation, here, in this circle of chosen spirits, the doctrine is upheld that the visible world was 
created by God in love, that it is the copy of a pattern pre-existing in Him, and that He will ever 
remain its eternal mover and restorer. The soul of man can by recognizing God draw Him into its 
narrow boundaries, but also by love of Him itself expand into the Infinite—and this is 
blessedness on earth.  
      —Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy 
The Microcosm and the Modern Moment 
The modern cultural epoch, of which we are a part, began with the Italian Renaissance, 
and it was Burckhardt who observed in his characteristic way the moment at which the 
knowledge of world and man reach maturity together. In the concluding lines of the Civilization 
of the Renaissance, he notes that magnificent moment whereby man, as raised upon a mystical 
edifice, may reach the full range of his god-like potential. The same love that had formed the 
very sinews of the cosmos in the will-based mysticism of Augustine; and the same love that for 
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Dante had done quite the same while also moving the sun and the other stars,
115
 now defined the 
vibrantly dynamical relationship of man and world. Man as a copy of the divine pattern—the 
microcosm—becomes the basis of redefining the older medieval relationship of God, man, and 
world. Thus, this is a poetical moment, which moreover was the creative force at work within the 
Renaissance. These vibrant energies now drawn into the relatively narrow boundaries of the 
microcosm were at the very heart of the creative moment that was the Renaissance, and indeed 
also, the Baroque and modernity as a whole.   
The question of the microcosm metaphor
116
 as expressed and acknowledged in its 
generative and poetic mode is crucial for reassessing the significance of the Cartesian move to 
put knowledge and truth on a new foundation; and moreover, to open new channels of inquiry 
into this, our modern world. The fruitfulness of this and related inquiries hinges chiefly upon 
three things: the interrelationship of language in the poetic mode (i.e., language in the generative 
as opposed to the descriptive metaphorical mode); the cultural conditions through which those 
generative possibilities were allowed to manifest; and the specific expressions of this poetic 
language as translated into thought and action through the mediation of culture. My aim in this 
section is simple: to raise the question of the microcosm as expressed in Pico della Mirandola’s 
Oratio de hominis dignitate as the operative and creative metaphor of modernity.  Insofar as the 
metaphor operates on multiple levels, it is the level of the pre-conceptual that offers the most 
significance to our considerations here. Though Aristotle seemingly stressed the cognitive 
function of the metaphor in the facilitating of learning
117
—a focus very appealing to formal 
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 Paradiso, XXXIII, 145, “L'amor che move il sole e l'altre stelle.” 
116
 The locus for our query into the microcosm metaphor is Pico della Mirandola’s Oratio de hominis 
dignitate. 
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 Rhetoric, III.10.3-10.7 in the Loeb edition, translated by J.H. Freese (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1926).  Indeed, Aristotle acknowledges the informative (and the creative) power of metaphor, yet it is his 
assumption that logic may be imposed upon the metaphorical to stabilize, namely its variegated and unstable 
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semiotic theories as well as certain brands of literary criticism—the Ricoeurian reading of the 
Rhetoric endeavors to move beyond “psychological” interpretations to present the complexity of 
the metaphor in a way perhaps more faithful to Aristotle’s, and indeed, the original Greek 
understanding.
118
  The metaphor in Ricoeur’s view serves not only as a lexographical figuration 
(lexis), which includes inter alia diction and style; but functions also semantically, i.e., at the 
level of meaning, so as to allow discourse (the Λόγος) to appear in a particular way.
119
   
My own approach follows Ricoeur’s basic interpretive move, especially the metaphorical 
operation at the level of the Λόγος, which is also a level of meaning. Yet, I wish to draw out 
more fully the integral relation of the metaphorical with respect to the moral dimension of 
thought and action. From here, we must endeavor to explore and, thus to articulate to a greater 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
semantic field. This move not only separates lexis from logos in a particular way, it does so also to the extent that 
lexis (diction) now re-incorporates logos (in this sense a more purely semantical level of language) in accordance to 
its own terms and demands.  The metaphor is still operative and power, though in a greatly limited way. This is 
overly and sadly simplistic statement regarding a decisive moment in the metaphysical tradition, the assumptions of 
which we continue to privilege and to a great extent.   
118
 Readings of a psychological bent proceed under the assumption that some underpinning science or 
philosophy, i.e., a theory, must be present to justify and legitimate our understanding of the metaphor. Ricoeur’s 
criticism here stems primarily from the fact that such approaches already not only impose a truth value about the 
metaphor, but deny it any informative or creative value.  What is more, these readings assume what “meaning is” 
and thus reducing the question of the metaphor—insofar as it is cast within these theoretical parameters—to a 
certain circularity and to the extent that metaphor will always act limitedly, which is to say, lexographically.  On this 
approach, see for example, I.A. Richards and C.K. Ogden, The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of 
Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism (New York: Mariner Books, 1989) and I.A. Richards, The 
Philosophy of Rhetoric (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965). 
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 See Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, et passim; and Ricoeur, “The Metaphorical Process as 
Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling” in On Metaphor, edited by Sheldon Sacks (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1979), 142. For Ricoeur semantics reflect the metaphor’s capacity “to provide untranslatable information and, 
accordingly…yield some true insight about reality” (141). To this I will add: that though Aristotle acknowledged the 
informative (and the creative) power of metaphor, he nevertheless assumed that logic may be imposed upon the 
metaphorical, and with significant implications for the possibility of knowledge.  He thus hoped to stabilize the 
variegated and unstable semantic field characteristic of this level of the metaphorical (lexis). This move not only 
separates lexis from logos in a particular way, it does so also to the extent that lexis (diction) by re-incorporating the 
logos (in this sense a more purely semantical level of language) in accordance to its own terms and demands.  In 
other words, the assumption here is that reasoning, and by extension knowledge (episteme), can only be attained at 
the level of lexis (though it is understood as logos). Though we are still talking of the metaphorical, and moreover 
we can still acknowledge the Aristotelian assumption that the metaphor remains operative and powerful in the 
facilitation of knowledge (especially by analogy), it is nevertheless functioning in a greatly limited way.  We have 
now entered into a new realm replete with completely novel assumptions regarding the dynamics of Being, 
especially as starkly contrasted with the Greeks of the Archaic Period. Indeed, this is an overly and sadly simplistic 
statement regarding a decisive moment in the metaphysical tradition, the assumptions of which we continue to 
privilege, and to a great extent.   
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degree, the fact that we are not only moral beings existing in a particular, historical world, but 
that we dwell within language in a fundamental way—the two are thus inextricable.  On one 
level, emphasis upon the raw, creative power of the metaphorical may occasion a movement 
away from more stylistic, literary, and indeed decidedly conceptual renderings of the same. This 
is to say, we wish to move beyond a treatment of the metaphor acting merely at the level of lexis; 
or in other words, acting in the very terms articulated and granted by the metaphor in its 
generative mode. This is to say that though the descriptive metaphor may convey meaning and 
significance, it does not create it—it lacks authentic, poetic openness to Λόγος. On another level, 
this approach endeavors to occasion an awareness and appreciation of—though from a different 
angle and perspective—the elusive dynamics that underpinned (and continue to underpin) a 
historically specific moment in the West—the Italian Renaissance—and from which the 
characteristics of modernity began to assume their present form.  
In other words, the intrinsic metaphorical possibilities of Pico’s microcosm extend to and 
are operative within the entirety of the modern Kulturepoche, including our unique, historical 
placement within it. Indeed, those dawning and incipient moments of the epochal threshold 
(Epochenschwelle), as Hans Blumenberg has called it,
120
 are especially interesting and 
problematic historically, and are perhaps crucial in the attempt to reckon and engage with the 
epoch’s significance. In particular, the metaphor has transformed and re-transformed itself 
throughout the epoch in crucially important ways, a concern which therefore becomes decisive 
for our considerations below. In recognizing the fundamentally creative potential of language 
and its relation to thought and action, we are at the same time recognizing the underlying 
concerns of meaning and significance, which by the operative definitions of this dissertation, are 
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tied inextricably to culture. To pose the problem of the metaphor in this fashion is to concede 
awareness that an informative and creative metaphor, such as Pico’s articulation of the 
microcosm, is constitutive and reflective of a particular mode of thought and action, which at the 
same time is constitutive and reflective of a particular cultural-historical manifestation. In other 
words, thought and action, and moreover, the cultural horizon by which these modes are allowed 
to appear, are fundamentally metaphorical.  
By posing the problem of the microcosm metaphor as a problem in the history of culture, 
and vice versa, we are opening the cultural concerns of thought and action vis-à-vis their creative 
potential to the broader ambit of positive and “vitalizing forces” as made possible by the 
metaphor itself.  From here the attendant questions of meaning and value can be posed and 
subsequently explored insofar as they sustain and condition the modern mode of existence.  
What is more, an attempt can be made to reveal the metaphor’s creative potential, especially in 
its relation to the possibility for the creation of new “truths” and new structures of meaning, and 
indeed, the creation of a new world—none of which, in any particular instantiation, were 
foregone necessities in the Renaissance.   This is especially important for a historically based 
critique—such as the one here employed—whereby the question of interpretation is of 
paramount importance. Therefore, an attempt can be made to question, and at several levels, the 
hegemonic sway of the dominant definition of truth as occasioned by Cartesianism together with 
the ontological stance it entails and privileges. Perhaps more importantly, it allows the 
opportunity to raise questions that might otherwise elude us or lay beyond our reach altogether, 
which are crucial to illuminating the problem of modernity as well as for fruitful reflection upon 
it vis-à-vis our “privileged” stance within the present.  To the dynamics of those questions, and 
the metaphor itself, we shall now turn. 
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Opening the Question of the Metaphor 
In order to open our analyses of the question of modernity, and the placement of the Cogito 
within, it is important to dwell briefly within the conditional moment where the germs of that 
history first began to unfold—the Italian Renaissance.  To hold true to Nietzsche’s observation 
that the world of the Renaissance “contained within it all the positive forces to which we owe our 
modern culture,” it is exceedingly important to illuminate not only the Renaissance, but the 
Baroque as well, as twin phenomena coterminous with the broader question of modernity.
 121
 To 
entertain this ambitious question is to advance most certainly upon a large and difficult ground. 
One avenue through which to pursue it fruitfully, as Nietzsche himself did with respect to the 
trans-valuation of values in Western culture—from antiquity forward—hinged upon the 
significance of the metaphor. In his “defense” of the metaphor against a privative, literal 
meaning (which as Gadamer and Ricoeur have shown, is still metaphorical), Nietzsche 
endeavored to show through a number of his works that the instance of humanity as a whole—
and by extension, life—is permeated in several senses by metaphors.
122
  The implication being 
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that the metaphor is rich, variegated and ever-present; and moreover, defies reduction to a fixed 
or logically stabilized schema, as guaranteed, for example, by a referentially adequate dimension 
that grounds both meaning and truth.
123
  In short, the metaphor mediates life.
124
  And, as 
Nietzsche’s general assessment suggests, the metaphor operates on a fundamental and pre-
conceptual level where it is uniquely expressive of its creativity and generative power.
125
  And 
yet, the metaphor acts also in accordance with a historically unique value structure, or culture 
(which I will address in some detail below). The metaphor mediates the potential of any number 
of modes of human existence and their cultural expressions. Indeed, the culture of the 
Renaissance (and by extension the Baroque)—together with its vibrantly affirmative expression 
of life—doubtless represents such a moment of fundamentally creative potential. The creativity 
and life-effusive impetus that animated and shaped any number of its cultural forms was 
thoroughly and authentically poetical. In this sense, poetry as a “poetical mode”—i.e., a mode of 
creativity or making—represents the “essence of art,” especially in its ability to open-up a 
historical world together with the vibrant potentialities for that world.
126
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Since the metaphor, as Nietzsche tells us, is itself linked to life, which in various ways 
extends to culture, the problem of the Cogito must first draw reference to the possibilities of the 
microcosm metaphor as established in the Renaissance, and most famously associated with 
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. Only then can the question of culture vis-à-vis the full possibility 
of these vital and positive forces be adequately posed—and from here an historical assessment of 
them.  Yet, a cultural-historical reading of the Cogito, though dependent upon the question of 
values—which is to say, the meaning and significance that determines and expresses the various 
modes of thought and action, must rely on the full ambit of metaphorical possibility. This 
metaphorical possibility is in many ways antecedent to the dynamic whereby cultural values 
shape those possibilities into definable realities, which are in turn expressed variously and 
vigorously in and through any number of cultural forms.  
To approach the question of the metaphor in this way—which is to say at the level of the 
poetical—is to delve below the diction-oriented (lexis) expression of language.
127
  At this 
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derivative level of lexis, language interrelates and conveys meaning, though it does not create 
meaning; it acts provisionally, even mechanically; but not poetically. By contrast, the poetical 
metaphor, as Paul Ricoeur has noted, occurs as a complex “event” whereby meaning emerges 
within language in a powerful and creative way—in other words it “opens up a world;” or more 
specifically, it opens the possibility for a world to emerge.
128
 That Ricoeur’s philosophical 
project was in large part hermeneutical (i.e., through its concentration on interpretation and the 
understanding of meaning), the written text was crucial in his attempt to explicate a particular, 
human mode of being as revealed by the text.
129
  What is more, the hermeneutical, or 
interpretative act, hinges upon the “textual world” as a type of “fictive world,” which moreover, 
becomes effectively a “proposed world” in which to project one’s possibilities in profoundly 
dynamic ways. This is especially the case vis-à-vis the creation of a “new world” outside the 
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text.
130
 The fictive or textual world reveals to us in a profound way our world; or more to the 
point, the possibilities for our world.  
It may be obvious that in using the specific notion of the “opening of a world,” or world 
disclosure, Ricoeur owes a debt to Heidegger. And indeed it was Heidegger who articulated and 
defined the “opening of a world” (Erschlossenheit) in terms of the complex notion of Ereignis, 
i.e., an event characterized as a coming-into-view or disclosure (Unverborgenheit). Rather than 
to establish—with respect to Ricoeur’s understanding —a common ground for the respective 
“realities” of text, metaphor and extra-textual world, employed as they were to overcome a 
hermeneutical problem, I want to follow a slightly different path. Though I agree with Ricoeur in 
viewing the interpretive moment—briefly outlined above—as an opportunity to understand 
ourselves and our world vis-à-vis the text and the creative possibilities it yields in their re-
description, I wish to emphasize the Heideggerian notion of Ereignis with respect to the question 
of possibility (Möglichkeit) itself.  Specifically, the question of a vibrant and creative possibility, 
together with its integral connection to metaphor (i.e., language in general) and culture, hinge 
upon the complex notion of Ereignis as the “event,” which makes any occurrence possible.
131
  
In accordance with Heidegger’s frame of thought, I maintain that the historical reflection 
summoned through the heuristic of Ereignis provides in its way a stark insight into the nascent 
and raw vitality of the human condition (and especially vis-à-vis values, meanings and 
significances), which again, (and not dissimilar from Heidegger) are linked to the creative power 
of language. Thus, Ereignis is in many ways crucial in the problematization of the metaphor and 
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what it purports to do in the creating of a new historical reality. The etymology of metaphor, as 
derived from the Greek metapherein, connotes a sense of “transference,”  “carrying over;” or 
indeed, a “changing or altering.” Together, they dignify the pre-Aristotelian sense of 
hermeneutics, as related to the god Hermes, who was the messenger of the gods who mediated 
between them and humanity—or effectively, he mediated between humanity and Being. Not only 
is Ereignis an “opening of a world,” (Erschlossenheit) it constitutes the conditional moment 
whereby language, in a historically unique way, creates and transforms human thought and 
action, and thus makes any “world opening” possible.   
Laying the Ground: Ereignis and World Disclosure 
On the very complex notion of Ereignis—and the attendant notion of the Λόγος on which 
the “event” thoroughly depends—a few prefatory remarks are in order. Notwithstanding the 
contested view that the Ereignis formulation was successful in overcoming Western 
metaphysics, as a heuristic, it is exceedingly fruitful in assaying a re-formulation of the problem 
of the modern cultural epoch. It must be emphasized that Ereignis, as an event, is not to be 
understood as a “factual event” expressed, for example, via a specific date, place or individual 
(e.g., William the Conqueror who was present at the Battle of Hastings in October of 1066); but 
rather, more in terms of a “clearing” (Lichtung). In this way a historical moment—along with the 
beings and things that comprise it—appear or shine forth, and thus come-into-view in a 
particular way. Implicitly crucial within Heidegger’s notion of Ereignis is the act of poíesis 
(ποίησις), which he understood in the full Greek sense of “the poetic” viz., a “production,” a 
“type of making” or a “bringing forth.”
132
 Ereignis is for Heidegger, arguably, the supreme 
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moment of poíesis, which furthermore, as should be stressed, is “poetic” in a very rich and 
complicated way.
133
  The “event,” in the first instance, is poetic in that it occasions the “bringing 
forth” of a world.  This poetic “bringing forth” comprises what Heidegger understood as 
“unconcealment” or the shining forth of a world, a notion he articulated further in terms of the 
Greek λέγειν/légein. Through λέγειν, and its more familiarly direct connotation “to speak” or “to 
say,” Heidegger interpreted its meaning more broadly so as to connote a type of “laying out;” or, 
as Heidegger states, a “letting-lie-together-before” (bei-sammen-vorleigen-Lassen).
134
   
Decisively for Heidegger, as he indicated later in the essay, λέγειν is understood as a 
“gathering” (as sammen would seem to imply); and yet this “gathering,” which must be 
emphasized, is itself a “poetic event.” The world that shines forth through λέγειν, as a type of 
gathering, does so in a total and collective way. Yet, the event that manifests, as the gathering, is 
not only whole and total, but is also exceptional. As Heidegger notes in his reading of the 
Heraclitus fragment, the “exceptional laying that is the λέγειν…comes to pass as the Λόγος.”
135
  
In other words, this is to suggest that while λέγειν allows beings and things to lie-together-
before, the λέγειν relates to the Λόγος in a particular and special way through which the Λόγος is 
allowed to shine forth as “the Laying that gathers.”
136
 Heidegger characterizes the relationship 
between λέγειν and the Λόγος with another crucial verb—ὁμoλoγεῑν/homo-legein. The action 
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conveyed by this verb (indeed, as a type of predicate) simultaneously strengthens this 
relationship while allowing Heidegger to convey a sense of that type of speaking (λoγεῑν) that 
harmonizes (ὁμoν) in certain respects becomes one with the way the Λόγος speaks.
137
   
Though λoγεῑν is itself a type of “laying out,” it attains a special significance insofar as it 
“lays out” in accordance with the Λόγος, i.e., that which is at once the “Laying that gathers.” 
What is more, the Λόγος, for Heidegger, represents one expression of the Urwörte, or the “primal 
sayings of thoughts,” the attunement to which allows for the articulation, in speech, of the 
“saying” of the Λόγος.  As Heidegger states:  
 
But since the dawn of thinking ‘Being’ names the presence of what is present, in the sense of the 
gathering which clears and shelters, which in turn is thought and designated as the Λόγος. The 
Λόγος (λέγειν, to gather or assemble) is experienced through ’Αλήθεια, the sheltering which 
reveals things.
138
  
 
The suggestion here is that within these “primal sayings of thoughts” we may engage with Being, 
or more specifically, the modes through which Being presents. The experience of these modes is 
transferred through ’Αλήθεια, or the moment of disclosure (Unverborgenheit) whereby the Λόγος 
is allowed to shine forth; and it is thus a moment of crucial significance by which human beings 
may find their authentic place within the world. And, just as λέγειν allows for ’Αλήθεια to 
present these modes on their own terms as an expression of the Λόγος (the disclosing of what is 
present in its presencing), it is the “middle region,” characterized by ὁμoλoγεῑν/homo-legein, 
whereby the saying of the Λόγος, as it is disclosed, is put into speech and designated properly the 
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Λόγος.
139
  By “designating” the Λόγος, through the humanly articulated λέγειν, Heidegger does 
not mean to suggest that Being (or reality) is somehow captured; but that the act of designation is 
part of the total “event,” which furthermore can only be understood reflexively with respect to 
the event as a whole.  What is more, the Λόγος is not understood as a static, metaphysical 
essence; it “is” rather, as Heidegger makes clear, both concealing and un-concealing. And, 
inasmuch as the Λόγος un-conceals (or appears or presences), it does so in such a way that it may 
be properly designated.
140
 
Again, the “designating” in speech of the Λόγος is effectively the vibrant and poetical act, 
and is furthermore that which commands our attention in addressing the question of the metaphor 
with respect to the modern cultural epoch. The poetical retains here the sense of “bringing forth,” 
and yet adds to it the equally significant poetical act of naming. The Λόγος brought to speech 
through poetry—or naming—is not an expression of Being per se, but a modal expression of it.  
The focus for us within this designating act becomes the mediating “power” (dunamis) of the 
poetical, especially as understood in terms of the ὁμoλoγεῑν/homo-legein, which puts-into-speech 
“the saying” of the Λόγος in a particular and exceptional, human way—i.e., through the 
gathering and laying of λέγειν.   
It should be made clear that the ὁμoλoγεῑν/homo-legein represents the poetical realm—
and as such is a realm of making and of creativity—that is “laid out” and in a particular way by 
λέγειν.  As the “naming” articulates the various modal expressions of Being, it simultaneously 
presupposes the harmony (ὁμoλoγεῑν) with the Λόγος—as “the Laying that gathers”—and in 
accordance with the destiny (Schicksal) that has brought this “naming” forth and that now comes 
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to pass.
141
  The poetical, thus understood, represents an authentic expression of the Λόγος, as that 
act of disclosure by which a world is brought forth. Indeed, through his reading of these 
Presocratic fragments Heidegger attempts to remind us that truth, thinking and the poetical are 
themselves unified in their expressions of the Greek mode of Being; and to the extent that it 
becomes possible to think in terms of a “poetical truth,” which preserves—in thinking—the 
authentic relationship between Being and the world it has brought forth through naming.  This is 
to emphasize that Heidegger’s engagement with the Presocratics, together with the powerfully 
interpretive moves he there employed, was not directed toward the thinking in the text per se, but 
rather the Λόγος, or “the saying,” of the fragments.  As he repeatedly emphasized, engagement 
with the fragments, and by extension any profoundly influential text in the Western tradition, 
occasions thinking about Being, and this is especially so insofar as this thinking aimed to recover 
a true sense of the fundamental character of Being.
142
  
Heidegger thus reinforces the Parmenidean dictum that thinking and Being are the same. 
This exceedingly rich fragment underscores the dynamics not only of Being to thinking; but also 
later formulations of the relationship between action and thinking, which are nevertheless unified 
in the above sense of the poetical as an expression of Being. In this sense, poetry, as a particular 
type of action, intensifies and condenses through speech (λέγειν) the primal meaning and 
significance of the “saying” of the Λόγος, which is itself humanly incomprehensible before the 
poetic act. The Λόγος thus appears in a unique and exceptional way (as λέγειν); and yet the 
poetic act is also a thinking act in which the powers of memory and imagination (though not 
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understood in a metaphysical sense) are called forth in the naming of a world as it appears before 
us.   
This is to suggest that the relation of the twin actions of thought and poetry occur, at one 
level, as a type poetic intuition, i.e., the ὁμoλoγεῑν/homo-legein, which moreover is necessary for 
the poetic act (as λέγειν) to take place.  Yet, Heidegger’s readings of these fragments reveal the 
dynamics of poetry and thought in another light. Insofar as thinking aims at the recovery of the 
fundamental character of Being, it engages with the “saying” of the text in a poetical way; indeed 
as a thoughtful confrontation with the transcendent greatness of the Greeks from which we might 
fashion from their power a hewn path into the creative possibilities for the overcoming of the 
nihilism set upon us.   
Though Heidegger’s engagement with the Presocratics is certainly hermeneutical, it is 
also fundamentally historical in orientation.  In this sense, he shares with others—namely 
Gadamer and Ricoeur—a great sensitivity toward the appropriative moment that characterizes 
this sort of engagement with a text—i.e., as a disclosure of meaning in language.
143
  Gadamer 
had read the hermeneutical situation primarily as a fusion of “horizons,” which moreover 
presupposed a historically grounded “horizon of inquiry,” from which to offer an authentic 
engagement with the open meaning of a given text.
144
  In a related fashion, Ricoeur placed 
emphasis upon the moment of “self-presentation” as manifest within the event of speech (aka, 
the text), which, he argued, yielded new possibilities for the reception—from the text—of a new 
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mode of being outside it.
145
 He argued that these possibilities depended upon the “recognition” 
of oneself through the acknowledgement of an individual’s “capacities,” which furthermore was 
a notion that depended upon an open and authentic orientation toward memory, i.e., history and 
the historical.
146
  
The nuanced difference for Heidegger, as his engagements with the Presocratics reveal, 
lie in his attempt to revitalize an authentic philosophical vision—or more specifically the vision 
of the myth lover φιλóμυθος/philomythos—and by implication, the poetic act whereby the 
wonders (θαυμάσια) of the Λόγος are gathered (λέγειν) and put into authoritative speech 
(μυθος).
147
 For Heidegger, the revitalization of this vision, together with the thinking that takes 
place within the gathering (λέγειν) where the vision becomes revitalized, bears an historical 
significance. This is the case largely because the gathering is itself an expression of fate 
(Geschick), which extends to the destiny (Schicksal) of the Western tradition in its entirety.   
Though the texts and the sayings that they usher forth are exceedingly significant from a 
general hermeneutical perspective, they are not necessarily so in terms of a strict hermeneutic, so 
as to imply its preserve within the literary realm.  Though the thoughtful confrontation that takes 
place between “thinker” and the “saying” of the text is derived from a convergence of 
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horizons—as a necessary but not sufficient component of the thinking act—it is foremost a 
determinate moment in the history of Being (Seingeschichte).  Inasmuch as this confrontation is 
an authentic confrontation with our history (Geschichte), it is simultaneously a confrontation 
with our destiny (Geschick). That the destinies of Being and Thinking are the same, this 
moment—with equal determinism— calls us to thought, provided we have the ears to listen. For 
Heidegger, this history became increasingly characterized by the nothing (das Nichts), a 
designation by which he meant the utter forgetfulness of Being (Seinvergessenheit); or, in other 
words, the historical moment where the question of Being—understood as fundamental to the 
essence of man and his world—could no longer be raised. The history of Being becomes 
synonymous with the history of metaphysics, which jointly become the history of nihilism, 
which moreover, for Heidegger, is an inexorable and necessary movement.   
As Heidegger claimed: only by knowing the history of metaphysics can the history of 
Being be properly interrogated, and only then can nihilism be overcome (aufgehoben). The very 
notion of an overcoming, which Heidegger inherited from Hegel, itself implies an historical 
movement; and yet overcoming does not connote an action whereby something is removed, 
jettisoned or left aside.  Rather, the moment of overcoming forms part of the larger history of 
Being, a history which has brought it to pass that just as nihilism is the authentic expression of 
Being (Being-as-absence), so is the thoughtful confrontation with the essence of nihilism.  The 
confrontation, as part and parcel of the overcoming, does not imply merely a super-cession of 
nihilism per se in the attainment of a higher consciousness or of a mode of Being, but is 
construed both historically and hermeneutically to the extent that Being at long last becomes 
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remembered and a proper orientation to it is regained.
148
 We now have a general conceptual 
frame in which to assess the metaphor of the microcosm as it stood before the poetic mind of the 
Renaissance.  Ereignis as understood in terms of the Λόγος—which together constitute the poetic 
or language event—presupposes historical thinking insofar as it brings to bear questions of 
destiny (Schicksal) and concerns for an authentic human existence vis-à-vis that destiny. This 
type of thinking assumes that the very act of thinking is part of the object of that thinking, and to 
the extent that the one determines the other.  
Ereignis arguably represents the essence of possibility as possibility; and yet it is 
language that mediates this possibility. In his later works particularly, Heidegger turned to the 
question of language with a keen eye toward the crucial significance it held for ontology; and 
specifically, fundamental ontology, which defined his overall project from at least the early 
lectures of the 1920s.  Along these lines, the 1962 essay, Time and Being, is particularly 
significant.  In that essay he endeavored once again to reformulate the relation of ontology and 
temporality, though this time with the powerful heuristic of Ereignis; again understood as the 
historically appropriative moment through which a world could emerge.
149
  The move made in 
Time and Being is perhaps the strongest formulation of his overall attempt to counter the 
Western tradition of thought by subordinating Being to Time; and implicitly for Heidegger, to 
overcome the “essentializing” structure of an ontology understood metaphysically.  His 
exceedingly rich declaration at the end of the essay makes exactly that claim:  
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But if we do what was attempted, and think Being in the sense of the presencing and allowing-to-
presence that are there in destiny—which in turn lies in the extending of true time which opens 
and conceals—then Being belongs into Appropriating [Ereignis].  Giving and its gift receive 
their determination from Appropriating.  In that case, Being would be a species of Appropriation 
[Ereignis], and not the other way around.
150
  
 
Ereignis defines (and describes) integrally the emergence or “opening of a world” as a particular, 
temporal moment, which becomes part and parcel of a particular expression of Being allowed to 
manifest in a particular way. The complex and interrelated expressions of the event (Ereignis) 
must be understood as an integral whole insofar as the event itself represents the shining forth of 
a world as well as the condition by which that world is allowed to shine forth.  In other words, 
not only may an event (Ereignis) be understood as a totality expressed as a spatio-temporal 
moment (which is to say, a historical moment such as the Renaissance), it represents in addition 
a totality of possibility whereby a specific historical moment may create and recreate itself vis-à-
vis the dynamics (dunamis/δύναμις) of the event as a whole, which in Heidegger’s language was 
nothing less than the giving (Es gibt) of Being to beings.  Yet, even more significantly for our 
concerns here is the various and dynamic manifestations of a world, not only as one possible 
world among many, but also with respect to the implicit possibilities of a specific world as 
mediated through and articulated by language.  This is to suggest that any actual moment, or 
shining forth of a world, carries within it the full force of its own creative possibility, as 
mediated through language, and to the extent that any appropriative moment (viz. Ereignis) in 
view of the emergent world that it calls forth, be characterized as fundamentally an “event” of 
language (Ereignis der Sprache).  
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As an event of language, the metaphor is integral—and indeed foundational—in 
rethinking the emergent possibilities of the modern world. This is especially the case when 
considering the manifested possibilities for thought and action before they are expressed as 
inviolable “truths,” as they would later become, for example, with the entrenchment of the 
natural sciences. As an important note regarding the question of dynamics integral to Ereignis, it 
must be stressed that the metaphor—as part and parcel of the totality that is Ereignis—is 
operative in a double capacity. At once it becomes expressive of possibility in its fullest form, 
while at the same time it serves as the vehicle through which all possibility is mediated.  Pico’s 
Oratio de hominis dignitate, I argue, serves our analyses as a particular instance of possibility 
working simultaneously as a full expression of possibility as well as its medium. What is more, 
since all texts are open hermeneutically, they convey their significances (along with the 
potentialities to rethink worlds) differently to different people and at different historical 
moments. The Oratio is one such text. Thus, it arguably becomes an indispensable text in the 
attempt to rethink the modern cultural epoch (Kulturepoche). To this extent, Pico’s text not only 
facilitates a rethinking of the possibilities it reveals metaphorically; but also, and no less 
significantly, it offers an occasion to rethink those possibilities in view of the Cartesian move to 
ground knowledge and “reality” in terms of a thinking subject or consciousness. Let us now take 
a closer look at the metaphor of the microcosm as it manifests in Pico’s Oratio. 
The “Breath the of Life,” the Λόγος, and Metaphoric Possibility in the Oratio 
The almost undiminished adulation towards Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and his most 
famous text, Oratio de hominis dignitate, stems from the emblematic stature of both author and 
text in the conveyance of the essential characteristics of the Renaissance discovery of man.  
Since his own time, the recurrent celebration of Pico’s vindication of human freedom, together 
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with his emphasis upon the autonomy and possibility of the human spirit, has secured the legacy 
of the Oration as the “manifesto” of the Renaissance.
151
  The lines from this text that express this 
sentiment are so famous as to be almost commonplace:    
Thou, constrained by no limits, in accordance with thine own free will, in whose hand We have 
placed thee, shalt ordain for thyself the limits of thy nature.  We have set thee at the world’s 
center that thou mayest from thence more easily observe whatever is in the world.  We have 
made thee neither of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, so that freedom of choice 
and with honor, as though the maker and molder of thyself, thou mayest fashion thyself in 
whatever shape thou shalt prefer.  Thou shalt have the power to degenerate into the lower forms 
of life, which are brutish.  Thou shalt have the power, out of thy soul’s judgment, to be reborn 
into the higher forms, which are divine.
152
  
 
Though dominant strands of Neoplatonic mysticism pervade the text, especially those describing 
the actuation and realization of man’s thoughts and affections into an angelic mode, it is the 
revitalization of the traditional metaphor of the microcosm that commands the greatest 
significance for the question at hand.  As Ricoeur has noted, “metaphor has the extraordinary 
power of re-describing reality,” which as a living, vibrant force finds itself in tension with 
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differing lines of interpretation in the shattering and increasing of our sense of reality.
153
  To 
reiterate, the metaphor—thus understood—acts within a pre-conceptual dimension, and in this 
way assumes a raw, yet highly generative potential.
154
  With this in mind, the significance of 
Pico’s text is oriented less toward a question of Renaissance self-fashioning, as cast within a 
Neoplatonic or mystical framework, than a setting in which to rethink the fundamental structure 
of man’s thought and action as it transformed at the threshold of the medieval and modern 
worlds. Perhaps even more significantly, the occasion arises in which to rethink the myriad 
possibilities associated with this transformation, and specifically how these possibilities 
manifested with respect to a redefinition of man, world and cosmos; not only in regard to their 
interrelations, but also in view of other creative possibilities generated by and through these 
interrelations.
155
   
The question of the Renaissance thus becomes a problem of reassessing a novel and creative 
way of being-in-the-world, and especially insofar as such potential could be expressed in any 
number of fertile and dynamic ways. In related fashion, the question of the Renaissance, and by 
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extension the problem of the modern epoch of which it forms part, becomes inextricably linked 
to the question of possibilities, and moreover, how those possibilities were (and are) expressed 
not only in terms of their full realization, but also intrinsically in terms of their ultimate 
limitation. It is therefore a question of measure. The analogia entis, as one way in which 
Scholasticism had understood the notion of limitation, has seen through the analogia imitationis, 
in particular a dynamic that allowed beings of imperfect similitude to relate to (or participate in) 
the most perfect Being (ens perfectissimum) according to the determination of their form, and to 
the limit (or measure) of their capacity to actualize fully that form. The possibility and the full 
reality to which it aspires are always governed by a limit (πέρας/peras) as the Greeks had 
previously understood. Possibility, and the actuation of possibility are not only interwoven, but 
are governed by the mediating and measuring instance of limitation—as a form or a semblance—
that lay at the very core of every possibility and every actuality. Thus the limit engendered and 
guided creativity.  
The Oratio breaks from this precedent, and in a powerfully creative way. In being 
constrained by no prescribed limit, man was free, and in accordance with his own will [tuo 
arbitrio] to realize [tibi illam praefinies] his nature, and to the fullest possible extent.
156
 Because 
he was neither purely of heaven nor purely of earth, man’s intermediary position within the 
cosmos bestowed upon him the privilege to observe the things of this world more clearly, and 
indeed, to contemplate the universe [ubi universi contemplator] as if an angelic intelligence, or 
God himself.
157
 But, even more significantly, in his privileged position as contemplator, man 
now takes his measure of all things in this world, and in the process is empowered to redefine the 
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relationship of man, God and world. This effectively constitutes a poetic naming (or renaming), a 
laying-out of the new possibilities of moral action in accordance with the Λόγος. The Oratio in 
its effective renunciation of the limit derives its potency from man’s indeterminate nature 
[indiscretae opus imaginis] as well as his free will [liberum arbitrium]; yet the moment is 
initiated in the image of God [in imagine deo]. This is the microcosm whereby man has 
privileged status of both creature and creator, and from whom new possibilities exude and in 
accordance to an as-yet undetermined measure or limit.       
The metaphor of the microcosm—as expressed in the Oratio—reveals the metaphor “at 
work.” The text illuminates—through poetic intuition—the means by which man extracts for 
himself the divine image, so as to become a type of “creator god,” who in turn directs and 
channels those vibrant and creative energies through the full range of human action.  As God had 
“formed man of dust from the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life,” and thus 
made him “a living soul,” Pico enacted anew—and in a decidedly poetic way—the Genesiacal 
moment in terms of the Renaissance’s characteristic novelty.
158
 The text reveals this novelty in 
what scholarship has traditionally viewed to be man’s godlike possibility, which furthermore, is 
a possibility hinged upon the dynamism of human nature itself.
159
  As the scholarship further 
observes, the dynamic possibilities of man’s newly discovered divine status are rooted in the 
familiar, qualifying nominatives: autonomy, freedom, creativity, self-fashioning, etc.
160
 As Pico 
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announces in the Oratio that man having an indeterminate nature [indiscretae opus imaginis],
161
 
was placed in the middle of the cosmos. And thus having neither a fixed place [nec certam 
sedem] nor a characteristic form [propriam faciem], nor a special mode of action peculiar to him 
[munus ullum peculiare] man could opt for himself his own placement, his own special form, 
and appoint to himself his own special role within the cosmos.
162
  
Pico’s recasting of the Genesiacal moment of creation reveals a two-fold significance, which 
is powerfully contained within the traditional “breath of life” motif, and which furthermore 
represents the transference of this god-like possibility into human form where it will be 
immanently and creatively expressed. The breathing motif, as I argue, is the edifice on which the 
microcosm metaphor in the Oratio gains its power. Indeed the power resides in the fact that man 
in being the Imago Dei, is also indiscretae opus imaginis, and thus in-potency-for a full range of 
creative action. In terms of the two-fold significance, Pico’s creative moment, in the first 
instance, subsumes not only the full import of its original meaning in the Old Testament—i.e., 
man created in the divine image (Imago Dei); but also discloses man in view of his increased, 
“double role” as both a noble creature and a dynamic creator.  Second, and on perhaps a more 
deeply significant level, the impetus to man’s creative power—as affected in God’s image, and 
transferred through the “breath of life”—is nothing short of the transference of the “saying of 
being” (Λόγος), which is the effective imparting to Adam of this god-like possibility.
163
  Adam, 
as both emblematic of humanity as well as a symbol of the divine possibility cast in a human 
mode becomes the vehicle through which the primordial Λόγος is allowed to creatively manifest 
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in a novel and unique way within the realm of human action.  This becomes the crux of our 
concern—the mediating moment of the power of the Λόγος, and with it, the possibilities for 
human action—as manifest through the generative possibilities of the metaphoric.   
Not only does this concern the creative potential of the Renaissance, but also that of the 
Baroque and, in particular, the Cogito formulation within. Thus this becomes a hermeneutical 
project insofar as it grapples with a question of meaning; and as meaning is always historically 
dynamic, the two cultural-epochal phenomena can neither be separated on a semantic level, nor 
an eidetic one.
164
 We are constantly engaged with historical meaning, and with it the images of 
the past, which at once exert their power over us (for significant cultural-historical reasons) and 
in so doing provide a meaningful and significant linkage to the present.  n this sense, there is 
something vibrantly operative within the modern cultural epoch as a whole, which in providing a 
degree of historical unity nevertheless conditioned the specific epochal moments of the 
Renaissance and the Baroque (and by extension our present) so as to manifest in markedly 
different ways.  
In relating this notion of creative potential to the breath of life motif, we are perhaps 
reminded of Hellenistic and specifically Aristotelian and Stoic notions of the pneuma, especially 
as they relate to something of a vital and animating force.
165
 Though Pico was no doubt aware of 
more strictly materialist considerations surrounding the pneuma, the significance here, as his 
usage implies, relies upon a more spiritual connotation, viz., a principle of movement (ἀρχη 
κινήσεως), or a “power” (δύναμις/dunamis), or even the animating character of the soul 
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(anima).
166
  To speak thus, and in terms of a cultural history is to give account of the “life of the 
epoch” or the conditional force or forces by which the cultural epoch assumed its recognizable 
shape or Zeitgeist.  But, this may seem too transcendent an explanation, too metaphysical; and 
with it an effective denial of the specific ways human beings interacted historically with their 
world, and the world with them.  And yet, in walking this line we should not hastily deny the 
significance of “powers” or “forces” as heuristic devices in shaping a “vision” of the modern 
cultural epoch in view of the historical problems we seek to articulate and the questions we seek 
to answer. And even still, Pico’s usage of traditional metaphysical language, motifs and 
metaphors are typically employed in a non-metaphysical fashion, which allows us to confront his 
understanding of the microcosm in terms of a new expression of δύναμις/dunamis, and one most 
certainly severed from an essentialist notion of actuality (energeia).
167
  
That powers and forces remain our concern, albeit heuristically, the dynamics conveyed by 
Pico’s Adam seems exceedingly appropriate in confronting historically the “spirits wafting in 
these sails” (Geister in diese Segel wehten) insofar as the spirits themselves represent the vibrant 
conditions through and by which the modern cultural epoch as a dynamic whole formed and 
continues to form itself.
168
  In the midst of this dynamicism, and with it the epoch’s tendency to 
make and unmake itself, what seems to be at stake here is not necessarily a question of forces per 
se, but their heuristic relation to the significance of value, on the one hand, and the mediating 
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departure, seeks to emphasize the cultural-historical phenomena of the Renaissance and the Baroque as in potentia 
manifestations of the metaphorical, which furthermore is to affect a movement away from a sole and concentrated 
emphasis upon in esse particulars, which are interpreted as hard, stubborn facts to be herded and gathered into a 
theoretical frame of analysis, and on which basis they are assessed in the capture of (and not merely a semblance of) 
a past “reality.”   
168
 Burckhardt’ phrase is apt, and conveys (I think) the sense he wanted to convey—an unseen force, that is 
nevertheless “real” insofar is it known by the image or vision it creates, and furthermore, remains (image and force) 
in constant flux. See, Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien (Leipzig: Verlag von E. U. Seemann, 1899), 283. 
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power of language on the other. The range of the dynamic—thematic, spatial, historical—is that 
which is of significance, and specifically the dynamic interplay between value and metaphor, 
which together yield the cultural phenomena of the Renaissance and the Baroque. This 
dynamical relationship as expressed between value and language, meaning and memory, yields 
not only an imaginative conception of the past that is palpably experienced in the present, it also 
occasions an “historical present” whereby an authentic understanding of that history may 
emerge. 
What I propose is that Pico’s breath of life motif provides the initial means of access through 
which this question of a dynamical Λόγος can be raised.  As the above qualifiers pertaining to the 
pneuma are Aristotelian (or at least Aristotelian in inspiration, i.e. the Augustinian anima), they 
rely upon an essentialist and metaphysical understanding of the Λόγος. What is of interest here is 
that while Pico’s understanding—to a degree—presupposes the Aristotelian formulation of the 
Λόγος—which Aristotle understood in the more narrow sense of an ordering principle or set of 
principles vis-à-vis the establishment of a science—the Renaissance thinker’s formulation 
transcends the Stagirite’s strict theoretical understanding to include a more total vision of the 
Λόγος, which is to challenge the metaphysical boundaries imposed by the tradition. Though not 
cast in rhyme and meter, I submit that Pico’s Λόγος is a “poetical” Λόγος, and reflects a totality 
that includes not only those modes of human existence that fall within the traditional category of 
reason and thinking (theōria), but also those of the broad categories of “practiced” action 
(praxis/poiesis) and feeling (pathos).
169
 To see how this metaphor translates into “practiced” 
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 The categories of theōria and praxis reflect types of knowing, and are thus broadly “active” and/or 
modes of action, which is a broad category that includes both contemplation and practical action. The notion of 
pathos is one of the three traditional Aristotelian “appeals” as articulated in the Rhetoric (the others being logos and 
ethos). They attest to the range of human action as exhibited in theōria and praxis, as well as the passive instances 
upon the soul as characterized in terms of emotion or imagination.  
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action, let us turn to broad semantic field of the Latin verb, invenire, which at once connotes a 
sense of discovery and of creation. 
Invenire and the Modal Action of the Metaphor 
By unifying these broad, modal categories of human existence—which is to say theory and 
practice—Pico’s formulation of the poetical Λόγος affirms what Burckhardt observed and 
subsequently defined as a “discovery of world and of man.”(Die Entdeckung der Welt und des 
Menschen).
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 Not only is Burckhardt’s overall treatment of the Renaissance a perhaps necessary 
point of departure from which any inquiry into the cultural history of the modern epoch may be 
allowed to proceed, his notion of Entdeckung is itself a cultural manifestation of the poetical 
Λόγος that Pico both articulates and reflects. Furthermore, as Burckardt implied and Nietzsche 
subsequently articulated, the Λόγος is never known directly, but only through the epiphenomena, 
or the cultural manifestations that “stand upon” it, which serves more to the point as to why a 
mediating metaphor becomes crucial. As with Pico’s Adam, the Λόγος, as the “breath of life” 
emanating from a transcendent God implies a being, a force, or a ground etc. that can never be 
fully known, and is actuated only through the metaphor, i.e., the Adamic microcosm. In this 
sense, Entdeckung, or the Latin invenire (which I will use henceforth) is an action that mediates 
through the creative dynamic of the Λόγος and allows it to manifest.  And yet, though it is a 
mediated action, it is emphatically a distinctively authentic mode of action for the Renaissance, 
which is inclusive of any number of derivatively authentic actions.  
As an inclusive mode of action, Burckhardt’s rich portrait of invenire denotes what we might 
call again “epiphenomena,” and include within its range, for example, the “discovery” of new 
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 This famous saying entitles the fourth part of Burckhardt’s Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, trans. 
S. G. C. Middlemore (London: Penguin, 1990); Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien (Leipzig: Verlag von E. U. 
Seemann, 1899); yet, the phrase was originally proffered by Jules Michelet in his Histoire de France. See Michelet, 
Oeurvres completes, ed. Paul Viallaneix, 21 vols (Paris: Flammarion, 1971-82), vii. 51.  
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worlds and peoples (as may be placed under a broad category of “otherness”); the discovery of 
the beauty of landscapes (landschaftlischen Schönheit), and indeed, his most famous and 
powerful characterizations regarding the discovery of man (die Entdeckung des Menschen), and 
the discovery of the world (die Entdeckung der Welt). As a modal category of action, invenire 
thus “phenomenalizes” the Renaissance (and by extension the modern cultural epoch, though in a 
decidedly different ways vis-à-vis the Baroque) as a cultural whole while making possible some 
revelation of the dynamic particularities that underpinned it. This is to say that though the total 
vision is constituted by an authentic range of actions, it simultaneously denotes the deeper 
significance of the poetical Λόγος vis-à-vis the metaphor and, especially the metaphoric power to 
create and to transform. This is not only an interesting, but also a decisive concern, and therefore 
constitutes the major thrust of this section.  
To raise the question of invenire with respect to the metaphor is to attempt an understanding 
of the relationship between values—as they translate into modes of action—and the Λόγος itself.  
An exploration of this metaphorically mediated relationship may be said to represent an initial, 
“phenomenological” reading of the operative dynamics of the modern cultural epoch. And yet, 
what is both interesting and problematical is that the various modes and domains of action 
representative of invenire as a semantic whole—which is to say, inclusive of an extended range 
of authentic action as oriented openly to the metaphor—differ in both their Renaissance and 
Baroque manifestations; and which furthermore point to deeper historical concerns as to the 
possibility of these emergent differences. As one scholar has recently observed, these marked 
differences hinged upon a movement away from the type of “discovery” characteristic of the 
Renaissance—i.e., a mode more neutral and accidental—to a more aggressive, purposeful, and 
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even instrumentalized form as characterized by the Enlightenment notion of “invention.”
171
 The 
suggestion is that this movement bears considerable relevance to the development of the 
“scientific objectivism,” together with its cold, impartial distance, which solidified during the 
Enlightenment. Along these lines, he further implies that this movement reflects the inexorable 
breakdown, or at least, a disarticulation of the fuller sense of meaning (as connoted by the 
Renaissance rendering of invenire) into a binary of related, though nevertheless distinctive 
meanings, i.e., discovery and invention. The latter notion of invenire, of course, holds a 
privileged status within the epistemological—and implicitly ontological—assumptions of 
modernity. Though I certainly do not disagree with these general assessments, are they sufficient 
to gain a sense of the dynamical force behind this transformation?   
At once building on and moving away from some of the first rate work devoted to this 
problem, I seek to emphasize that such a “movement” is ultimately reflective of the particular 
and eminently complex orientation toward life and existence that Europeans possessed during 
this epoch, and that furthermore, was articulated in and through language.
172
 The Italians 
beginning in the thirteenth century were, as Burckhardt famously noted, the “first-born among 
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 The rich notion of invenire (or discovery) has recently captured the interest of certain Renaissance 
scholars. In the introductory essay to the edited volume, The Invention of Discovery, 1500-1700. ed. James D. 
Fleming (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), Fleming has framed the problem of invenire as the “invention” of the early 
modern period. In this problematic suggestion, Fleming sees a vibrant and active Renaissance culture as the force 
behind the separation of the “idea of invention,” on the one hand, and the “idea of discovery” on the other. The 
binary opposition between these ideas was solidified during the Enlightenment. His observation that a “binary” of 
invenire did not exist during the Renaissance is one with which I agree; however, there is no satisfying explanation 
as to why a binary emerged, which effectively separated the neutral and accidental discovery of the Renaissance 
from the purposeful invention of the Enlightenment. As we shall see, this a metaphorico-cultural problem.    
172
 See, for example, Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David 
Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004; Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the 
Collège de France 1981-1982 (New York: Picador, 2005); Stephen Goldblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From 
More to Shakespeare (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Robert Nichols, “Self-Interpretation and 
Agency in Modern Hermeneutics and Genealogy” in Declensions of the Self: A Bestiary of Modernity, Jean-Jacques 
Defert, Trevor Tchir and Dan Webb (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008). 
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the sons of modern Europe.”
173
 And, thus we are talking of a broadly conceived mode of action 
(and thought) as it articulates and relates itself to this orientation toward life; and if we are to 
assert that invenire is in some way “fundamental” to the modern cultural epoch in terms of this 
orientation, these manifest differences between the Renaissance and the Baroque not only 
suggest the complexity and elusiveness of modernity as a cultural-historical problem, they also 
reflect heuristically, at least, the semantic and cultural dynamics through which these differences 
were made manifest, and into which we can only begin to make inquiry.  
What is more, the manifest differences, as demonstrated in terms of invenire as a broad mode 
of action, reveals to a historical consciousness not only modernity’s nearness, but also its 
distance to that which has shaped it in terms of its cultural history. And, thus the Burckhardtian 
notion of invenire carries with it not only a semantic relevance, but also, and perhaps more 
importantly, an implicitly ontological one as well. Pico’s articulation and employment of the 
breath of life motif (vis-à-vis the operative metaphor of the microcosm) implies within his text 
the broad modal action of invenire, and with it a notion of the discovery of man’s potential 
(indiscretae opus imaginis), which moreover, gains meaning only in relation to a larger worldly 
or cosmological structure. Descartes’ texts, however, reveal something quite different.   
To perhaps get ahead of ourselves, the Discours de la méthode (1637) offers a powerful 
counterpoint to the modal action of invenire, especially as expressed in the full vibrancy of the 
Renaissance. As is well known, the Discours assumes as its primary directive a project of 
discovery, which in its juxtaposition with the Oratio begins to reveal a shifting sense of the 
semantics of invenire. Amid the distrust and doubt harbored against a larger, external edifice of 
meaning, the Discours articulates a linear, narrowly causal and altogether staggeringly willful 
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 Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy. 98; “der Erstgeborne unter den Söhnen des 
jetzigen Europas…” 
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application of the method, which it endeavors to deploy toward its end of world discovery. With 
this, the Burckhardtian notion of invenire is seemingly reformulated. And whereas discovery and 
invention in the Renaissance sense are semantically linked because they emanate from and are 
supported by an extensive range of possible action, and thereby unify the moral realm of acting 
with the practical realm of making, the Cartesian sense, by comparison, seems impoverished. 
And though the Cartesian sense has retained the strong semantic link between discovery and 
invention, it has done so in a fashion that reflects strongly the modern mode of existence, 
especially as it has come to be characterized since the Enlightenment.
174
 The redefinition of the 
relation of world and man is one that renders ourselves masters and possessors of nature. 
175
  
The Discours thus reinterprets in a strikingly novel way the unity of possible action as 
expressed in a Renaissance mode. This is to say that the Cartesian reinterpretation of this unity is 
increasingly understood, and thus defined, in technical terms where “discovery” is expressed 
fundamentally in terms of the intellectualist illumination of formal “truths,” which are 
subsequently and deftly applied in the invention (inventum) of an “objective reality.”
176
 What is 
more, “discovery” in following a more literal connotation of invenire (at least in a broad sense) 
as a “coming to light” (accederet ad lucem) has now become more purposeful; and thus accords 
with Descartes’ “inquisitio veritatis per lumen naturale [rationis]” or [the search for truth 
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 Such a characterization is decidedly problematic, and what may be deemed here as abstract and 
ultimately fantastical, is an effort to “phenomenalize” a cultural force as it translates to action.  Notwithstanding 
these criticisms, the move to characterize the modern mode of existence in reference to a delimited semantic field of 
invenire, even if in reference to what may be readily observable and even a measurable phenomenon, only buttresses 
the point regarding that mode’s power and influence. But more problematically, it effectively carries the defining 
and dominant “mechanism” through which the determination of an individual (with respect not only to “what” it is 
to be human, but also “how” and in what ways he may be human) derives its force. Only through the phenomenon 
may we proceed reflectively into the forceful possibilities that lay just behind it.     
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 AT VI:62, ...et ainsi nous rendre comme maîtres et possesseurs de la nature. Ce qui n'est pas seulement 
a desirer pour l'invention d'une infinite d'artifices, qui feraient qu'on jouirait, sans aucune peine, des fruits de la 
terre et de toutes les commodities qui s'y trouvent....[and thus render ourselves masters and possessors of nature. 
This is to be desired not only for the invention of an infinity of artifices, which would allow one to enjoy without 
any trouble, the fruits of the earth and all the commodities therein]. 
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 The subtleties of these distinctions I intend to bring out more fully in the analyses that follow below. 
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through the natural light of reason]. Inventum, however, intimates more the technical dimension 
of invenire insofar as it relates to the employment of skill (artis); vide Apollo’s uttering in Book 
I of Ovid’s Metamorphosis, for instance—inventum medicina meum est.  And yet, it must be 
stressed that what are most certainly significant semantic variances at the same time transcend 
these transformations to reflect a more fundamental shift not only in openness toward the 
metaphor, but in orientation toward life (Λόγος).
177
  
As I have attempted to argue, the question of the microcosm metaphor is fundamentally a 
cultural concern not only because it mediates action and thought within the modern cultural 
epoch; but also because it effectively establishes modern culture and grounds the range of 
possibilities within it. Yet, in order to pose effectively the question of the modern cultural epoch 
in relation to the integral role played by the Cogito, it is necessary to introduce the significance 
of the metaphor as a handmaiden in those developments, and through which the semantic 
transformations of invenire thoroughly depend. Following what is observed to be in Pico’s 
Oratio a unity of potential action, and not only action expressed through the modal category of 
invenire, but also as action simultaneously mediated by the microcosm metaphor, it is here that 
the climacteric role of the metaphor begins to disclose itself.  
 
As a mediator of action, the metaphor is equally a mediator of life (Λόγος), and as such 
represents what may be termed a “metaphoric space” into which the distended potential of the 
Λόγος comes into presence. In its presence through the metaphor, the Λόγος opens to a distinctly 
human possibility, which moreover, the metaphor always mediates.  Thus the metaphor “carries 
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 The Λόγος is a complex notion, which I here (and in what follows) equate with life from which a strong 
definition of culture follows. My understanding of the Λόγος proceeds under the great influence of Heidegger’s 
reading of the Heraclitus fragment, in particular, and his readings of the Presocratics more generally. In what 
follows, I will expand more fully upon what I mean by the Λόγος together with its decisively important relation to 
the metaphor on which a vibrant notion of culture depends. 
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over” the distended potential of the Λόγος into the moral realm where its conveyed potential 
intensifies within an almost endless variety of human action. In other words this metaphoric 
space, or indeed, the “dimension” of the metaphorical, effectively represents the realm of 
possibility itself insofar as possibility may translate into specific human deeds, thoughts and 
works. It is in this sense that the implications of Pico’s breath of life motif gain force, especially 
insofar as the motif is understood in terms of the metaphorical conveyance of the primordial 
Λόγος of which Adam is the vehicle, which to say, the microcosm; and the image through which 
the distance of the Λόγος is closed and the full range of human possibility may be actuated.
178
  
In the Discours, invenire is thus not a discovery of man and world in potentia in reference to 
a larger, hierarchical structure of meaning as it had been with Pico, Alberti, or Cusanus. Nor is it 
a discovery in potentia of the capability of man to know and understand himself and his world in 
relation to shifting centers (which is to say shifting potencies of and for a thorough and broadly 
poetic expression), as it had been for Montaigne. Rather, invenire in the Discours demonstrates 
an in potentia discovery hinged upon the application of the method to affect a regimented, 
calculated and presumably infinitely expanding knowledge (scientia) of nature, which moreover 
is an objective, instrumentalized knowledge willfully projected outward. It no longer 
reciprocates in the offering to man a knowledge and understanding of himself and what it means 
to be fully human within a world; it has lost the crucial element of authentic reflection.
179
  In 
                                                          
178
 For an interesting and related treatment of the image as resemblance (as opposed to representation), and 
especially in terms of a “ground” (fond) and “gathering” (rassemblment), see Jean-Luc Nancy, The Ground of the 
Image, trans. Jeff Fort (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), especially, 7-9. “Resemblance gathers together 
in force and gathers itself as a force of the same—the same differing in itself from itself: hence the enjoyment 
[jouissance] we take in it.” 
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 Early in the Discours (Part II), Descartes’ remarks on the Spartan lawgiver, Lycurgus, are telling, and 
demonstrate the sort of linear and applied understanding of invenire, which is less a poetic discovery than a technical 
invention: “Et pour parler des choses humaines, je crois que, si Sparte a été autrefois très florissante, ce n’a pas été 
à cause de la bonté de chacune de ses lois en particulier…mais à cause que, n’ayant été inventées que par un seul, 
elles tendaient toutes à meme fin” ( And, to speak of things human, I believe that, if Sparta was once flourishing, 
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each instance—i.e., with Pico, Alberti, Montaigne, and Descartes—the expression of invenire as 
a potency to be more fully actuated or realized depends fundamentally upon a (historically 
specific) human orientation to life and existence (which I understand here as the Λόγος) as well 
as an awareness and openness to it. From this orientation exude certain ontological assumptions 
that are themselves manifest through action, mediated through language and “phenomenalized” 
more concretely in a variety of cultural forms. In this way, the range of possibilities grounded in 
the metaphor—which is to say, the range of possibilities of being fully human—reveal the 
creative power of language as it works on a deeper level and translates to the realm of human 
action as manifest within the Renaissance and Baroque worlds.     
As a broad mode of action, which accords with the protean power of the metaphor to assume 
and to characterize many derivative modes, invenire as an expressive action of the operative 
dynamics of the Λόγος is of crucial significance.  In this vein, what is of particular concern—
though not articulated directly by Burckhardt—is the “unmarked middle ground” between 
invenire, as a broad mode of action, and the wide range of potentialities as lain out by the Λόγος. 
The dialectic that occurs between the Λόγος and the realm of action constitutes a thoroughly 
creative moment where actions—both moral as well as productive—join with the full possibility 
of the Λόγος. The possibility—indeed the power—of the Λόγος is mediated by the metaphor, 
which furthermore is expressed in thought and action.
180
  This is not to say that the Λόγος 
conditions necessarily thoughts and actions, and by extension culture, nor does it act as a sort of 
phenomenological ground; but rather its force manifests only insofar as the metaphoric “space” 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
this was not because of the goodness of each one of its laws in particular…but because, having been devised by only 
one individual, they all tended toward the same end.  
180
 For the metaphor as a mediator, and also a translator of similitude (or something analogous), Nietzsche 
remarked that the “[m]etaphor means treating as equal something that one has recognized to be similar in one point,” 
which implies the metaphoric conveyance of the potential of the Λόγος in a particular way. See, Notebook 19[249] 
in Writings from the Early Notebooks ed. Raymond Guess et al and trans. Ladislaus Löb (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 160.   
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is sufficiently open to convey its power. What is more, the various modes of thought and 
action—as broadly derivative of invenire—are at the same time part and parcel of this 
metaphoric space where they may manifest and flourish. These modes of action are at once 
reflective of a unique orientation toward “life” and “existence,” and furthermore, presuppose a 
core set of values along with their underpinning meanings and significances. And, as actions and 
thoughts reflect the value structure that makes such actions meaningful and significant, they are 
always mediated through a metaphor where they are empowered in an expressive way.   
We have now put forth an operative definition of a how a culture can be said to 
phenomenalize and thereby to open a world. This is to include those dynamics whereby value 
interrelates with the metaphoric to translate into meaningful thoughts and actions, which are at 
the same time creatively empowered. I would suggest that the interaction within this “unmarked 
middle ground” effectively constitutes a cultural historical moment. In such a moment not only 
does a culture shine forth, but also an entire world is opened to a range of novel possibilities. The 
inherent vibrancy of these historical moments directly relates to the operative dynamics of a 
generative and creative metaphor insofar as it translates or “carries” the Λόγος openly into an 
expressive potential, which may then manifest into a wide range of poetical thoughts and 
actions.
181
   
It should be stressed that this metaphorical middle ground, especially in its generative mode, 
is both vibrantly unstable and eminently creative, which furthermore extends in all directions the 
“space” of imaginative potential.
182
 Insofar as that, which we shall call the “phenomenal realm” 
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 Here, I understand the “poetic” in both a broad and a strict sense. 
182
 There are some clues to this sentiment in Nietzsche’s early writings on the Greek “state,” which he 
admired. For Nietzsche, the “bellum omnium contra omnes” described in Hobbes’ Leviathan also typified the inter-
poleis Hellenic world, which he understood in terms of good Eris (strife/striving). In the intervals between war, 
Nietzsche noted that the striving turns inwards and thus “gives society [as culture] time to germinate and turn green 
everywhere, so that it can let the radiant blossoms of genius sprout forth as soon as warmer days come.” See, 
Nietzsche, “The Greek State” (1871-2) in Nietzsche Reader, ed. Keith Ansell Pearson and Duncan Large (Malden: 
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of culture (i.e., thought and action as related to this notion of discovery) is authentically open to 
the possibilities of the Λόγος—and as mediated by the generative metaphor—can those 
possibilities be translated through it in a powerfully creative fashion.  As with the Renaissance, 
new cultures emerge and furthermore assume new forms amid this creative moment. For it is 
those cultures which retain an authentic openness to the metaphor—e.g., archaic Greece and 
Renaissance Italy—that serve as models representative of a cultural totality and from which 
other less-unified cultures can (and should) take their measure. These models reveal a culture(s) 
at its most creative, especially vis-à-vis the “plastic power” they possess via this openness to the 
metaphor, and to the degree that it is capable of creating (poiesis) new cultural forms in vibrantly 
enduring ways.  
The Three Powers (Drei Potenzen) and the “Phenomenalization” of the Metaphor 
As Die Kultur der Renaissance reveals, the engagement of man with his world is itself a 
“poetical” act, and hinges chiefly on the reciprocity of discovery between the knowledge man 
gains of himself and that which he gains of his world. In the World Historical Observations, he 
had introduced what he called the drei Potenzen, or three powers (namely, politics, religion and 
culture).
183
 The immediate indication is that at given moments one of the three powers holds 
sway over the other two, so that a particular age might be characteristically viewed as a religious 
age or a political age, for example. Upon closer inspection of that section, however, we learn that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Blackwell, 2006), 88-94. This notion of “striving” relates intimately to the Greek’s tremendous ability to creatively 
appropriate everything into an expression of life, and from which great works of art naturally emerged.  In this 
sense, culture, for Nietzsche, becomes “the rule of art over life.” See, Notebook 19[310] in Writings from the Early 
Notebooks, 162. 
183
 On the three powers, see WB, 254-92. See also, John R. Hinde, Jacob Burckhardt and the Crisis of 
Modernity, (Montreal: McGill, 2000); and for the perceived, though tacit Hegelianism in Burckhardt, see E. H. 
Gombrich, In Search of Cultural History, Philip Maurice Deneke Lecture (London: Clarendon Press, 1969), 35. 
Gombrich oberves that Burckhardt found in the facts a Hegelian world of the spirit; on the three powers working in 
accordance to a Hegelian dialectic, see Jörn Rusen, Konfigurationen des Historismus: Studien zur deutsche 
Wissenschaftskultur (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1993). Though Burckhardt acknowledged the influence upon him 
of certain philosophies (namely the Hegelian philosophy of history), yet given the various heuristics he employed in 
his method (Anschauung) of cultural history and the dynamics by which they operate, it seems difficult to suspect a 
tacit Hegelianism at work there. The movement he describes is much more Herderian than Hegelian, it seems to me. 
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Kultur is the constant; and moreover, that all three of the powers are different expressions of 
Kultur in a broad and deep sense. The heuristic of the three powers provided for Burckhardt a 
way of understanding how forces translate into action within various cultural spheres at given 
historical moments.  
What is interesting is that the dominance of a particular power is also suggestion of a 
culture’s vitality. The pronounced characteristic of naivete in the higher arts, as with those of the 
Italian Renaissance, reveals how what he called a spiritual surplus [geistiger Überschuß] ushered 
forth into a wide range of creative activities.
184
 What is more, however, in its surplus, the 
creative spirit of the Renaissance contained that unique and elusive plastic power to create new 
cultural forms through which that spiritual vibrancy might be most fully expressed. As I have 
attempted to argue, the notion of invenire, both in terms of its broad semantic sense (as both a 
discovery and an invention) as well as the specific orientation between man and world that it 
implies, it becomes the “site” in and through which the full range of this spiritual surplus is 
translated into action. The creativity that manifests through the reciprocity of discovery of man 
and world, again, hinges fundamentally upon an authentic openness to the metaphor from which 
“poetic” action emerges in a rich and variegated way. And, since the creative powers in 
question—again understood as heuristic devices—are metaphorically mediated, the notion of 
invenire, especially as visualized in an historical consciousness, becomes what we might call the 
“vestibular threshold” through which the dynamics of the metaphor may be more thoroughly 
assessed.  
As Burckhardt repeatedly observed, it is the arts that powerfully and enigmatically convey 
the extraordinarily creative potential of these plastic forces, which, for him, it seems to me, was 
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 WB, 279. 
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intimately tied to this notion of invenire.
185
 Poetry, in the strict sense, represents the most 
mysterious, the most transcendent of the arts. Indeed poetry is that which is of the highest and 
most noble character, and which finds through culture a historical expression.
186
  But, language 
more generally, as Burckhardt noted, represents “the most direct and specific revelation of the 
spirit of a people, their ideal image, their most durable material in which they encapsulate the 
very essence [Substanz] of their spiritual life [geistigen Lebens], and especially in the sayings 
[Worten] of their great poets and thinkers.”
187
 In what he termed the drei Potenzen (three 
powers), which for him comprised culture (in a strict sense) together with the state and religion, 
Burckhardt endeavored to show (or, indeed, to visualize) the complex set of interrelations that 
constitute a cultural totality, and of which language is not only the spearhead [Spitz]; but the 
“supreme manifestation of its soul.”
188
  
The cultural totality is also an “ideal totality,” and the Potenzen serve as the heuristic by 
which to view the dynamic interplay of these forces insofar as they shaped a culture into an 
observable whole. As Burckhardt articulated in his Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen, the 
historian should endeavor to study a culture’s historical development in broad terms, which 
serves as an understanding of the historical past (and present) hinged upon an eidetic connection. 
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 See the discussion regarding the general power of the arts (and the comparatively attenuated sciences), 
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187
 Ibid. 276.30-34 
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 Ibid.,“hochstespecifische Offenbarung des Geistes,” 276.30; also, on the visual-pictorial quality of 
Burckhardt’s Civilization of the Renaissance and to his cultural histories more generally, see Karl J. Weintraub, 
Visions of Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 115-60, and especially pp. 144-58.  
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This broad understanding is very much a Goethean understanding, which is to say that to the 
extent that the historical is a function of memory, it is fundamentally a memory of the ideal or 
eidetic whole.  Consonant with this understanding, the Potenzen are morphological types, and 
thus serve as a set of guiding impetuses or drives to formation (Bildungstrieben). And, while 
Burckhardt did not understand these drives (Trieben) in strict reference to what Goethe had 
understood to be operative at their base, i.e., an archetypal phenomena (Urphänome) that guided 
development in relation to an ideal or fixed image, his understanding of the development of 
culture nevertheless relied intrinsically upon the “phenomenal.”  
The “phenomenal” is effectively the point of departure for a cultural historical analysis, and 
furthermore constitutes the “imaginative” reality from which a more thoroughly heuristic 
analysis—as the drei Potenzen reveal, for example—and may be allowed to proceed.  The 
heuristic device serves to assess the images of the past in a meaningful way, which it does 
through the creation of a “total vision” of a culture in view of its broad contours, and from which 
the images derive their significance.  And yet, the employment of a heuristic in the formation of 
a total vision is not only reflected in, but is also made possible through the creative act of 
historical writing. A Burckhardtian-type history, conscious as it is of its creative role within the 
realm of the historical more generally, underscores its significance as the creative mechanism 
through which a culture is “phenomenalized” to a historical consciousness in the present, which 
thereby connects that present in a significant (and particular) way with the past it attempts to 
know.   
To put it another way, the total vision is constituted, in part, by the concrete expressions of 
the age’s spiritual life as instanced by and presented through any number of its cultural forms.  
What is more, the concrete or “real”—manifest as it is through certain thoughts, actions and 
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more specific cultural forms (e.g., the lyric form of the sonnet)—integrates with the heuristic 
conceptualization of the operative Potenzen, for example, to form a total vision of the culture as 
mirrored through its creative expression of life, which is “phenomenalized” to an historical 
consciousness.  Inasmuch as Burckhardt’s notion of a total vision is conceptual, or even 
idealistic, it proceeds fundamentally from a Kantian, but more specifically a Goethean 
understanding of Anschauung—which is to say a type of viewing that inter alia allows for a sort 
of viewing-of-the-whole, which simultaneously presupposes an authentic self-world 
relationship.
189
   
Following Goethe, Burckhardt developed what has been termed an anschauliche, or visually 
demonstrative method, to facilitate understanding of the Renaissance by way of detailed images 
and illustrations.
190
 The “method” as deployed in Die Kultur der Renaissance serves the express 
purpose of “revealing” the Renaissance’s spiritual contours (geistige Umrisse) in a fashion that is 
dymamically and meaningfully represented to our own age. The connection to our age is not only 
eidetic, insofar as the “concrete,” “real” expressions of the Renaissance (as manifest through the 
cultural forms) continue to exercise upon us an imaginative power, it is also a connection of 
value, (i.e., a core value set of which we are not only heir, but also may continue to share).
 191
  
Taken together—the eidetic in accordance with a core set of values—these components are 
fundamentally constitutive of Burckhardt’s understanding of cultural history, which is similarly 
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 Anschauung, though literally an “on-looking,” is practically impossible to render into English. The 
above “functional” definition shall serve for the present purpose. 
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 On the this method, and on the notion of Anschauung in general, see Benjamin Sax, “An Acute and 
Practiced Eye: Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, and the Problem of Cultural History,” 
in Cultural Visions: Essays in the History of Culture, ed. P. S. Gold and B. C. Sax (Amsterdam and Atlanta, Rodopi, 
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Renaissance vis-à-vis the expressions it gave to life and Burckhardt’s anschauliche method as an historical portrayal 
of it, see Weintraub, Visions of Culture.   
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 On values and the “perishable reality of harmonious life,” see Weintraub, Visions of Culture, p. 148. 
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and powerfully represented in the works of Huizinga and Benjamin et al.
192
 The eidetic 
connection characterized by a “collective” memory constituted by powerful images (Bilden), 
forms an ideal whole of a historical past and present, which moreover, gains its power and 
significance through the mediation of values.
193
 The anschauliche “method,” as my examination 
of “the poetic” will attest, was not steadfastly or irreconcilably opposed to a history extolling the 
“holiness of the minute particular;” but rather in its attempt to present a total vision, seeks also to 
visualize the “backdrop” of a culture more fully and more meaningfully from which the detailed 
particulars emerge in relief.
194
  Thus, Burckhardt could say in reference to Machiavelli’s 
Florentine history that “we might find something to say against every line of the Storie 
Fiorentine, and yet the great and unique value of the whole would remain unaffected.”
195
  
The “truth” here is a cultural-historical truth, and not an abstract, scientific one. Insofar as 
meaning is conveyed, on the one hand, through the historical act of articulating synchronically 
the spiritual contours of the Renaissance expression of life, and on the other hand, as 
diachronically expressed in the eidetic—and by extension, value-laden—relation to our own age, 
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 Johan Huizinga, The Autumn of the Middle Ages, trans. Rodney Payton and Ulrich Mammitzsch 
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History, Forgetting, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 
especially pp. 44-55. In a way not too distanced from Burckhardt, Ricoeur endeavors to bridge the gap between the 
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 Nietzsche’s early notebooks of the 1870s, and on the basis of his observation of the necessity for an 
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Notebooks ed. Raymond Guess et al and trans. Ladislaus Löb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 105.   
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 Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, trans, S.G.C. Middlemore (London: Penguin, 2004), 70. 
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a particular historical truth emerges. As the scholarship would suggest, the question of these 
powerful shaping forces as they pertain to the significances of the synchronic, and with it the 
emergence and development of a total vision of life is a difficult one to pursue.
196
   
The Experience of Possibility 
By turning more closely to the Λόγος and the mediating power of the metaphor, I seek to 
illuminate this question of a total vision of life, especially as it relates to the problem of the 
Cogito as coterminous with the broader question of the Baroque. The cultural dynamic as 
repeatedly conceptualized by Burckhardt in terms of the drei Potenzen is a powerful heuristic in 
assessing a generalized and vibrant interplay of forces insofar as they “appear” in the 
Renaissance with the creation of new cultural forms; the formation of new “free personalities”; 
and the altogether novel and spirited re-orientation of the individual to the world as well as to the 
generative forces within it. All of these concerns represent major descriptive threads permeating 
Die Kultur der Renaissance, and through them Burckhardt endeavored to show in striking and 
illuminative detail the various ways by which that culture “phenomenalized” in Italy from the 
mid-thirteenth through the mid-sixteenth centuries. What Burckhardt had done was to show how 
these powers “functioned” in an interrelated way within the closed horizon of a culture.  
As it may now be obvious to the reader, my intention to assess the Λόγος follows a similar 
heuristic path, though not in terms of Burckhardt’s drei Potenzen per se; but rather in relation to 
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the power of the Λόγος “to lay out” the conditions of possibility for modes of living. This full 
possibility combines with the metaphor, which through its mediating power opens the possibility 
of the Λόγος to action. We are thus talking of “powers” on at least two fronts: first, in terms of 
the fullness of the Λόγος, and second, in terms of the mediating power of the metaphor through 
which the Λόγος is expressed. In both cases, powers relate to possibilities, or rather potentialities, 
which furthermore implies “openness” to them through which they may translate into acts. Both 
the operative metaphor and a core set of values lay at the core of a cultural horizon, which is 
itself a heuristic device that allows for the visualization of a cultural whole in terms of thoughts 
and actions as well as the way they are expressed in and through various cultural forms.  
To problematize the metaphor in terms of its mediating power is a way to question, on 
perhaps a more intimate level, the connection of the creative potential/power of language as it 
appears pre-conceptually in relation to various modes of human living as they manifest within 
the modern cultural epoch. To pose this question is to examine it from two different angles or 
perspectives: 1) the manifesting action; and 2) its operative potential. Both perspectives form 
part of a larger vision in which they are reciprocally and dialectically involved; and as such, this 
total vision of a culture does not imply a hierarchy of significance or meaning, which places 
actions as necessarily derivative of metaphoric potential. This is to propose a type of 
metaphysical ground, which is emphatically not the case. Rather, the Λόγος, which I understand 
as synonymous with Nietzsche’s understanding of “life,” is neither an absolute nor a static 
notion; but rather is dynamic and vitalizing. As perhaps equally dynamic, the values that orient 
towards the Λόγος, i.e., as a vibrant unfolding of life, do not “know” or experience it directly, but 
rather indirectly, and only through a mediating metaphor.  
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The relation of the Λόγος to a historically specific mode of human existence is dialectical, but 
not in a Hegelian sense. The dialectical relation that occurs between the Λόγος, and the valued-
based orientation to it, is affected through the dynamic of the metaphor through which creativity 
is made possible. It is through this creative dynamic that a culture emerges. And thus, the 
horizon of a culture is centered on a both a core set of values and an operative metaphor, which 
both mediates and empowers the full possibility of the Λόγος inasmuch as it is historically 
capable; and which furthermore, in its full, generative mode is expressive of wide range of 
creative thoughts and actions.  
As suggested above, Burckhardt’s direct and indirect application of the notion of invenire 
represents a rich and fruitful path to this end. As a broad mode of action, and with a perhaps 
equally as broad semantic range, Burckhardt’s understanding of the term reflects at the very 
least, what he observed to be an authentic relationship of man, world, and God. This relationship 
was greatly attributable to the openness Renaissance man had toward the possibilities within his 
world, which was underpinned and thoroughly penetrated by this notion of invenire as an active 
and vibrant force in itself, if also the mode through which it was variously expressed. As a case 
in point, the usage during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of the verb invenire—to which 
Burckhardt was no doubt sensitive—reflects this “openness to the possible” in a powerful way; 
and with it, conveys a sense of the many vibrant options through which a world could be created, 
and also creatively sustained. Invenire thus yields a fascinating glimpse into the vital forces at 
work in the Renaissance insofar as they translate into actions that can be seen, measured and felt.  
At this level of the phenomenal, i.e., that plane where thought and action are manifest in 
decidedly “real” and concrete ways, the Renaissance rendering of invenire begins to disclose the 
poignant and vital relationship between the manifest modes of life on the one hand, and on the 
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other hand, the creative forces—which I understand in terms of the metaphor—that gave them 
shape. At once the extensive semantic range of invenire connotes a sense of discovery that not 
only harmonizes with, but also includes within it a broad range of theoretical and practical 
actions. The meaning conveyed by invenire effectively unites the realms of “morals” and of 
“making,” so that they must be understood not merely as two modes of action, but also as two 
modes/expressions of a larger force of potential. And thus, on the one hand, invenire invokes the 
broadly conceived moral action whereby man, in authentic attunement to the world, discovers 
the world and himself within it, all as part of a singularly meaningful totality. Thus, an authentic 
moral action is by definition an action of discovery insofar as it is “phenomenalized” in thoughts 
and deeds.
 197
 In this respect, one need only think of Goethe in Dichtung and Warhheit in his 
suggestion that he knows himself only insomuch as he knows his world, and he knows his world 
only insomuch as he knows himself. On the other hand, invenire calls within its ambit that 
specific action (or deed) by which man creates, produces or invents.
198
 This is the realm of 
“making,” i.e., the realm of art, where the action of discovery is directed toward the production 
of something, whether a painting, a sculpture or a dramatic or musical work. As a specific mode 
of creative, practical action, the work of art—as an invention—at once reveals the moral actions 
of thought and deed while translating them creatively into a variety of artistic forms through 
which those actions are affirmed and even celebrated.     
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Though invenire (itself a type of phenomenon), along with the actions by which it is 
characterized, conveys a sense of those forces in affecting an understanding of how the men of 
the Renaissance came to know, to create and to act within this world, it transcends it. And, as 
Burckhardt understood so well, the very point at which invenire actuates for us the phenomenon 
of the world of the Renaissance; articulating it into almost palpable detail, while describing the 
means by which man and world existed wholly and meaningfully together; it is at the same time 
inscrutably elusive. The phenomenon is but a glimpse of that moment—indeed, an illusion of our 
living, historical past—with which we must come to authentic terms in the present. The 
phenomenon occasions not an elusive quest for certainties in the form of undeniable facts, but a 
more deep probing into that larger force of potential from which not only the smallest facts, but 
also the defining actions of discovery derive their meaning and significance.  The actions of 
discovery as they relate to man, world and God are subsumed within a larger dynamic, but the 
phenomenon that it brings forth nevertheless “sets the stage” on which deeper questions vis-à-vis 
the Λόγος—as mediated through metaphor and expressed in any number of cultural forms)—can 
be firmly posed, and without which the twin phenomena of the Renaissance and the Baroque are 
but empty shells. 
With this is mind, let us for the moment, return to Pico della Mirandola. Not only does 
invenire present in the Oratio and other texts as the authentic mode of action for Renaissance 
culture in redefining the relation of man, God, and world; the action itself is effectively the 
experience of metaphoric possibility. In his invective against astrology, as articulated in the 
unfinished Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinitricem
199
 (Disputations against Divinatory 
Astrology) of 1496, Pico assessed the question of divine knowledge from a mystical edifice, 
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Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinitricem, (henceforth, Disput.). Disputationes adversus 
astrologiam divinitricem 2 vols., ed. Eugenio Garin (Florence: Vallechi, 1946-52). 
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which furthermore brought to consideration the possibility of a closer harmony between the 
immediacy of the mystical experience and the rationalized approach of traditional theology.  As 
the more familiar example—the Oratio—reveals, and specifically the repeated references to 
Jacob’s Ladder, the two approaches are not opposed. That Pico’s Oratio is expressive of the 
love- and will-based mysticism that goes back to at least Augustine, it is perhaps equally 
informed by traditions—from Neoplatonism to late-Scholasticism—oriented toward the 
theoretical knowledge of God (as theo-logos).  Man, through the act of creation, is an entity who 
simultaneously exists as the familiar of the gods (superis familiarem)
200
 and, whose variable and 
unfixed (though godlike) nature within the hierarchy, confers a status upon him where he may 
contemplate the universe (ubi universi contemplator)
201
 in many different ways and from many 
different perspectives. The point being that the mystical edifice for Pico becomes part of the 
larger experience of the divine insofar as the experience subsumes the range of human action in 
its various modes of theory, practice and making.   
The experience qua experience is the crucial point of significance, for it—as a moment of 
totality and fullness—is both inclusive and open to an almost inexhaustible field of possible 
thoughts and actions, which not only comprise the “totality” of the experience itself, but also 
constitutes the intrinsic significance of Renaissance mysticism as a cultural form. It is here that 
inventus, in terms of the overall action of the discovery of man and of world, gains its thoroughly 
penetrating significance. In Pico’s formulation, the experience constitutes inventus and vice 
versa; and to the extent that they are constitutive of each other, the scope of moral action and 
creativity lives fully and openly within the experience to affect the concomitant discovery of 
man, God and world, all within the same realm of possibility. The mystical experience—as 
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formulated specifically by Pico or even more expansively as a cultural form of the later Middle 
Ages and Renaissance—cannot be approached exclusively in terms of the interiore homine, or of 
an inner movement more generally. Though these notions are necessary to a fuller understanding 
of the mystical experience, they are not sufficient in terms of an appreciation for the overall 
significance this broader notion of mysticism holds not only for the Renaissance as a cultural 
epoch, but also with respect to its implicit role in the manifestation of Baroque culture and the 
modern mode of existence in its more recent forms.  
If invenire in its Renaissance manifestation is constitutive of the broad experience of the 
divine—along with its mystical overtones—the Oratio may serve to show how a broadly 
conceived notion of “discovery,” coupled with a large array of creative forces, characterized the 
phenomena of the Renaissance in all of its fascinating diversity. As is well known, Pico’s efforts 
at syncretism served as the hallmark of his scholarly achievement, and his inclination to the unity 
of all knowledge must have produced in him the belief that he was the legitimate heir to a rich 
intellectual tradition, and especially insofar as this belief was marked by a religious sensibility. 
Notwithstanding the specific problematic of Renaissance astrology with which Pico was 
engaged, and which moreover, he saw as an impediment to the immediacy of the mystical 
experience, the “striving to find”
 202
 as written in the Disputationes (invenire contendunt) 
commands our attention. The animating sentiment, even if cast in a negative tenor, is the same 
that pervades the Oratio where an eternal striving for the truth at once transcends and eludes us 
while giving true value to human existence.
203
 In the Oratio it is not so much that man will 
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ascend Jacob’s Ladder to attain an angelic intelligence; for he may quite possibly descend the 
ladder to realize the brute within. Rather, it is that he shall endeavor to do so in a supreme act of 
individual willing. Indeed, it is man’s striving as actuated by his own will—and because his 
being is not fully determined (indiscretae opus imaginis)—that has true meaning, and from 
which he derives an almost god-like status to create. In this way the Λόγος proper mediates 
through the metaphor of the microcosm from which new and alternative potencies now emanate.  
This becomes the decisive moment of the Renaissance. What is more this is a strikingly 
poignant and deeply significant historical question, for Pico’s Adam—and by extension 
humanity—serves to redefine the creation account in a powerfully new language. The 
microcosm, as the image of the macrocosm along with the analogous set of potentialities 
inherent within it, is “recreated” in Pico’s account so as to speak the divine Λόγος in a new way; 
and in a powerfully unique way for a newly emerging world as manifested through the moment 
of the Renaissance. Man as the Imago Dei is radically redefined from its Augustinian precedent. 
For it is the image itself that has now become creative, with the divine possibility flowing 
through it, so as to find actualization in a variety of forms.
204
 But, though Pico’s Adam became 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Menschen. Denn nicht den Besitz, sondern durch die Nachforschung der Wahrheit erweitern sich seine Kräfte, 
worin allein seine immer wachsende Vollkommenheit bestehet. Der Besitz macht ruhig, träge, stolz—[The true value 
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which his ever-growing perfectibility is to be found. Possession makes one passive, indolent, and proud], Anti-
Goetze: Eine Duplik [1778], tr. Scott Horton, in Werke, ed. H. Göpfert, 8, (1979), 32-33. 
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 It would take us too far afield here, but a fuller examination of Cusanus would be fruitful in revealing 
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emblematic of the revitalized Neoplatonic microcosm, the poetical forces at work in his 
conception transcend—though they certainly include—the familiar motif of freedom and self-
fashioning. The metaphor thus opens what may be termed a “horizon of possibility” within 
which the modern cultural epoch emerged—and indeed, by which it is still operative in a 
fascinatingly unique way.  By raising the question of the metaphor “essentially”—that is with an 
eye to its creative and expressive possibility—the question of culture per se can be properly 
addressed. And though the metaphor has ontological primacy in this particular sense, it is 
nevertheless inextricably entwined with a culture’s core set of values on which its thoughts, 
actions, and indeed, all cultural forms thoroughly depend. 
Indeed, in approaching the notion of the “poetic,” which the metaphor most certainly is, one 
must certainly hearken back to the Greeks in determining its full sense.  As poíesis/ποίησις, such 
action connoted for the Greeks a “making,” an “artifice” or a “production,” and was moreover, 
thoroughly inclusive of a wide range of practical and theoretical activities.  The more strict 
consideration of the poetic—which is to say, an art form per se; and specifically the 
compositional act of articulating the metaphor into language—obviously falls within this broader 
ambit of meaning. Yet, what differentiates it from the more general significance of poíesis is the 
double-sense in which it operates—a sense dependent upon the simultaneous nearness and 
distance to the “reality” it articulates.  In a word, such a sense is “metaphoric.” Indeed, all 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Maxim autem, cui minimum coincidit, convenit ita unum amplecti, quod et aliud non dimittat, sed simul 
omnia. Quadpropter natura media, quae est medium connexionis inferioris et superioris, est solum illa, quae ad 
maximum convenienter elevabilis est potentia maximi infiniti Dei. Nam cum ipsa intra se complicet omnes naturas, 
ut supremum inferioris et infimum superioris, si ipsa secundum omnia sui ad unionem maximitatis ascenderit, 
omnes naturas ac totum universum omni possibli modo ad summum gradum in ipsa pervenisse constat. [DDI, 
III.3.126]. Nicolai de Cusa: Opera Omnia, Vol. I, De docta ignorantia, ed. Ernest Hoffmann and Raymond 
Klibansky (Leipzig: Meiner, 1932). [Now, it befits the Maximum—with which the Minimum coincides—to 
embrace one thing in such a way that it does not repel another thing but is all things together.  Therefore, a middle 
nature, which is the means of the union of the lower [nature] which can be suitably elevated unto the Maximum by 
the power of the maximal, infinite God.  For since this middle nature—as being what is highest of the lower [nature] 
and what is lowest of the higher [nature]—enfolds within itself all natures: if it ascends wholly to a union with 
Maximality, then—as is evident—all natures and the entire universe have, in this nature, wholly reached the 
supreme gradation.],  trans., Jasper Hopkins, De docta ignorantia (Minneapolis: Arthur J. Banning Press, 1985).    
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authentic, mytho-poetic forms are synonymous with the metaphoric, and while in one sense they 
articulate (in “artificing”), they simultaneously (and in another sense) reveal human imagination 
and capability at the very limits of the possible—which indeed is a possibility bordering on the 
transcendent. The medium by which meaning is articulated (and made) into language, as well as, 
the medium by which this revelation into the mysterious possibilities takes place, is always 
metaphoric. Poetic revelation itself attunes us to the metaphor’s living presence along with the 
expressive possibilities mediated through it.  
In opening a “horizon of possibility” the metaphor reveals an “essence of possibility”—
which is to say the full range of poetic potential as unarticulated, but yet metaphorically 
mediated.
205
  My assessment of the Cogito together with the cultural epoch of which it formed 
part proceeds in an interpretive vein directed by a concern for the in potentia historical 
expressions—both authentic and inauthentic—of metaphorically mediated thoughts and actions. 
This is to say that to frame the problem of the Cogito as a cultural problem, the metaphor must 
take precedence in relation to the modern cultural epoch as a whole. The metaphor and culture 
(as the phenomenalizing of its possibilities) are thus united in a unique and interesting way. In 
this regard the horizon of possibility, as revealed by the metaphor, consists of the primordial 
possibilities of human being as an “essence of possibility” in itself, which is engaged 
dialectically with a core set of values from which the concrete phenomenon of the modern 
cultural epoch (inclusive of the Renaissance and Baroque) emerges.
206
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 I would distinguish the “essence of possibility” from “absolute possibility,” the latter understood as that 
which lay beyond the limits of human understanding and imagination and is akin to the metaphysical formulation as 
Being qua Being. 
206
 Whereas the conventional modern sense understands the metaphor in terms of ornamented language, 
which is furthermore “put to use” in the service of the poet to affect something aesthetically pleasing; by contrast, 
the metaphor acting in a primordial sense, which is to say “essentially,” reveals the essence of creative possibility. 
The poetic act proper, together with the energies and transfiguring capabilities unique to it, articulates into language 
a historically specific “essential possibility” through a mediating metaphor, which furthermore expresses itself 
poetically in and through various practical and theoretical activities.    
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The metaphor as representative of the “essence of possibility” is manifestly operative in both 
a broad and a strict poetical sense—or what I will call the derivative and the definitive, 
respectively.  On the one hand—the derivative level—the poetical creatively expresses itself 
authentically in thought and in action. In this sense, the derivative function of the metaphor is 
constitutive of the concrete expression of a particular mode(s) of life, which it also represents 
through the dynamics of life properly constituted as an authentic expression of the metaphor.
207
  
On the other hand—the definitive level—the poetical acts in concert with a sort of primordial 
capability so as to define the very possibilities of actions and thoughts as they come to be (and 
are) expressed in a multitude of ways within a culture—i.e., cultural forms, thoughts and actions. 
This second, more fundamental sense—as in with the microcosm of the Oratio—represents the 
strict poetic act whereby the metaphor is “named,” and in so doing, the possibilities for thought 
and action are articulated into language in accordance with Heidegger’s treatment of the 
Heraclitus fragment. This represents the “essence of possibility” with which we are concerned 
vis-à-vis the modern cultural epoch. Thus, through the definitive function of the metaphor 
language is “given” in such a way that modes of thought and action can now themselves be 
properly “thought” and interpreted reflexively in terms of the mediating metaphor, especially 
with an eye to their fundamentality and creative potential.   
By way of conclusion, I want to suggest—in accordance with Burckhardt’s notion of the 
cultural continuum—that inasmuch as the metaphor functions as a mediator, the moment in 
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 Walter Benjamin articulated a similar position with respect to the “allegorical viewpoint” as expressed 
in the German Trauerspiel, which he saw as the “ideal/Gestalt” for understanding it, and by extension as assessment 
of the darkness of our own times.  The allegorical, for Benjamin, served as the expression of convention itself (what 
I would call a specific cultural mode of action) as opposed to an “accurate” conventional representation of some 
notion from a distant historical past.  He writes, “…it is not the conflict with God and Fate, the representation of a 
primordial past, which is the key to a living sense of national community, but the confirmation of princely virtues, 
the depiction of princely vices, the insight into diplomacy and manipulation of all the political schemes, which 
makes the monarch the main character in the Trauerspiel.” The Origin of German Tragic Drama, p. 62.    
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which it is properly named allows for the full operative range of the poetic to become jointly a 
hermeneutic and a historical concern. In other words, the microcosm metaphor as named by Pico 
in the Oratio becomes the animating spirit of the Renaissance and through which any number of 
creative actions manifest. The metaphor gave the age, as it does any age, its spiritual contours. 
Thus, Pico’s notion of the microcosm is a definitive poetic act, which articulates in language the 
possibilities for action and thought, which in turn (from an historical, hermeneutical standpoint) 
reveal the patterns of meaning in their totality, and as expressed by the metaphor in the creation 
of new cultural forms. The derivative operation in which invenire may be said to take place 
effectively represents the moral realm insofar as poetic function combines with a core set of 
values, which is a concern to which we will attend below. The definitive operation of the poetic, 
however, is manifestly a conditional moment insofar as the metaphor dwells almost exclusively 
within the realm of possibility in the shaping of modes of thought and action.
208
  The grounds for 
this possibility—as metaphoric— surpass what may be deemed a “fundamental change in 
intellectual attitude,” insofar as the poetical becomes powerfully linked to an almost transcendent 
possibility, albeit in a worldly guise where it finds unique expression.
 209
  In this way, Leon 
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 It should be noted that the metaphor represents one contingent and historical aspect in the shaping of the 
modern West. The other depends upon the dynamic of culture wherein the question of value comes to the fore in the 
shaping of human history. These values, in their authentic linkage to metaphoric possibility, are themselves creative; 
and it is through them that a culture takes shape in significant and meaningful ways.  This is a rich and complex 
notion, indeed, and one that we will attend to below where the Baroque is problematized more directly.  With the 
question of culture—on which the thrust of my argument depends—we enter effectively into the moral realm where 
the poetical (metaphorical) links with a value-determined impetus, which in turn shapes thought and action in 
concrete (as opposed to abstract) ways. The metaphor, in bringing to language the possibilities for thought and 
action, also brings them to thought, or more specifically, allows for interpretative reflection—in view of a core set of 
values—from which the range of human possibility can be “thought” historically with respect not only to its past, 
but also its present and future.   
209
 On the “fundamental change in intellectual attitude,” see Eugenio Garin, Science and Civic Life in the 
Italian Renaissance trans. by Peter Munz (New York: Double Day, 1969), p. 9; and Ernst Cassirer, The Individual 
and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, trans. By Mario Domandi (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 6 et 
passim. Garin, especially, sought to challenge the continuity argument waged by Haskins, Chenu et al; yet his 
reference to the poetical aspects of Renaissance are largely in passing and the degree to which the epoch is poetical 
is never really explored. On the continuity argument, especially with respect to Renaissance novelties already extant 
in the Middles Ages, see for example, the classic account by Charles Homer Haskins, The Renaissance of the 
Twelfth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); on “inventiveness” and creativity within the new 
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Battista Alberti, who though he did not speak explicitly of the infinity of man in terms of a 
theosis or full participation in the godhead, as Charles Trinkhaus would suggest with respect to 
Pico, he could nevertheless speak glowingly about the infinite number of possibilities available 
to him, whether they be in the mode of an architect, a painter, a gymnast, an administrator or a 
dramatist.
210
   
Along these lines what is interesting—and perhaps decisive—for the problem of the Cogito 
as examined vis-à-vis the metaphor is that it is operative under the same possibilities that 
pervade and energize Pico’s Oratio. Yet, at the same time, the Cogito formulation retains and 
employs many of the metaphysical presuppositions (i.e., concepts) of the tradition, which present 
in a complicated and confused way.
211
 Of these metaphysical presuppositions, one may turn, for 
example, to the Scholastic interpretations of essentia and existentia as evidenced in the thought 
of Aquinas, Scotus and Suarez, and of whom Descartes was a direct heir.
 212
 As Heidegger has 
pointed out, the sense of actuality and existence in pre-modern philosophy was always oriented 
toward actualization to the extent that for a created being (ens creatum), existence was added to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
framework of nature, see M. D. Chenu, Nature, Man and Society in the Twelfth Century (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1968); for the continuity of antiquity into the Middle Ages (and beyond), especially Platonism, see 
Etienne Gilson, La philosophie au moyen âge, (Paris: Payot, 1922) and the contributions of pagan antiquity more 
generally, see Melange Mandonnet, Etudes d’histoire doctrinal et littéraire, 2 vols (Paris: Vrin, 1930).  
210
 On this notion of the “many-sided man,” see for example, Garin, p.10; and more definitively, 
Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, trans. S.G.C. Middlemore (London: Penguin, 2004), pp. 
102-4.  Also see Trinkhaus, “In Our Image and Likeness,” 518-29, et passim. 
211
 At least part of the problem regarding the Cartesian move (as solidified in the Meditations) hinges on the 
reversal in meaning of the traditional concepts of actualitas and realitas. See, Heidegger, The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology, trans. by Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1982), 77-121. On the one 
hand, the traditional, “pre-modern” formulation of actualitas, and especially in its Aristotelian, form equated in 
meaning with a notion of existence or being. Actualitas accorded also with the Aristotelian notion of movement or 
physis (φύσις) expressed on its own terms. On the other hand, the pre-modern tradition had understood realitas in 
terms of “essence,” or “quidditas,” which is to place emphasis upon the first principle, i.e., the original arche/ἀρχή 
or underlying substance of a thing, which in turn established and determined its “whatness.” The grounding of 
reality in modernity is subjectivity, which is a foundation determined by a specific—and limited—formulation of 
actuality (energeia/ενεργεια) as something fully existent. On this foundation is an ontological primacy on which 
attendant claims to truth are legitimated.  
212
 On these late Scholastic distinctions, see Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 88-99; 122-76. 
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the actual, which is to say, a being’s full existence depended upon the degree to which it was 
fully actualized. The essence (or potential) is actualized through the full development of a thing’s 
(res) “real content” in accordance with particular type of movement (φύσις).
213
 It is not merely 
that these traditional concepts are retained in Cogito, and even in a complicated and confused 
way, but rather that they are affirmed dogmatically.
214
 The Cogito as the ground for certitude 
depends upon the understanding of itself as fully actualized and situated in over-and-against the 
world, which is to enact an inauthentic relationship between man and world.
215
  Insofar as this 
relates to the question of metaphoric possibility as raised by the Oratio, the Cogito at the very 
least delimits the full range of creative possibility—if not negating it utterly—insofar as 
possibility lay beyond the parameters of truth and knowledge as grounded in the Cogito and 
determined on the basis of epistemic certitude.  
What I wish to show in this dissertation is that the dynamic of this transformation, though 
presupposing the full possibility of the metaphor, resides ultimately in a question of value that 
bespeaks a particular orientation to the world. This, or course, is a cultural concern. Within that 
dynamic—that is between the Λόγος and a specific value orientation—the metaphor mediates the 
expressive possibility as lain out by the Λόγος. The various ways in which the metaphor mediates 
are effectively the in potentia historical expressions of a world as a world.  And insofar as the 
entire dynamic forms part of the cultural continuum, the continuum’s illumined and emphasized 
aspects, as much as its obscured and deemphasized aspects, are conditioned and allowed by a 
cultural horizon. The return to Pico’s text in terms of the metaphor, as the conveyor of the vital 
forces that shape a world, allows us to problematize effectively the Cogito as a cultural concern, 
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 Ibid. 124-25. 
214
 Ibid. 122-76. This section, in particular, overviews the question of dogmatism in relation to the 
metaphysical tradition preceding Kant. 
215
 This is a common theme throughout many of Heidegger’s works. For one instantiation, see Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology, 104-5. 
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and perhaps only then to reorient ourselves toward the discovery of the full range of possibilities 
in the modern world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 148 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
“Quod Rectum Iter Veritatis?:” Subjectivity and the Cartesian Self 
We have so far endeavored to show how the generative metaphor of the microcosm 
mediates the power of the Λόγος whereby that potential is expressed through the modal action of 
invenire to reveal a world as a world. The metaphoric power of the microcosm as named in the 
Oratio, in large part, derives its force through the indeterminate nature of man (indiscreatae opus 
imaginis) whereby he may expand and enfold into the world according to his will and to the full 
extent of his potential. As we have suggested, the microcosm effectively redefined the traditional 
notion of the Imago Dei, or divine image, in view of man’s indeterminate nature to reveal his 
“double role” as both a noble creature and a dynamic creator. The redefinition itself presupposes 
the dynamic between the Λόγος (or life) and the value orientation towards it, and always in 
accordance to the full expressive possibility of the metaphor. To the extent that this expressive 
possibility translates into the realm of moral action, and specifically through the mode of 
invenire, the focus now directs to the question of patterns as well as the specific ways that these 
vital forces may shape a world.  
As a question of moral action, it is also a cultural concern insofar as cultures emerge and 
come into view through a wide range of thoughts and actions. One way in which to grapple 
historically with this question, as I here propose, is to examine more closely the poetic dynamic 
that informed the redefinition of the Imago Dei in view of Pico’s understanding of the 
indeterminate nature of man; and especially his newly privileged status as a microcosmic god 
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replete with creative possibility. The dynamic plays out within what may be called the tradition 
of the interiore homine,
216
 which achieved its fullest development with Augustine and as was 
deeply pervasive throughout Western culture.
217
 What is more, the tradition of the interiore 
homine effectively found new life in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as evidenced 
through the outpouring of various types of meditative and devotional writing, and within which 
parts of the Cartesian corpus are certainly characteristic.
218
 Yet, I am concerned less with these 
meditative aspects per se than with the traditional model of the interiore homine as (by the 
seventeenth century) a still vibrant cultural form through which to articulate a notion of self. In 
this sense, meditative literature—and specifically as it pertains to Descartes in the Discourse and 
the Meditations—constitute a type of “life writing,” which reveals not only a particular 
conception of self, but also its relation to the world (and God).  
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 De vera religione, 39.72, and specifically, noli foras ire in te ipsum redi: in interiore homine habitat 
veritas.[Do not go outside, but return into yourself: for in the inner man dwells the truth], emphasis mine. The 
connection between Augustine and Descartes is firmly established in the scholarly literature. See, for instance, Henri 
Gouhier, Cartésianism et augustinisme au XVIIe siècle (Paris: Vrin, 1978); and more recently, Stephen Menn, 
Descartes and Augustine, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
217
 Recall Burckhardt, the spiritual continuum, as discussed above. 
218
 In many ways the classic text of the sixteenth century, and especially the influential and powerfully 
imaginative notion of “composition of place,” is Loyola’s Exercitia Spiritualia; yet other examples abound and 
include inter alia Donne’s Holy Sonnets, George Herbert’s A Priest to the Temple, and Jean de La 
Ceppède’s Méditations sur les Psaumes as well as his Théorèmes sur le sacré mystère de notre redemption. In terms 
of the secondary literature that addresses the meditative act, see for instance, Pierre Hadot, Exercices spirituels et 
philosophie antique, novella ed. (Paris: Albin Michel, 2002) who though establishing Loyola as the springboard for 
his investigations, navigates backward in time to the ancients, especially Marcus Aurelius and the Stoics and the 
treatment of philosophy as a mode of life and the contemplation of a moral and physical totality; Michel Foucault, 
The Care of the Self (New York: Vintage, 1988); for the metaphysical poets, see the excellent treatment of Louis L. 
Martz, The Poetry of Meditation: A Study in English Religious Literature of the Seventeenth Century (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1976); for continental examples, especially in reference to the notion of “moral perfection,” 
see J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998); and for treatment of the “spiritual exercise” in an early modern, continental context, see for 
example, John Sellers, “Justus Lipsius De Constantia: A Stoic Spiritual Exercise,” Poetics Today, 28(2007): 339-
362, and the notion of constantia (in contradistinction to the tradition-rich notion of consolatio) as a form of 
habituation or perseverance hinged in repeated reflection in the moral perfection of the soul; similarly see Matthew 
L. Jones, “Descartes’s Geometry as Spiritual Exercise,” Critical Inquiry 28( 2001): 40-71. Jones pursues the well-
established line of moral perfection as an askesis, and thus sees Descartes’s deployment of the exercise in terms of 
geometry as possessing a sort of therapeutic capacity for wisdom, moral perfection, and of course, a stable 
foundation on which to base judgment of all questions of knowledge and understanding.  
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Thus, this section proposes to advance a notion of the Cartesian self, albeit tentatively, as 
situated within the cultural tradition of the interiore homine, and as influenced (and in large part 
shaped) by the poetic dynamic associated with the microcosm metaphor. The whole effort is 
pursuant to the centrality of the metaphysics of subjectivity, which I maintain, found within the 
horizon of the modern cultural epoch the conditions of possibility for full expression. Directly 
related to the problem of subjectivity is the confused usage of such terms as “subject”, “self”, 
“soul”, “spirit”, “consciousness”, “self-consciousness”, etc., both in the Baroque period as well 
as subsequent periods, including our own.  This is to say that by engaging the problem of 
subjectivity (including the Cogito) we are also raising the problem of self-conception, which 
again, is less a philosophical or psychological problem than a historical and cultural one.  The 
notion subjectivity as it developed in the canonical texts of Descartes hinges further on the 
understanding that there exists a sub-history within the metaphysical tradition whereby the 
hypokeimenon, understood here in the original Aristotelian sense as that which is “neither 
asserted of nor can be found in the subject,” yields to an inwardly oriented notion of subject, and 
thence to subjectivity.
219
 Within the horizon of the modern cultural epoch, this history unites 
with and subsumes the rich tradition of the interiore homine in ways that will become decisive 
for the modern conception of truth, as well as the possibility of being fully human. I thus 
maintain that the notion of the subject, as conceived in largely in terms of the validity of the 
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 On the sub-history of subjectivity with metaphysics, see Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: 
Max Niemeyer, 2006); Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY, 1996); What is Called Thinking?, 
trans. J. Glenn Gray (New York: Perennial, 2004); Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: 
Perennial, 2001); Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2000); “The Age of the World Picture,” in the The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. 
William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977). Also relevant essays within that volume include, “Nietzsche’s 
Word: God is Dead;” and “The Question Concerning Technology,” among others.  “Der Neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft 
und Der Modernen Technik” in Gesamtausgabe, Band 76, 1976. On the hypokeimenon, Categories I 2a.5; and 
2a.512-13; where Aristotle characterizes the hypokeimenon in terms of substance (ousia), which though a part of the 
a categories is also beyond them. This obviously carries on ontological significance whereby ousia, or substance, in 
“underlying” a thing can be predicated of accidents or other qualities, but is never itself a predicate. This relates to 
what Kant suggests in the First Critique that being is not a real predicate. 
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inner experience, is central to the question of the Baroque. It is only by gaining a sense of the 
historical foundations of subjectivity—and only then from a few limited perspective— that we 
can begin to understand Descartes’ conception of self as it relates to his turn to the Cogito and its 
defining ideals, as laid out initially in the Regulae, of a mathesis universalis or a universalissima 
sapientia. For it is upon these ideals especially that the triumph of the natural sciences rests, and 
which in many ways underpins the dominant truth claims of modernity. Beyond this, it provides 
a feasible starting point from which to rethink the Cogito as a particular expression of 
metaphoric potential, especially as it becomes part of the value-centered dynamic of a cultural 
horizon. It is from here that we may perhaps begin to raise effectively the question of the culture 
of the Baroque, and the dynamics of which our modern existence is thoroughly interwoven.     
The Question of the Cartesian Self: Preliminary Concerns 
This inquiry into the Cartesian notion of self is admittedly the most tentative that I here 
advance in the dissertation. There are larger cultural-historical questions to consider quite 
beyond the purview of the dissertation, which relate to reformulations of traditional concepts 
such as eternity and the nunc stans; as well as a re-conception of the analogia entis;
 220
 and a 
restructuring of the traditional Aristotelian psychology that, in large part, entailed a fusing-
                                                          
220
 I have only begun to think through this aspect of the problem; and though the initial insights will prove 
fruitful, they are too inchoate to include here. In any case, much of the significance regarding the late medieval 
debate on the analogia entis relates directly to Cajetan, and his De nominium analogia. On the question of the 
analogia, especially in its late-medieval sense to which Descartes was a direct heir, see for instance, E. J. Ashworth, 
“Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic: Aquinas in Context,” in Medieval Studies 54 (1992): 94-
135; Ashworth, Les théories de l'analogie du XIIe au XVIe siècle (Paris: Vrin, 2008); Bernard Montagnes, The 
Doctrine of the Analogy of Being according to Thomas Aquinas, trans. E.M. Macierowski (Milwaukee: Marquette 
University Press, 2004); and Ralph McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of 
America Press, 1998). See also Erich Przywara’s magisterial study, Analogia Entis, Metaphysics: Original Structure 
and Universal Rhythm, trans. John R. Betz and David Bentley Hart (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Erdman’s 
Publishing Co., 2014). For a now “classical” neo-Thomist formulation of the problem with an eye to its 
epistemologico-ontological significance, see Jacques Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, trans. Gerald B. Phelan 
(South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Press, 1995). Pierre Aubenque, "Les origines de la doctrine de l'analogie 
de l'être" in Les Études philosophiques 103 (1978): 3-12. 
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together of the intellective faculty within that of the imaginative—all with dynamic and decisive 
consequences.
221
 Yet, we can at least provisionally advance a notion of the Cartesian self in 
relation to the broader tradition of the interiore homine within which many of the dynamical 
transformations, such as the invigoration of the imagination, took shape. To this extent, we are 
ultimately raising questions pertaining to the “cosmic implosion” of the later sixteenth century in 
which the medieval cosmos—as constitutive of an entire moral, physical and metaphysical 
totality—had effectively collapsed only to retreat into the realm of the inner experience. Yet, the 
broad and deep network of sustaining cultural traditions—intellectual and other—did not 
disappear; but rather, were redefined, restructured and given new meaning in view of a drastic 
reorientation to life. The reorientation of a self to life and world, as the Cartesian example 
certainly attests, are attempts to regain that totality, and especially the meaningful whole that it 
represents. Thus, this chapter inasmuch as it is provisional is also transitional in that it points to 
the question of a transforming reality, as addressed in the next chapter. Specifically this 
transformation relates to the problem of the dream, which becomes especially problematic in 
view of the validity of the interior experience; and in its uniquely Cartesian context, questions 
the confused status of consciousness. What is a dream? What is a thought? In the process the 
whole edifice of the traditional reality is brought into question from which I would like to 
suggest, is one aspect of a larger dynamic from which a Baroque culture begins to unfold. But 
before attending more directly to that question, let us first turn to the notion of the Cartesian self, 
and the centrality of the Cogito through which it is largely sustained and understood.  
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 On the question of the imagination, see Pierre Boutroux, L'Imagination et les mathématiques selon 
Descartes (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1900); Stephen Henry Ford, Imagination and Thought in Descartes, (Philosophy, 
York University: Unpublished dissertation, 1977); Dennis Sepper, Descartes’ Imagination: Proportion, Images, and 
the Activity of Thinking (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); Jacqueline Wernimont, “Discovery in The 
World: The Case of Descartes” in the Invention of Discovery, 1500-1700, ed. James Dougal Fleming (Surrey: 
Ashgate, 2011). 
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The Cartesian Self 
The problematic notion of the Cartesian self emerges in two passages, one within the 
Discourse on Method and another in the Mediations on First Philosophy. Indebted in many ways 
to the meditative, religious literature of the age, the very structure of these works is reflective, 
and taken together and in their completeness reveal the meditative process aimed to determine, 
as he Baillet relates in his autobiography, “what road in life shall I follow [Quod vitae sectabor 
iter]…as a condition to be “on the right road of truth” [rectum iter veritatis].
222
  Through 
dialogic reflection Descartes engages the question of truth through the employment of the 
traditional triad constituted of memory, understanding and will.  Mainly as a general process of 
reflection, which is to say thought, the Cartesian self begins to emerge, certain not only of its 
existence, but the truth to which it aspires. Moreover, it rests its conclusions primarily on the 
certitude of the reflections themselves determined as it were by the criterion of clarity and 
distinctness, i.e., the essential foundation of the method. Through meditative action directed 
toward “the right road of truth” Descartes thus defined selfhood on the basis of epistemic 
certitude; and moreover, established epistemology as the edifice for modern philosophy and by 
extension modern science. In order to get an inkling of how Descartes envisioned his project to 
which the mind (and in a decisively new way) becomes foundational, let us briefly look at those 
passages mentioned above.        
 
The Fourth Discourse:  
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 AT X, 186, Baillet’s Vie (1691) represents the first definitive biography of Descartes as commissioned 
and endorsed by Cartesians. We will attend to certain of its concerns more fully below.  
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I knew from this that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature is to think, and 
which, in order to be, does not need any place, nor depend on any material thing 
depend…and having noticed that there is nothing at all in this—I think, therefore I am—
that assures me that I speak the truth, except that I see very clearly that, in order to think, 
it is necessary to be. I judged that I could take for a general rule that the things we 
conceive very clearly and very distinctly are true…. 
223
 
 
The Second Meditation: 
 
So that all things having been weighed and beyond, this statement here established that “I 
am, I exist” [Ego sum, ego existo] is necessarily true, so often as it is uttered by me or 
conceived by my mind…Here I find: it is a cogitation; this along cannot be rent from me 
[a divelli nequit]. I am, I exist; it is certain [Ego sum, ego existo; certum est]…I am, then, 
precisely only a thinking substance [res cogitans], that is a mind [mens], or soul [animus], 
or intellect [intellectus], or reason [ratio]: words with significations previously unknown 
to me. But I am a true thing, and truly existing. Yet what quality of thing? A thinking 
think, I have said. 
224
  
 
 The Fourth Discourse contains the first uttering of the Cogito formulation, “je pense 
donc, je suis, suggesting that on the basis of the premise, “I am thinking” [je pense/ego cogito], 
the conclusion “I am” [je suis/sum or ego existo] logically follows.  The phrase should not suffer 
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 AT VI, 33, All citations from the Discourse derive from Oeuvres de Descartes, Vol. VI, ed. Charles 
Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris: J. Vrin, 1982). “je connus de là que j'étais une substance dont toute l'essence ou la 
nature n'est que de penser, et qui, pour être, n'a besoin d'aucun lieu, ni ne dépend d'aucune chose matérielle...Et 
ayant remarqué qu'il n'y a rien du tout en ceci: je pense, donc je suis, qui m'assure que je dis la vérité, sinon que je 
vois trés clairement que, pour penser, il faut être: je jugeai que je pouvais prendre pour règle générale, qui les 
chose que nous concevons fort clairement et fort distictement sont toutes varies.” As we shall see, the cultural 
problematic comes into view when Descartes continues: “mais qu'il y a seulement quelque difficulté à bien 
remarquer quelles sont celles que nous concevons distinctement” [but that there is only some difficulty in correctly 
recognizing what we conceive distinctly]. The significance here is that which is conceived distinctively must accord 
with an initial intuition from which that distinct conception will be defined.   
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 AT VII 25; 27. Adeo out, omnibus satis superque pensiatis, denique statuendum sit hoc pronuntiatum, 
Ego sum, ego existo, quoties a me profertur, vel mente concipitur, necessario esse verum…Hîc invenio: cogitatio 
est; haec sola a me divelli nequit. Ego sum, ego existo; certum est…sum igitur praecise tantùm res cogitans, id est, 
men’s, sive animus, sive intellectus, sive ratio, voces mihi priùs significantiones. Sum autem res vera, & vere 
existens; sed qualis red? Dixi, cogitans. All citations from the Meditations derive from Oeuvres de Descartes, Vol. 
VII, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris: J. Vrin, 1983). 
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a logical or inferential (or even a performative) reading;
225
 rather, we should take significant 
heed to the fact that in both of these works Descartes had expressly established the ground for 
thinking (and existing) not only on the basis of the conclusion that he was a substance 
(substantia), and particularly a thinking substance (res cogitans); but also from what he believed 
to be the all too certain claim, “Ego sum, ego existo”.  This is to say that by the Second 
Meditation, the Cogito becomes implicit and, moreover, collapses into the ego sum—ego existo 
formulation as the ground for all truth and certitude, viz. what Heidegger had dubbed the 
fundamentum inconcussum, or unshakable ground.
226
 As the Second Meditation reveals, truth 
and the certainty that undergirds it are to be found solely in the solipsism of the present moment; 
and that the proper perception cannot be found in the deceptions of the imagination or the 
mendacious memory (mendax memoria) or that of the imagination, but only insofar as it is 
perceived easily and evidently in the mind.
227
 The striking aspect here, as we shall see, is that 
faculty of the memory, which in the tradition had been so central to the understanding, and 
therefore also its mediating role in connecting that understanding to a cosmological whole 
(indeed, reality itself) was reconceived as something to be distrusted. Along these lines, the 
necessary truth that Descartes felt poised to utter i.e., that he is a thinking substance (res 
cogitans) means, somewhat problematically, that the ego is interchangeable with a host of other 
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 In the case of performative readings, see, for example, Jakko Hintikka, “Cogito, Ego Sum: Inference or 
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Descartes, Tom Sorell, ed., Ashgate, 1999 
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 AT VII, 25, Quare jam denuo meditabor quidnam me olim esse crediderim, priusquam in has 
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whatever could have been weakened even at a minimum by the reasons brought forth, so that thus, finally, precisely 
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certain and unshakeable. On this point see, Jean-Luc Marion, On Descartes’ Metaphysical Prism: The Constitution 
and Limits of Onto-theo-logy in Cartesian Thought, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1999)169-75 
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 AT VII, 24; 34, “cognosco nihil facilis aut evidentius mea mente posse a me percipi.” 
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“cogitatively-oriented” nouns, e.g., the mens, animus, intellectus and ratio, which the 
Augustinian tradition, for example, had held as separate; and furthermore, maintained that each 
in their different ways was crucial to the attainment of the intellectual knowledge of God as well 
as the proper placement of the self within a larger cosmological totality.
228
  
The concern in question—both with respect to a generalized Baroque form of “life 
writing” and to the particular instance of Descartes—relates to the discovery of “the right path of 
truth” (le droit chemin de la vérité; rectum iter veritatis) as well as the measures to be taken that 
allow one to find their way upon it. The correct path and its relation to a particular conception of 
truth is by no means novel within the Western tradition; and in many ways, the model, at least in 
its Christian form—and whether it was acknowledged or not—hearkens back to Augustine.
229
 In 
On the True Religion (De vera religion) Augustine tells us: “Do not go outside, but return into 
yourself: for in the inner man dwells the truth” (noli foras ire in te ipsum redi: in interiore 
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 Though Augustine is in certain ways integral for situating Descartes within the tradition, the 
Augustinian notion of self and with it the detailed consideration of the three triads, serves to again illustrate how 
traditional concepts, richly and densely rendered (as in Augustine) have not only broken down, but have become 
exceedingly problematic..   
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 Parmenides is the first to open the possibility to the type of truth (namely, Fragment 2-3, 6-7, “The Way 
to Truth”) to which the Western tradition would orient itself; namely a “way to truth” characterized as a journey of 
striving and inquiry. Plato will develop this decisively throughout his dialogues as can be found in Book VII of the 
Republic, Theatetus, Phaedrus inter alia wherein it is determined that man is a lover of wisdom (philosophia) who 
shall endeavor to be wise. Aristotle, too, will famously initiate the Metaphysics in his statement that “[a]ll men by 
nature desire to know,” which in Aristotle’s understanding is to be knowledgeable of first principles and thus to 
obtain knowledge of substances qua substances. The influence of Augustine upon the tradition almost goes without 
saying; and how he formulates the distinction between worldly knowledge (scientia) and extra-worldly wisdom 
(sapientia) informs his thought throughout, whereby the ascent to knowledge of divine things through the 
illumination of imago Dei constitutes man’s summum bonum. The greatest good, which is divine wisdom, becomes 
integral to man’s striving, and from that path we must not diverge lest we become errant: “in quantum igitur omnes 
homines appetunt vitam beatam, non errant.”(De Libero arbitrio, II, ix, 26.) Cusanus, in De Docta ignoratia,  De 
Sapientia and De Visione Dei, formulates the movement in mystical fashion, whereby the ultimate form of God may 
never be known by the human intellect; and though knowledge of this fact facilitates contemplation of the One, it 
also happily reflects a type of learned ignorance (docta ignoratia) to which presumably is tied a type of blessedness, 
albeit in a decidedly intellectual mode. The striving thus tends to the limit, though it may never surpass it. Pascal 
puts it yet in another form to accommodate the infinitization of cosmos, and the problem of Cartesian dualism. The 
contradictory nature of man is one in which he must seek to find—through his blind and wretched state—the traces 
that God has left of himself. And though man may perceive an image of the truth [une image de la vérité], he 
possesses nothing but falsehood. Pascal insists that man must come to know that “man constantly transcends man” 
[l’homme passé infiniment l’homme]; and that only through the submission of his natural reason to the mystery can 
he really come to know himself. 
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homine habitat veritas).
230
 Yet, it is in the Confessions where Augustine revealed most 
poignantly his path to truth; and where he recounted—in the most personal and intimate detail—
this dictum as it took shape for him in practice. It must be said that the movement from the 
exteriore homine to the interiore homine proceeded on faith; and yet, it also constituted the initial 
movement into the mystery of the absolute. Along these lines we find in the Confessions that the 
entry into the region of the inner man is tinged by both familiarity and mystery. This is to say 
that the gift of faith by which this movement is motivated (and which is also a primal act of 
divine love) finds some stability through the faculty of memory whereby the act of recollection 
“re-presents” to the mind the divine love as manifested in and through the sensible world, and 
especially in pertinence to the self in question. As Augustine reminds, we become newly familiar 
to ourselves through an authentic act of memory (which is to say a recollection of ourselves), 
which in a complex dynamic engenders a new love of self because it begins to find in itself the 
divine love to which it aspires to be reunified. As with the faculty of memory, the faculty of 
understanding, too, operates through faith (fides quaerens intellectum) and together they 
comprise and fully enact the vita contemplativa as the definitive moral action of the interiore 
homine.  
We find in Augustine that the understanding is always preliminary and provisional, and 
thus the divine essence to which wisdom aspires shall remain mysterious until that wisdom 
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 Augustine, De vera religione, 39.72. The Cartesian parallels to this Augustinian sentiment can be found 
variously thus, for example: 1) the “Preface to the Reader” in the Meditations, “ex eo quod mens humana in se 
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with the regula veritatis of Mediation V, which equates truth not only in the objective idea, but that all truth is 
established on the subjective basis for epistemic certitude.  
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transforms absolutely in the super-intelligible unity of the visio beatifica (beatific vision). Even 
mystical wisdom, and with it the comparative immediacy it yields to the understanding in its 
possession of some small aspect of the divine essence, presents merely a taste—indeed, a fleeting 
and glimmering moment—of the sweetness of God, which at the same time defies all human 
understanding. And though the understanding attained through a contemplative life will 
nevertheless carry with it a portion of the divine wisdom on its graceful ascent to beatitude 
(engendered as it were by the divine love) Augustine gives us to understand that anything short 
of the beatific vision (and the “superintelligible” ecstasy it occasions) is by necessity incomplete 
and defective. This is to say that the essence of God transcends all the powers and capabilities of 
the intellect such that any wisdom of the divine is not only by definition incomplete (and thus 
provisional); but even more significantly, the reality that undergirds that wisdom, and indeed that 
which animates the striving toward it, remains in the deep shroud of mystery.  
For Augustine, all intellectual activity vis-à-vis the divine essence is per speculum in 
aenigmate, yet the region of the interiore homine is nevertheless established as the domain where 
the language of truth is spoken. The language of truth as it assumes force within the domain of 
the inner man does so through the act of love (amor), which unites creator and creature. The 
Imago Dei in many ways becomes central to this, and thereby mediates the complex dynamic of 
amor. In De Trinitate this dynamic is detailed in the strictest intellectual rigor; and accounted for 
throughout the Confessions, and in the most intimate fashion. We learn in De Trinitate of the 
mediating and uniting power of amor in the both the act of loving (amans) and the act of being 
loved (amatus). Augustine reveals (as does the later medieval tradition) the dynamic by which 
the cosmos is sustained in its beautiful totality. To that extent, we are given to understand that 
man, though he loves himself, through the action of memory, the understanding and the ultimate 
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acquisition of wisdom, learns to love God even more. Thus, language and the understanding 
facilitated by it together inform the possibility toward absolute transcendence as well as confirm 
man’s placement within a meaningful whole. 
The Augustinian Conception of Self: Fides Quaerens [Sapientiam]
231
 
The prayer concluding the De Trinitate reveals in typical fashion Augustine’s gift for 
weaving exhortation with the most apt Scriptural reference; and though the prayer presents a 
reaffirmation of his faith in the Word
232
, it also reiterates the nature of the problem to which he 
had addressed in the preceding treatise. Here Augustine pleads: 
 
Directing my course to this rule of faith, insofar as I could, and insofar as You made it 
possible for me, I sought You, and desired to see with my understanding that which I 
believed, and I have argued and labored much…Before You are my knowledge and my 
ignorance: where You have opened to me, receive me when I enter; where You have 
closed, open to me when I knock. May I remember You, understand You, and love You. 
Increase these gifts in me, until You have reformed me completely.
233
  
 
For Augustine, though the faith was both integral and necessary in the soul’s (animus)
234
 ascent 
back to God, this progression was perhaps more significantly an intellectual problem. It is the 
intent of this essay to explore Augustine’s notion of the intellectual understanding of God with 
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 In relation to the large majority of Augustine’s works, conventional scholarship views De Trinitate as 
his metaphysical masterpiece. This view is not without foundation, especially in terms of the broad philosophical 
categories within which historians and philosophers typically engage and interpret works of intellectual history. To 
be sure, the ontological concerns on which De Trinitate is focused together with its subtending epistemological 
claims make it a profoundly speculative piece; and this is to say nothing of the cosmological assumptions evident 
throughout, which are decidedly Neoplatonic. The speculative nature of De Trinitate and Confessions, especially 
insofar at they emerged during what I term Augustine’s “speculative period” is an interesting theme that this essay 
will address.   
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 Word, or logos, in the Augustinan context, is taken to mean, The “Word of God”, which means the 
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humans may come to possess the treasures of wisdom.  It is these treasures that are tantamount to ultimate 
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 De Trinitate XIV:xxviii,51, henceforth On the Trinity, in Augustine, On the Trinity, edited by Gareth B. 
Matthews and translated by Steven MacKenna (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), emphases mine.   
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 Augustine placed distinction between anima, the soul that invigorates and provides life to all living 
creatures, and animus, which he understands as the rational soul unique to man as an earthly creature. Mens, or 
mind, is a specific property of those endowed with animus. 
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an eye for its importance to the problem of self conception. As others have noted, Augustine 
predicated knowledge of the divine on a detailed and rigorous exploration of the depths of the 
internal (interum aeternum) through which the soul having gleaned understanding proceeded 
upward into the Godhead.
235
  This assessment is fundamentally correct; however, by focusing on 
Augustine’s notion of the inner man (interiore homine) as the crucial factor in the ascent to 
God—from which we shall argue a conception of self is derived—it neglects the cosmological 
structure on which Augustine grounded his intellectual approach and from which his cultivation 
of self derived meaning.
236
   
In a post-Cartesian world it is often the inclination to place a perhaps undue emphasis on 
this “inward turn”, which, alas, diminishes the scope of the problem Augustine sought to address 
as well as the reality it presupposed. As I will argue, Augustine’s motto in the De Trinitate, 
“fides quaerens intellectum”, “faith in search of understanding”, fundamentally denotes an 
inward move, but was considerably more elaborate. As Augustine understood, the divine, 
mediating act of faith occasions and makes possible the striving for understanding, which for 
him was both a process and an end. On the one hand, viewed as an end, understanding is the 
ultimate fulfillment of faith when at last the soul finds that for which it sought and is fully 
realized and subsumed within the Godhead. Understanding at this level is entirely 
incomprehensible until the moment of this reunification, and I shall henceforth refer to it as 
ultimate understanding.  
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On the other hand, as a process, understanding involves those acts—especially the 
striving for knowledge (scientia) and wisdom (sapientia) of things sensible and eternal, 
respectively—by which the mind comes to view itself as an analogue of the divine, or more 
succinctly, the image of God (imago Dei). It is here the Augustinian self becomes manifest. It 
becomes so through the employment of a series of triads
237
 that explore—through the action of 
the rational soul (animus)—the interrelationship of the world, the mind and God, by which the 
self becomes meaningful not only to itself, but in direct relation to the entire cosmological 
structure within which it inheres. This process is thus dependent upon what Plotinus referred to 
as the “integral omnipresence of the Authentic Existent”, whereby the divine unity emanates 
forth from itself out towards the “Other Order” to what is manifest as an infinite multiplicity, 
albeit that which is pervaded by the divine unity.
238
 Furthermore, each successive triad, moving 
inwardly, not only builds upon the other, but in the process realizes itself more fully; so, in 
knowing the world outside of itself, the mind comes to more thoroughly understand itself, which, 
in turn, and the through the intercession of faith
239
 ultimately understands itself in relation to the 
entire cosmological structure, which was created in the divine image (imago Dei), and renewed 
in the mind at the conversion moment. Understanding, in this sense, is thus a definitive quality of 
the process of Becoming for it “still seeks Him whom it has found” and will continue to do so 
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 I shall address these mental triads directly below, but for the purposes of clarity, I state them now.  The 
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 See, Plotinus, Ennead VI. v.1-3, trans., MacKenna edition, (New York: Larson: 1992).   
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 Grace (gratia) is also of crucial importance here, but we shall not address that notion in this essay. For 
one, it goes beyond the problem of intellectual knowledge of God of which we are here concerned, and second, 
Augustine engaged the problem of grace directly and subsequently to the writing of the Confessions and the De 
Trinitate. However, the dependence of the intellectual knowledge of God upon grace is here understood as crucial.   
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throughout its striving towards the direct, and ultimate understanding of God, as guaranteed by 
faith.
240
  
The eminently speculative moment of the ultimate understanding, whereby faith is 
replaced by the complete vision of God and within which the self is subsumed, is not only 
beyond the scope of this essay, but quite beyond Augustine’s De Trinitate, for as Plotinus 
maintained before him, “to know without image is to be”.
241
 Rather, it is the problem of the 
embodied soul within the process of Becoming—engaging with and in things both sensible and 
eternal—with which the Confessions and the De Trinitate are predominantly concerned. As 
intimated above, the idea of understanding expressed in Augustine’s motto “fides quarerens 
intellectum” denotes an on-going process in which the mind shall “seek his face evermore”, 
insofar as an individual is firm in his knowledge “that he must not cease as long as he is making 
progress in the search itself of incomprehensible things, and is becoming better and better in the 
search itself of so great a good, which is sought in order to be found, and is found in order to be 
sought”.
242
 The process is conditioned be the renewal of the image of God (imago Dei), which 
resides there as a reminder that it is both “capable of Him”
243
 and “can be a partaker of Him”
244
; 
so in this process, the mind comes to remember (memoria), understand (intellectum) and love 
(amor) itself, it also comes to remember, understand and love Him by whom it was made.
245
  It is 
through the operation of Augustine’s second and third mental triads that the process of 
understanding is possible and by which the mind becomes wise. Furthermore, wisdom 
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(sapientia), which Augustine claims derives from knowledge and understanding, is a gift from 
God mediated through Christ.  
The mind’s cultivation of wisdom, which Augustine understood as the contemplation of 
eternal things, allows its participation in God Himself. In books 9-14 of the De Trinitate, 
Augustine went to considerable pains to work out the process by which the mind participates in 
God, via wisdom, which meant the seeking of eternal things that come to be understood through 
things that are created. And though Augustine contended that there could be no wisdom without 
understanding, I submit that in the process of seeking, wisdom serves both as the impetus for 
understanding, as well as the fruit of understanding through which the mind becomes better in its 
efforts towards the greatest good. As with understanding, I perceive a distinction between true or 
eternal wisdom, which is that of God and the saints; and human wisdom, understood as the 
higher power of the human mind whereby the contemplation of eternal things is possible. The 
degree to which a mind is said to be wise or in the possession of understanding is directly linked 
to the extent it has become and is still “Becoming”. It is the seeking of wisdom as much as that 
of understanding that reconciles the soul back to God; and as processes, the act of understanding 
and the cultivation of wisdom through the participation in God are integral not only to the full 
realization of the self in relation to those things which are made, but also its ultimate realization 
within the divine. The mind, in participating in the divine, via wisdom, by extension participates 
in the entire cosmic process in which God called creation back to Himself, and to this we shall 
now turn.  
The eternal life with and in God, which the moment of ultimate understanding implies, 
denotes the ultimate happiness toward which all rational souls (animi) aspire. In the concluding 
chapter of Book 13 of the De Trinitate, Augustine reflected on the just man’s desire for 
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happiness and asserted that a life could never be truly happy unless it was eternal.
246
 Similarly, as 
Plotinus had worked out roughly a century and a half before, the notion of the good is intimately 
linked to the principle of unity, e.g., the Authentic Existent, which inheres in the most essential 
way within all men and to which all aim to return. Furthermore, the notion of the good, as an 
essential quality of the Authentic Existent, resides in all and constitutes the aim to which they 
direct themselves.
247
 Augustine, however, asserted that the condition on which a rational soul 
could achieve ultimate happiness was met not only by the ability to “will well, but to be able to 
do what one wills”.
248
  Thus, as Augustine understood, the purified heart “came about through a 
striving of the faith, which all do not will, for the happiness which no one cannot, but will”.
249
  
Sidestepping the specific and important issue of the will, it is apparent that the conversion 
experience described in Book 8 of the Confessions served to set up the deeper problem that 
Augustine addressed with some satisfaction in the concluding four books of that work, but later 
worked out more distinctly in the De Trinitate. The act of turning away from the impairing and 
disfiguring effects of the world begins the process whereby the will becomes “good” and directs 
itself towards ultimate happiness. The intellectual implications of this “turn” become the primary 
thrust not only in the De Trinitate, but in the Confessions as well.  
Though roughly thirty-three years separated the Milan conversion experience and the 
completion of De Trinitate,
250
 which included the writing of the Confessions, a remarkable unity 
persists with respect to the nature of the problems Augustine engaged. Indeed, I have chosen to 
treat this as his “conversion period” insofar as the Confessions and the De Trinitate may be read 
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in tandem as twin efforts toward the same goal, which, for Augustine, meant working out the 
intellectual implications of the conversion experience. I suggest that the moment of conversion, 
aside from the obvious turning away from the sensible world and its disfiguring influence on the 
soul, was significant for three other reasons, which similar to Augustine’s other triads are 
mutually dependent and reinforcing. These include: the renewal of the image of God (imago 
Dei), the reception of faith (fides) and the granting, by God, of grace (gratia). In the first 
instance, conversion marked the beginning of the process by which the image of God (imago 
Dei) was renewed within the mind, or to assert it differently, a renewal of the individual in the 
knowledge of God. As Augustine was quick to stress, the moment of conversion, unlike what the 
effect Baptism has for the complete remission of sin, marked only the initial stage by which an 
individual was to progress from the temporal to the eternal and the visible to the intelligible, etc. 
upward into the full and pure likeness of God.
251
  The De Trinitate and the Confessions, 
especially the last four books, attest to the significance that the intellectual process of renewal 
held for Augustine; however, intellection alone was not sufficient to transform hope into the 
reality of oneness with the divine—and eternal happiness.  
Indeed, mingling in the Truth through the contemplation of eternal things facilitated the 
return to God, but the gradualism of this process—let alone its culmination—required divine 
mediation. This mediation came through faith, which was planted in the convert by Christ, at the 
conversion moment, and enabled him to seek the happiness, which is incomprehensible. 
252
 Since 
the revolutionary nature of the conversion experience was not definitive, it served, in the most 
perfunctory sense, as the grounding point of the conversion process—a process, which could not 
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be fully realized until the convert unified with the Godhead. It is at this point that Augustinian 
motto, “fides quarerens intellectum,” faith in search of understanding, assumes significance. As 
he recounted in Book VIII of the Confessions, “You converted me to yourself, so that I no longer 
desired a wife or placed any hope in this world but stood firmly upon the rule of faith.”
253
 The 
process of searching for, or rather the striving towards, eternal happiness has thus begun—a 
point of which he reminded his readers in the concluding prayer of the De Trinitate. Moreover, 
the conversion moment in Book VIII, though emotionally powerful and climatic, sets the stage 
for the subsequent five books of the Confessions in which Augustine, supported by faith, could 
begin the process of understanding.  
The image born in the mind at the moment of conversion appears “not yet in vision, but 
in faith; not yet in reality but in hope.”
254
 The end of Book VIII, especially the moment in which 
he receives the faith, serves to unify the outer Augustine of the first eight books with the inner 
Augustine of the remaining five. Moreover, as he worked out in Book 13 of the De Trinitate, 
Christ is for us both knowledge and wisdom because it is through Him that faith is instilled in us 
regarding things temporal inasmuch as it is through Him that the truth of eternal things becomes 
manifest.
255
 The faith, which is internal to us becomes a point of nexus between the temporal and 
eternal realms, and is necessary insofar as we may “obtain happiness in all the good things of 
human nature, that is of the soul and the body.”
256
  
The Ostia vision recounted in Book IX is not only a case and point regarding the 
mediating power of faith to which the striving toward happiness was made possible, but is also 
reflective of Augustine’s position on the nature of wisdom and its role in the process of 
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understanding.
257
 Additionally, it a transitional book in terms of the structure of the Confessions; 
but it also reflects Augustine’s transition from the outer man (exteriore homine) to the inner man 
(interiore homine). The spectacular and thoughtful vision, which accompanied the conversation 
between Augustine and his mother, led him through the splendor of God’s creation and ranged 
from the basest materiality to the wonder of the eternal Wisdom; and, thus enabled him to 
believe that “no bodily pleasure, however great…was worthy of comparison, or even mention, 
beside the happiness of the life of the saints”.
258
 The life to which he referred was the life of 
Wisdom, and though he had experienced it for one fleeting moment, it henceforth remained for 
him a source of intense longing. The vision together with the instilling of faith that characterized 
the conversion moment served to solidify his life-long striving for understanding, which at least 
at the journey’s outset, was deeply influenced and encouraged by the life of Wisdom. 
The conversion moment, which included the implanting of faith and the renewal in the 
mind of the image of God (imago Dei), contained also God’s granting of grace, from which the 
proceeding two are derived. Indeed, grace is necessary for any individual who is renewed in the 
knowledge of God, for it is through grace alone that renewal is possible. It permeates the entire 
process by which an individual “transfers his love from temporal to eternal things, from visible 
to intelligible things, from carnal to spiritual things and to lessen the desire for the former, and to 
bind himself to the latter.”
259
 The bestowal of grace thus marks the moment where the human 
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will becomes God’s will, and may be construed also as submission to the goodness and wisdom 
of God through which the soul is brought to perfection.    
Perfection, oneness with God, and/or the ineffable moment of the divine vision are each 
intensified notions of ultimate understanding the meanings of which are further captured by the 
Latin adjective intentus, which connotes an act directed or aimed towards a specified goal.
260
 
Indeed, the counter adjective, distentus, as Augustine understood the term, characterized the state 
of sin, which is taken to mean a falling away from God and the eternal Wisdom. Though 
Augustine conceived of distinctions between inner and outer, spirit and matter, mind and body, 
etc.—where in each binary set the former is pure and latter corrupt—these were not hard and fast 
divisions. Rather, as the influence of the Platonists indicates, especially Ennead VI, Tractates 
five and six, Augustine’s conception of inwardness is both complex and dependent upon 
Neoplatonic principles of unity and number. As Plotinus envisioned in Ennead VI, the universe is 
at once unified and numerically diverse and places the Authentic Existent, as a pure, unified and 
unchanging Being at its center. The Authentic Existent thus radiates Being from itself, which 
pervades the lower orders of Being and allows them to participate in it to the extent that they are 
actively coming into Being. All participants, though appearing diverse, are unified by the 
omnipresence of the Authentic Existent, which is wholly pervasive, which is to say, the apparent 
multiplicity is “absorbed by the Absolute.”
261
    
The image conveyed is a sequence of concentric spheres expanding outwardly and 
limitlessly where each sphere has its own generating center while remaining coincident with the 
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first center, which is to say, the pure, unified Being.
262
 This universe is devoid of definitive 
partitions or intervals and “existed,” in various states of Becoming as a continuum orientated 
towards and away from the Authentic Existent or God. As outlined briefly above, the process of 
returning back to God, as expressed throughout De Trinitate and Confessions involves a complex 
inward movement that serves not only as an integral stage in the movement towards ultimate 
understanding; but presupposes the Plotinus’ vision of the universe from which Augustine’s 
conception of self derived meaning. Indeed, Augustine’s entire endeavor to achieve an 
intellectual knowledge of God was in many ways pursuant to the concluding chapter of the Sixth 
Tractate in Ennead VI where Plotinus articulated his vision of the omnipresent power that is the 
Authentic Existent. He conceived of it as an “ever-fresh infinity, a principle 
unfailing…brimming over with its own vitality.”  It is only the denial of it, even though it is all-
pervasive, that occasions the falling to a lesser order of Being. The contrary, however, is to turn 
once again to its enveloping embrace:  
In that you have entered into the All, no longer content with the part; you cease to think 
of yourself as under limit but, laying all such determination aside, you become an All. No 
doubt you were always that, but there has been an addition and by that addition you are 
diminished; for the addition was not from the realm of Being—you can add nothing to 
Being—but from non-Being. It is not by some admixture of non-Being that one becomes 
entire, but by putting non-Being away. By the lessening of the alien in you, you increase. 
Cast it aside and there is the All within you; engaged in the alien you will not find the 
All. Not that it has to come and so be present to you; it is you that have turned from it. 
And turn though you may, you have not severed yourself; it is there; you are not in some 
far region: still there before it, you have faced to its contrary.
263
 
  
As is well known, Augustine, not unlike Plotinus, understood the cosmos in terms of plentitude 
and privation; yet the marked difference for Augustine’s thought is the function of the will and 
the related problem of evil. Even still, evil is merely privation and not an active force. In terms of 
knowledge, which Augustine contended is a necessary platform in the cultivation of wisdom; it 
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must be sought in reference to and accordance with the image of God (imago Dei). What is 
more, to seek knowledge for the sake of knowledge (vanas curiositas)—and without the 
Mediator who is both knowledge and wisdom—is to fall away (defectus) from God and into 
disfigurement (deformatio).  As Augustine remarked, [y]ou never depart from us yet it is hard for 
us to return to you
264
…[c]all us back to yourself...[k]indle your fire in us and carry us away”.
265
 
As God, through Christ, called His creation back to Him, the impediment to return hinged on the 
incompleteness of the will, which Augustine attributed to the role of habit, which weighs down 
the mind by conforming it to the world.
266
   
As Reiss has observed, the right path to God and the unity that waits at the end depended 
on Augustine’s viewing of the soul (anima) as a “mediating prism” between the human and the 
divine, and as such, it accounts for Augustine’s indifferent usage of the term anima (which could 
mean soul, mind, rational soul, etc.), which he believes suggests the inseparability of the 
embodied soul and its participation in the divine. 
267
 I disagree with Reiss’ view that Augustine 
was indifferent or sloppy in his usage of the term anima. Indeed, Augustine was quite meticulous 
in differentiating the various qualities of (anima), which is common to all living things and refers 
to an animating principle or a vital spirit. As he moves further inward in his exploration of the 
intellectual knowledge of God, his terminology becomes more concentrated and exact. In the De 
Trinitate, Augustine was concerned less with anima per se than with animus—understood as a 
rational soul—which possesses the capability to engage in rational acts that are both discursive 
and contemplative. The mind (mens), however, is a particular quality of the rational soul, in 
which resides the image of God (imago Dei). The mind thus enjoyed pride of place in 
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Augustine’s attempt to attain an intellectual knowledge of the divine, and should be understood 
as the nodal point between God and the surrounding physical world.  
My inclination to view the mind more as a nexus between the earthy and the eternal leads 
me to Reiss’s second observation. He is correct to observe the soul (anima), in a general sense, 
as a sort of mediating entity; however, in the De Trinitate, Augustine employs the term mediator 
(intercessor) in a strict sense especially insofar as it relates to a divine act on the soul’s behalf. 
For example, Christ is the Mediator by which the return to God takes place and without whom 
the soul falls into nothingness. Mere participation in the divine via the mind, or the soul as Reiss 
understands, is not tantamount to mediation for it is only through the act of the divine Mediator 
that participation is possible. Perhaps what Reiss wants to assert relies on the notion originally 
articulated by Plotinus that the soul is never severed from the divine unity; and since God had 
always been present within the soul, what Augustine understood as a renewal of the divine image 
(imago Dei)—made possible by the bestowal of grace—may be read as an act of rediscovery 
rendered by the rational soul in which it becomes reconciled with God and His creation. Be that 
as it may, the action of the soul, which I understand as participation, depends upon a mediating 
act of the divine—grace. 
Augustine nevertheless insisted that the role of habit as promoted by an incomplete will 
must be broken, which involved “[s]tripping yourself of the old man with his deeds” [to] “put on 
the new man, that is being renewed in the knowledge of God, according to the image of him who 
created him”.
268
 As we have seen above, the breaking of worldly habits rests primarily on the 
divinely mediating acts of faith and grace when at last the soul turns back to God. As recounted 
in Book 10 of the Confessions, Augustine presumably endowed with faith, nevertheless sought 
understanding. In seeking that “Being who is so far above [his] soul”, Augustine resolved that “it 
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must be through [his] soul” that he would achieve both knowledge and the ultimate vision of 
Him.
269
 Both Gilson and Taylor view this as the defining maneuver in Augustine’s ascent to the 
divine—a path characterized as “leading from the exterior to the interior and from the interior to 
the divine”.
270
  Indeed, this is significant, but what does it mean in terms of the implications for 
Augustine’s broader project, especially is it relates to the problem of the embodied soul?   
That there is a move from the exterior and ultimately to the divine does not necessarily 
imply that, once the rational soul resolved to move inward, the act was continuous and final. 
Indeed, as the Confessions makes clear, Augustine struggled constantly not only with earthly 
habits in themselves, but also with attempts to reconcile the created, physical realm of Becoming 
with that of eternal Being. This is to stress that a mere movement inward does not dissolve the 
problem that the created world held for the embodied soul. Augustine understood that any entity 
created by God is endowed, in varying degrees, with the divine goodness, which is to infer God’s 
omnipresence in His creation. To return to Plotinus, this meant that any lesser-ordered being—as 
a product of emanation from the Authentic Existent—contained within it the divine unity that it 
endeavored to realize. Furthermore, we should recall Plotinus’ vision of the universe as a 
sequence of concentric spheres radiating outwardly from the unified center where each emanated 
sphere has its own generating center, coincident with the unified center, and from which further, 
lesser-ordered emanations exude. With Plotinus’ model in mind, in addition to appreciating its 
influence on Augustine’s mature thought, the problem of the inner man (interiore homine) 
becomes considerably more complex.  
                                                          
269
 Confessions, X: 7, (Pinecoffin, ed.). 
270
 Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, (London: Golancz, 1961), 20. Taylor 
subscribes to this view as well; however, the “inward turn” for him is significant in reference to the historical 
development that this maneuver held for modern conceptions of self—especially, in his view, the extent to which it 
anticipates the Cartesian subject. As a shortcoming, both accounts make no effort to reconcile this move with the 
cosmological structure Augustine presupposed together with its inherent difficulties. 
 173 
In placing emphasis on the inner man (interiore homine) and its orientation back to the 
divine, Augustine had to reconcile that move not only with the rational soul more generally, but 
with the created world to which it inclined. His move presupposed Plontinus’ vision of a 
sequence of concentric spheres and radiating centers allowing him to envision the mind as a 
center unto itself. Having turned away from the disfigurement of the world, the mind directs 
(intensio) itself, by degrees, back towards the true unity of God; but in the effort to realize this 
ultimate goal, it must first realize itself. Inasmuch as the mind is a generating center (distensio), 
it is also a unified with respect to the physical, created world within which it takes part. In the 
process of God’s recalling creation back to Him, a process within which the mind actively 
subsumes itself; recalls as well God’s creation, which is to say it recollects itself. 
Recollection, or memory (memoria), is obviously of significant concern in both the 
Confessions and the De Trintate and represents the substantive member of the second mental 
triad, along with the other members, understanding (intellectum) and the will (voluntas), or love 
(amor), which constitute its acts. This triad, understood in relation to the process of return, is 
derivative from the first triad, which is comprised of mind (mens), knowledge (scientia) and love 
(amor). Together, the first triad represents the world in relation to the mind whereby the mind 
senses objects from without, creates an image of them, and by an act of will, or love, unites 
them. The second triad, which for Augustine is more pure than the first, emerges in the mind 
itself whereby a bodily image is recalled from the memory, impressed by thought or 
understanding, and united by the attention of the will which brings them together. Yet, there is a 
third mental trinity, which Augustine understands to be in the image of God (imago Dei) insofar 
as it properly belongs to the realm of the inner man (interiore homine). Moreover, because it is 
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endowed with grace, which renews the image of God (imago Dei) within it, it also has faith 
which enables it to act in accordance with that image.  
Having briefly described Augustine’s mental triads we can now address the question of 
memory. Though he had resolved early in Book 10 of the Confessions to find God inwardly 
through the soul—and by extension the mind—and the “force which we call the memory”, he 
realized that he must pass beyond it.
271
 The memory that he must pass beyond is that of the outer 
man (exteriore homine) for as Augustine pointed out, it is beleaguered with images of external 
things, many of which the mind has forgotten. Moreover, the memory of the outer man is linked 
almost inextricably with the external world for the knowledge it contains is derived not only 
from sensible things, but is placed there by the understanding that is directed outwardly to seek 
knowledge for the sake of knowledge (vanas curiositas). Neither the memory of the outer man 
(exteriore homine) nor the knowledge contained within it could serve to achieve as a basis for the 
intellectual knowledge of God.   
However, the knowledge derived from the memory of the inner man (interiore homine), 
as articulated in the second half of the De Trinitate, is something very different.  The knowledge 
contained within his memory is the product of a mind, indeed an understanding, which has 
submitted to the Wisdom of God.
272
 Memory is no longer understood in terms of the specific 
contents it presently contains or has forgotten, which is to say it is no longer solely dependent 
upon worldly knowledge and, by extension, vain curiosity (vanas curiositas). Rather, the 
memory of the inner man (interiore homine) is linked to wisdom, understanding and the turning 
away from disfigurement. Moreover, the act of recollection is neither dependent upon worldly 
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knowledge nor the infinitude of facts that constituted it. Rather, it is the simple reminder that the 
soul should turn to the Lord.
273
  
 As Reiss has noted, memory of the inner man is sacred memory, and has further observed 
that Books 12 and 13 of the Confessions represent scriptural memory, which was necessary to 
ground “Augustine’s telling of the human passage from the material back to the divine”.
274
 The 
memory of the inner man, I argue, is sacred insofar as it is reminded, through the act of 
recollection, that it is contained within the divine memory for it is “in Him that we live and move 
and have our being.”
275
 Given Augustine’s understanding of this, there was no need to “ground” 
the last four books of the Confessions in this regard. As the mind of the inner man comes to 
remember itself, understand itself, and love itself, it continues to renew the image of God (imago 
Dei) that reposes within; and from which it comes to remember, understand and love the divine. 
It is therefore through the act of recollection that the image of God is more thoroughly renewed 
in thought and from which a greater love for Him not only comes forth to unite the two; but 
further directs the triad more forcibly towards eternal Wisdom.  In Book 14 of the De Trinitate 
Augustine contended that: 
 
[I]n the hidden recesses of the mind there is a certain knowledge of certain things, and 
that when we think of them, they then proceed, as it were, to the center and are placed, so 
to speak, more clearly in the sight of the mind, for then the mind itself discovers that it 
remembers, understands, and loves those things of which it was not even thinking when it 
was thinking of something else.
276
   
 
The memory is essential—in the technical sense of the term—for the process of understanding 
insofar as it is through the memory that the acts of understanding and love are possible. As the 
first nine Books of the Confessions testify, the act of recollecting his years as an adolescent and a 
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young adult engendered understanding and love of a God that worked through him without his 
knowledge. His recollections on the desires for worldly knowledge or reputation as a rhetorician, 
as well as the circumstances in which these desires placed him, renewed in him a love for the 
eternal.  
 What is more, in a process reminiscent of Plotinus, the act of recollection calls back—to 
the mind’s center—knowledge of an entity acting in time, but with an understanding of the 
invisible things that acted through it. The mind in recollecting itself, realizes itself in the image 
of the divine. This is to say that the act of recollection not only serves to reveal to the mind the 
presence of eternal things in those things that are made; but is instrumental in solidifying an 
understanding of itself in relation to the divine image, which is both integral and necessary in the 
ascent to the ineffable and incomprehensible moment which characterizes the divine fullness and 
the achievement of eternal being. Until that ineffable moment the soul is in a state of Becoming 
and therefore seeks the divine wisdom and understanding gradually where both are mutually 
reinforcing not only to themselves but to the entire process of seeking.  
The process of seeking the divine, characterized by the familiar Augustinian motto “fides 
quarerens intellectum” presupposed an elaborate cosmological framework whereby the 
intellectual soul (animus) is within the divine unity as well as the divine unity is within the soul. 
The seeking of the divine is dependent upon the bestowal of grace and the instillation of faith at 
which point the soul turns back toward God and the divine image is renewed within the mind. 
Moreover the seeking of the divine occasioned by the moment of grace not only allows for the 
soul to turn away from disfigurement, but commences its state of Becoming. Through the 
seeking of understanding the mind gradually finds wisdom, which in turn serves as the impetus 
for further understanding and so on. It is through the process as a whole that the mind reconciles 
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itself, through the act of recollection, not only with the created, physical world; but also with 
itself where it gains understanding of itself in relation to the divine image to which it aspires. It is 
here that the Augustinian self becomes manifest for it is through the intensified act of 
recollection that its gains a true understanding of itself, though that understanding is never 
directed inwardly towards itself to the extent that self-conception becomes any sort of end. 
Rather, its understanding always derives its meaning in relation to the divine and the cosmos that 
emanates from it. To put the notion of the Augustinian self into proper perspective with respect 
to itself, and to the cosmological whole of which it formed part, perhaps one need only turn to 
Plotinus’s utterance in the Seventh Tractate of Ennead VI: 
 
When we look outside of that on which we depend we ignore our unity; looking outward 
we see many faces; look inward and all is one head. If a man could be turned about—by 
his own motion or by the happy pull of Athene—he would see at once God and himself 
and the All.
277
   
 
Re-conceiving the “Path to Truth”  
The overarching point to be made in what may be seen as an “Augustinian aside” is to 
reveal certain of the distinctive and influential aspects of the tradition that are forcefully 
revealed, and at the same time redefined in Cartesian thought in view of a particular openness to 
the metaphoric possibility of the modern cultural epoch. This is not to suggest that there was any 
sort of exact coincidence between the Cogito and the Augustinian mens; but rather as Stephen 
Menn has recently noted, philosophical projects in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were 
entwined with theological concerns to the extent that any number of “Augustinianisms” found 
appeal.
278
 Though I don’t think this can be disputed, there seems to be more of an underlying 
significance here, which speaks to the fact of how thoroughly Augustinian we are as a culture; 
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and that the tradition we have inherited in marked, profound and enduring ways is a dynamic 
itself—constantly transforming, modifying, and in some cases, reborn anew. Viewed in relief, 
the Cogito is something of a monadic totality, and thus possesses definite, singular and unique 
characteristics; yet at the same time, bears within itself a striking reflection of the cultural totality 
of which it forms part. This is to say that the familiar aspects of the tradition—Augustinian or 
other—are incorporated into Cartesian thought in a powerful way that at once forces redefinition 
of the interiore homine.  
Such a redefinition does merely yield to the traditional notion of the Imago Dei in favor 
of that of the indiscretae opus imaginis as glorified in Pico’s Oratio; and there lay part of the 
problematic. Recalling the solipsism of the Second Meditation, Descartes maintains that the 
Ego—existo is necessarily true (and by implication both fully real and fully actualized) only 
when it is brought forth or conceived by the mind [quoties a me profertur, vel mente 
concipitur].
279
 With this moment of hyper-presentism not only is the faculty of memory 
effectively negated in its relation to truth, but also the very conditions of the res cogitans (i.e., 
thought thinking itself) suggest that it is fully determinate; and only then within the relatively 
narrow ambit of the order of knowing (ordo cognoscend). By contrast, the order of being (ordo 
essendi), as understood here in a fuller medieval and Renaissance sense, along with all the 
possibilities of magnitude and gradation contained within it, are now subsumed thoroughly 
within the representational frame of an objective reality grounded and determined by the res 
cogitans. Yet beyond this, the expressive potential of a self, so as to be truly and fully human is 
similarly delimited. As Louis Marin has noted, understanding and truth are achieved in the 
modern world only to the extent that the Cogito can feign its reality;
280
 and thus it must deny all 
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affections of consciousness, save only a rationalized representation grounded in simple intuition, 
viz. a clear idea. Beyond intuition, the completion of knowledge, as Descartes tells us in Rule 
Seven of the Regulae, depends upon “a certain movement of thought,” which will lead ultimately 
to a more certain conclusion of the truth.
281
 This is also to imply a leading towards a more 
perfect representation, which again is attained by feigning a reality. And while the act of feigning 
(viz. the Cogito) functions in accordance with an act of inventus, it nevertheless delimits 
possibilities, if also denying reciprocity with its world. Thus the reality is made real by 
simplification as well as through the effective denial of the manifold range of possibility given it 
through the metaphor.  
And yet, Descartes could still formulate this movement in terms of the traditional path of 
truth (iter veritatis). Insofar as the Meditations are cast firmly within the medieval meditative 
tradition, they combine within them a powerful array of components from the traditional 
conception of a meditative ascent; but this ascent is conceived less in terms of a gradus 
attingere, and one more in favor of the order of knowing (ordo cognoscendi) as articulated in the 
Meditations—i.e., knowledge of self, to God, to world.  As we saw above, Augustine is perhaps 
the most notable in articulating the western, Christian model of the interiore homine; and 
especially in terms of the soul’s ascent into the divine oneness. And of course, it is by Augustine 
that later writers in the western contemplative tradition were decidedly influenced; yet there were 
certainly precedents from antiquity that antedated Augustine, or who were more influential in the 
East.
282
 However, the meditative project that Descartes undertook in the Meditations, and which 
                                                          
281
 AT X: 387, References to the Regulae derive from Adam and Tannery, Oeuvres de Descartes, X (Paris: Vrin, 
1908), “continuo quodam cogitationis motu.” 
282
 Not only is this a question of ascent to the Divine of which these writers were all concerned, it suggests that there 
were an array of meditative models in the world of late antiquity in which to find in the context of the Divine Love, 
the spiritual ascent back to oneness with God. Among these figures, we might include.  As for Augustinian 
precedents, Plotinus (by which Augustine was decidedly influenced) is perhaps the most famous, at least in terms of 
 180 
he informs us of in the Second Discours is markedly Augustinian, and seemingly begins quite 
modestly as an attempt, as he says, “to reform my own thoughts.” Yet, as soon as he admitted the 
purpose of his project, he broke ranks with the Augustinian tradition in a remarkable way with 
his admission that such a reform was necessary in order to build “on a foundation that is totally 
my own.”
283
 It is only later, and through the methodologically mediated process of reasoning 
(cogitans) that Descartes proceeds from the established foundations of the Cogito—together with 
its criterion for truth—to engage in the search for “other truths” (d’autres vérités). The 
establishment of consciousness, and specifically a consciousness defined as “thought thinking 
itself” (i.e., the Cogito) served for Descartes as the unshakable ground (fundamentum 
inconcussum) on which the methodological criterion in the search for truth is based. 
The concern in the Discourse, and certainly in the first half of that work, hinges in the 
first instance on a notion of reformatio, or “reformation to the better” whereby reform is 
determined by a type of “returning” to an original or more pure form.
284
 In the context of the 
medieval university, for example, this implied a discipline (of faculty, degree, institutional 
organization, etc.) as intended to actualize (in an Aristotelian sense) the macrocosm of the divine 
as it dwelt within it, and which furthermore always served as both the impetus and the measure 
for thought and action. For the medieval world, this was undoubtedly and unquestionably a 
corporate enterprise. However, with Descartes and the reformation he undertook vis-à-vis his 
thoughts, the macrocosm (though implied) was deemphasized in favor of the microcosm as a 
new source of light radiating to all things (and beings) so as to illuminate them within an ever-
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enlarging ambit of truth. The dynamics of this shift are noteworthy. The Cartesian “reformation,” 
in contradistinction to the older notion, employs an idea of obedience not to a transcendent 
authority by which it is measured and actuated; but rather in strict adherence to something else—
namely the method.  
The crucial years of the early 1630s in following the abortive project of the Regulae of 
1628 bring into partial focus the dynamics of a shifting foundation of truth from which the 
Cogito would emerge triumphant. By the late 1620s Descartes’ thought had become increasingly 
characterized by an attempt to achieve new certainties of knowledge and to validate them within 
the traditional structure of truth. As Descartes states straightforwardly in the Regulae, his 
purpose was to establish on an edifice of geometrical certainty the rules for the direction of the 
natural intelligence (regulae ad directionem ingenii). In accordance with this, he further 
maintained that the establishment of rules is necessary for the purpose of bringing forth solid and 
true judgments regarding all things that occur to it (ad solida et vera, de iis omnibus quae 
occurrunt proferenda judicia).
285
 In the 1628 text, the question of knowledge, though not yet 
fully subjected to the criterion for epistemological certainty as mandated by the Discours and the 
Meditationes, nevertheless reveals Descartes’ orientation to a decisively theoretical stance with 
respect to the realm of moral action. For with the project of the Discourse, Descartes established 
ethical knowledge (as Aristotle understood as phronesis) as a domain of the theoretical; and to 
the extent that only knowledge derived initially from simple intuition can be true knowledge, the 
realm of possibility for moral action belongs solely to the thoughts of the rational soul, or mind 
(quae totae in animi cogitatione consistent).
286
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Reform as a Question of Method 
The method insofar as it is entwined with the program of epistemic certitude as deployed 
by the res cogitans becomes almost interchangeable with the Cartesian notion of self. The 
Cartesian mind, as directed by the method, i.e., its criterion of truth, operates within a relatively 
narrow and constricted conception of a mathesis, which is to say it operates on the basis of a 
strictly ordered structure of principles and concepts.
287
  By operating under and accordance with 
principles and concepts, the mathesis for all intents and purposes becomes merely an ordering 
structure.
288
 For Descartes to conduct his thoughts, as he says, in an “orderly way” he must 
establish first principles, which is to say, to place them on a firm, metaphysical foundation. That 
principle, of course, is stated first in the proposition, “I am, I exist is necessarily true every time I 
express it or conceive of it in my mind”; and in the concluding proposition, “I judged that I could 
take it to be a general rule that the things we conceive very clearly and distinctly are all true.” 
The ego, as res cogitans, established as both the unshakeable (inconcussum) and the absolute 
ground (absolutum fundamentum) becomes the foundational first principle and the basis on 
which the truth of all subsequent propositions (including the existence of God, the world and that 
which exists within it) must be measured.
289
 Thus, the substance-as-subjectivity (or what 
Heidegger would call “Ichheit” or “I-ness”), and by extension the various attributions of the res 
cogitans, serve as the mathesis itself, which is to say the ordering structure by which the ego and 
the world it attempts to understand derive their meaning.   
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The Cartesian sense of the mathesis (and later the mathesis universalis) reduces itself 
primarily to a sense of ordering, and this is perhaps most evident in the manner by which the 
mathesis is projected into the world beyond the ego. However, in the sense that subjectivity is 
understood as present to itself (ramaneat), i.e., to be understood as a particular manifestation of 
energeia, and thus fully actualized in the Aristotelian sense, it sees itself as the source of 
illumination of all truths and the ground from which all concepts and principles derive. This is to 
say that through the act of cogitation, and in accordance with the strictures placed upon that act 
by the method, Descartes was confident he could discover and thus, re-appropriate to himself 
sound and certain principles, and thus make knowledge in the sciences possible. For it is within 
the consciousness that the truth dwells…   
In the Second Discourse, having established that the rule of clarity and distinctness was 
the chief methodological criterion in the ascent to truth, Descartes turned to the question of that 
which would serve as his instrument in the achievement of truth and certainty. He deduced that 
in terms of knowledge deduced from a geometric-style of reasoning, “there can be nothing so 
distant that one does not reach it eventually, or so hidden that one does not discover it.”
290
  It 
was, of course, the model of mathematics per se, and specifically geometry that would serve as 
the basis for intuitive clarity in his seeking of truth in the sciences.  Yet, by the Third Meditation 
Descartes has fully turned to the question of ideas and how they are formed in his mind. He 
distinguishes here the notion of a formal and an objective reality. By formal reality it is 
understood that there exists, by degrees, an extra-mental reality insofar as God is thought to exist 
or that the planets or bodies exist in some form outside of our conception of them.  By an 
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objective reality it is understood that anything, whether it have a corresponding formal reality or 
not, is simply an object of the mind, i.e, an idea.  
It is here that the Cartesian Circle emerges.  As a number of scholars have noted, the 
significant problem of the Cartesian Circle hinges on Descartes’ understanding that though he 
does not doubt the necessity that there be a formal reality in his ideas, the ultimate formal reality 
(God) that legitimates all lower ordered ideas is still an object of the mind, i.e. an idea.
291
 
Moreover, in accordance with the Cogito formulation, together with its criterion for truth, the 
only “true” knowledge is that which emanates from an objective reality, i.e., knowledge of an 
idea or subjectivity in general.  Thus the problem of representation further complicates the larger 
problem of subjectivity and by extension the Cartesian self and modernity as well. 
That epistemic certitude has become the definitive condition for what is meaningful to 
the Cogito denies it the possibility of selfhood. On the basis of the objective reality the Cogito 
creates, which it does through the adjudication of its representations, it subsequently projects this 
reality into the world as a mathesis universalis.
 292
  The implication of this move for selfhood is 
dire insofar as the objective reality the Cogito projects into the world, in turn, forces the Cogito 
to define itself in terms of objectivity and the epistemic certitude that guarantees it.  In other 
words, the Cogito takes itself out of the world, and thus very problematically, conceives of itself 
in terms of itself. By what is effectively an act of asceticism, the Cogito, as the newly formulated 
interiore homine denies the world. In other words, the Cartesian self effectively negates the idea 
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of a self in denying reciprocity between self and world, which is in complete opposition to the 
cosmological totality presupposed by Augustine.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Dream and the Opening of the Baroque World 
Preliminary Concerns 
In the last chapter, I posed the question of the Cartesian conception of self, which given 
its lack of reciprocity with its world, is not a self, but rather a subjectivity standing in opposition 
to its world so as to become its master and possessor. This chapter is in many ways a justification 
of the previous. In this chapter it is necessary to pose the question of the dream as the condition 
of possibility for the Cogito’s emergence, and what it perceived to be necessary in taking the 
particular stance it did toward the world in deploying the new conditions of truth. To that extent, 
the Cartesian dream forms part of a larger cultural concern towards dream phenomena during the 
early modern period. Within this period, people found it increasingly difficult to reconcile dream 
phenomena with the legitimizing demands of the inner experience. In view of the draw inward, 
and for a variety of reasons, the older cosmological truths no longer held, and therefore had 
begun to lack meaning and significance. The dream phenomenon is one expression of this larger 
dynamic, and in some forms—as with the theatrum mundi—the notion of the dream brought to 
the fore questions of a reality brought into doubt while at the same presenting a creative response 
by which to work through those concerns and difficulties. In other ways, the dream linked more 
closely to the meditative tradition where the dynamic of the inner experience was more clearly 
accentuated. Descartes’ dream is to be found here. In this regard, the dream was central to the 
traditional cosmological order in occupying an ontological middle ground between the realms of 
the divine and the mundane.  
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Though by the early decades of the seventeenth century the ontological status of the 
dream was in question, it was certainly not meaningless. As I have attempted to show in the 
dissertation, Descartes’ position in relation to the problem of modernity presupposes a broad 
cultural tradition, and within which dreams occupied a meaningful place. As a cultural problem it 
has many aspects in both a synchronic and diachronic sense, and which must be opened to a 
broader ambit of time. Given the changing world and a changing orientation toward it—a 
transformation that was in large part actuated through the metaphoric possibility of the 
microcosm—the dream presents an interesting and fruitful avenue through which to pursue this 
dynamic as a decisive episode in the history of culture. Also, given the hegemony of the Cogito 
in modernity, the Cartesian dream provides an opportunity to think our way through the difficult 
and mysterious depths represented by the dream phenomena in general insofar as it presents 
amid a moment of cultural crisis. In that sense, dreams themselves occupy a somewhat 
emblematic place in considering the foundations of modernity.  
The larger interpretive concern that I have set with respect to the dream is that the 
Cartesian dream account becomes an allegorical-poetic function through which the angst of a 
collapsing, traditional notion of reality, along with its underpinning ontological functions, can be 
confronted. To read the dream under the uncritical sway of the Cogito’s claims to truth is to 
diminish its significance. Thus the dream is less a “curious” episode in the movement toward a 
triumphal form of rationalism than an intensified expression of uncertainty—a mundus 
ambiguum. Within this moment, the new value orientation (legitimized through the inner 
experience) co-mingled confusedly with traditional forms of meaningful expression. In other 
words, the allegorical function of the dream is at once open-ended, confused, and multi-faceted; 
it is in an unsteady communion of the traditional and vibrantly novel; a network of the 
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ambiguous and unstable, within which a variety of meanings, some consonant, some conflicting, 
and some coincidental, unsteadily occur. The Cartesian dream, as I see it, retained its “reality” to 
the young Descartes, and in a very traditional way. He even admits his belief that the dreams 
came to him from on high. And, yet the dream insofar as it is brought into question is also a 
confusion of possibility rife for actualization; and on new terms, and with the full force of the 
metaphoric potency as emergent in the Renaissance. The dream reveals that point in the life of 
the young Descartes where a confused Baroque world presents in a forceful way. 
The rationalist suspicions that marginalize and call into question the status and 
significance of dreams, which the Cogito represents, form only one aspect of the dream’s 
significance vis-à-vis modernity. The dynamic of the early modern dream brings to the fore deep 
and powerful questions pertaining to the entirety of the cosmological order—and together with it, 
questions of meaning, moral action and, of course, the possibility of being authentically and 
creatively engaged with those possibilities, especially as they relate to being fully human. In 
what follows, I want to pose the problem of the Cartesian dream as a cultural problem (in view 
of the previous chapters) so as to set the stage for a deeper consideration of the dream both in 
relation to the metaphorical dynamic posed in chapter 3, and to work through more fully that 
problematic in the attempt to rethink the Baroque. In that regard, it is necessary to propose 
carefully the problem of the Cartesian dream, and also to situate it properly within the larger 
problematic of dreams and collapsing cosmological order.  
The Problem of the Dream 
Descartes gives us to understand that dreams operate ambiguously somewhere between a 
realm of revealed truth and one of erroneous representation. He further suggests that the 
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possession of truths as attained by reason—if also in a dreaming state—are more confused and 
obscure (confus et obscur), and are thus more fallible and less perfect than at those moments 
when we are awake.
293
 His pronouncements regarding the imperfections of thought in the 
dreaming state aided in the Enlightenment construal of dreams purely as a type of fanciful 
illusion; or as pensées un peu chimériques, as Leibniz had characterized them in reference to the 
specific dreams Descartes experienced on the eve of St. Martin’s, 10-11 November 1619.
294
 
Leibniz’ somewhat curt dismissal of dreams is telling and speaks to a larger, cultural 
problematic; yet we are nevertheless given to understand that though dreams are technically 
thoughts they are nevertheless unreliable thoughts. As the dream account suggests, the question 
before us concerns not merely the confused status of dreams, especially insofar as they are 
elusive and beguiling, but also the status of thought; and specifically as the question relates to the 
uniquely modern conviction to establish decisively for itself, the constitutive aspects of reliable, 
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true (and even certain) thought. Herein lay the crux of the problem.  
To the late-medieval understanding, dreams occupied an intermediary realm, which 
outside of a direct revelation (visio and to some extent, oraculum),
295
 are confused and obscure, 
if not completely false. The world, too, is confused and illusory, and thus one must endeavor to 
find meaning and truth by reading—indeed, interpreting—an enfolded, diffuse and thoroughly 
distended network of signatures, imprinted as it was, with the image of God (Imago Dei). The 
mediating signs within the world, and by extension dreams, were part of a via ascensus to 
spiritual illumination. The structure of which they formed part was not only exceedingly 
complex it was rife with meaning; mediated by a rich network of signatures, which Foucault has 
aptly characterized as the “prose of the world.”
296
 It must be added that within this network of 
meaning, the medieval mind understood that the “true” meaning lay hidden, and required a 
learned and skilled interpretation to negotiate the symbolic complexities and to unmask the 
deeper meaningful structure—indeed the reality—that lay beyond. The significant point here is 
that divinatory knowledge of any sort, as Foucault has pointed out, was not a rival form of 
knowledge (as opposed, for example, to the rationalist or demonstrative knowledge of the 
schools), but rather was part and parcel of knowledge itself.
297
 Even with the changing status of 
dreams during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, which were made possible through a host 
of cultural transformations, dreams continued to occupy an ontological middle ground for 
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discovering hidden truths and meanings.
298
    
The dream, as the First and Second Meditations reminds us, is an intensely personal 
experience steadfastly to be overcome. The relevance the dream had, or may have had previously 
in reference to a larger cosmological frame of meaning is a negligible, or even non-existent 
concern. The Augustinian dictum “interiore homine habitat veritas,” which had shaped the 
tradition in defining the inner dynamic between God and the soul, had also shaped the 
undeniable Cartesian assumption that only upon the foundation of the interiore homine could 
truth be properly sought. What is more, the Augustinian model for self-conception, which had 
served since the Middle Ages as the preferred model in accordance with which to model a 
conception of self so as to find orientation within it, the world and the cosmos, was with 
Descartes at once retained and called into question.
299
 One need only look to the First Meditation 
as well as the second Replies to ascertain the general tenor of the new reality Descartes 
embraced. In the text, Descartes adheres fundamentally to the traditional assumption of the 
Augustinian interiore homine, while maintaining the absolute necessity of the mind’s abstraction 
from the senses [mentem a sesnibus esse abducendam], which he further maintained are 
necessary in order to understand metaphysical things [res Metaphysicas intelligendas].
300
 As he 
tells us in the Second Meditation, in order to understand these higher-ordered things, one must 
implement hyperbolic doubt [tanta dubatatio] so as to lead the mind away from the senses [ad 
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mentem a sesnibus abducendam] and its deceptions.
301
 The dream, though not necessarily a 
sensation per se, is nevertheless an experience, an affective of consciousness; and given the 
arguments deployed in the Meditations and the Second Replies against the uncertainty that 
dreams represent, they are by definition deceptive, and must therefore be called into question, if 
not resolutely denied. As the Meditations reveal, the solution was to feign reality through 
representation, which problematically is itself an illusion that its implementer, the Cogito, fails to 
recognize.  
Given the fundamental question as to the formidable possibility of an illusive reality [ago 
ergo somniemus]
302
 as confronted in the Meditations, Descartes engages that question both 
through an order of discovery and an order of exposition. The goal was to lay out those 
cogitations [cogitationes] that allowed him to arrive at a certain and evident cognition of truth 
[certem & evidentem cognitionem veritatis], and which might serve as a model to others.
303
 As 
Jean Luc Marion has recently suggested, the question of dreams and the attendant concerns for 
the re-grounding of truth was for Descartes largely a matter of self-interpretation; which is a 
significant point to mention.
304
 By the time the Meditations were composed (1641), the certainty 
of the Cogito was (to Descartes at least) an established fact, and therefore the dream problem 
presented in the First Meditation is in many ways a problem already resolved. With both the 
Meditations and the Discourse, the Cogito integrates fully with the dream problematic to serve, 
presumably, as the only solution. The Cogito occupies a significant and unique place within the 
variegated possibilities that characterized Baroque “space,” and the culture emergent within it. 
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This is to say that the Cogito is a particularly Baroque response to the problem of the general 
chaos and uncertainty that came in the wake of widespread cultural collapse. And given the 
Cogito’s demands for certainty—as mandated primarily through the legitimacy of the inner 
experience—it found worldly chaos and uncertainty most profoundly represented in the dream 
phenomenon.  
As a counterpoint to the solution Descartes offered to the chaos and uncertainty posed by 
the dream phenomenon, one need only look to Pascal to see that a Cartesian brand of rationalism 
was not the only answer. With Pascal, who was writing in the 1650s and in an increasingly post-
Cartesian, rationalist world, continued to struggle with his own sense of uncertainty to work 
through the larger, cultural question of man’s separation from his God. He often employed 
skeptical arguments to certain Cartesian doctrines and scenarios—and namely that of the dream. 
Originally a man of science, Pascal revealed in his Pensées that his fideist and Pyrrhonian brand 
of piety was not mutually exclusive with rationality in the absence of verifiable proof. The 
Pensées arguably constitute his attempt to reinvigorate the dignity of man through the primacy of 
thought, which he did always in relation to his understanding of the omnipotence of God and the 
impenetrable secrecies of the universe of which reason knows not.
305
 Only within the abyss of 
unknowing and the uncertainty that man has of his placement within the vast hidden reaches of 
the universe, can he truly find himself and regain his dignity. As he tells us in the Pensées:  
 
No one can be sure, apart from faith, whether he is sleeping or waking, because when we 
are asleep we are just as firmly convinced that we are awake as we are now [la vie où 
nous pensons veiller n’est elle‑même qu’un songe]. As we often dream we are dreaming, 
piling up one dream on another, is it not possible that this half of our life is itself just a 
dream, on to which the others are grafted, and from which we shall awake when we die? 
That while it lasts we are as little in possession of the principles of truth and goodness as 
during normal sleep? [peu les principes du vrai et du bien que pendant le sommeil 
naturel] All this passage of time, of life, all these different bodies which we feel, the 
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different thoughts which stir us, may be no more than illusions like the passage of time 
and vain phantoms of our dreams [ces différentes pensées qui nous y agitent n’étant peut‑
être que des illusions pareilles à l’écoulement du temps et aux vains fantômes de nos 
songes].
306
  
 
With both Pascal and Leibniz (alluded to above), we have two divergent stances vis-à-vis 
dreams, and moreover, stances that are undergirded by rationalist assumptions; and yet the 
Cartesian solution won out. 
 As with Pascal, the question of repositioning man in the cosmos, if also to regain his dignity, 
hinged upon the primacy of thought. The problem of the dream for Descartes thus initiates as an 
attempt to distinguish a true (or certain) thought from a false (or delusional or fantastical) one. 
And though this is an important distinction in a world where the validity of the inner experience 
holds dominance, the question directs more crucially to the undergirding concern of what 
constitutes truth; and indeed, the reality on which that truth depends. This is to say that the 
question of the dream—to which Descartes’ canonical texts (and by extension his conception of 
self) was largely a response—formed part of a larger cultural significance. Indeed, within the 
vast expanse of the onieric tradition, dreams occupied a mediating position between the dreamer 
and a larger cosmological structure to which meaningfulness was ultimately tied. Descartes’ 
dream experiences together with the solution he offered to them are but one example in an array 
of possibilities through which to understand the general question of the oneiric experience within 
the Baroque world, as well as it deeper, ontological and cosmological significances.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Cartesian dream is familiar to us mainly because of the 
arguments deployed against it in the Meditations, which represent Descartes’ attempt to 
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(London: Penguin, 1995), VII.131 (“Contradictions”). 
 195 
overcome them as delusions and falsities. Indeed, the problem presents in its most articulated and 
straightforward form in the First Meditation with Descartes’ admission of the strong possibility 
of being within a dream delusion [in somnis fuisse delusum]; and thus hinges on his remark that 
“there are no certain marks by means of which being awake can be distinguished from being 
alseep.”
307
 That Descartes chose the genre of the meditation through which to confront the 
problem of the dream is significant, and given the precedent established by Loyola in the 
Spiritual Exercises (a work with which he was no doubt familiar), the task of the meditation 
served as a way to thoughtfully engage with certain truths, and in a profoundly personal way. 
This also greatly empowered the imagination as the mediating faculty between an intellectens 
and the truths it sought to understand. Along these lines, it is perhaps equally significant that 
Descartes instituted the Meditations as a sort of thought experiment,
308
 or contemplative 
exercise. In a general sense, the contemplative act allowed the understanding, by way of the 
imagination, to engage with a certain cardinal question in philosophy, namely the relation of God 
and of soul [de Deo & de Animâ],
309
 and the opening of the possibility for redefining that 
relationship.  
The task of the Meditations, I submit, was constructed to confront the false reality of 
dreams, and to work through the problem methodically (as by meditation) to reveal the necessity 
of the foundation of a wonderful science [mirabilis scientiae fundamenta] to which a new sense 
of totality might be regained as well as a viable (and even certain) basis for moral action.
310
 This 
is to say that the attempt to regain this totality redefines the relationship of man and world, as 
well as the possibility for a particular type of self-conception. The uniqueness of the Cogito as a 
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 AT VII:1. 
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 AT X:179. 
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specific type of Baroque self-conception asserts itself in search of an objective truth. Dreams are 
too open and too unstable to be objective; and they defy the transparency characteristic of a 
“true,” and actively conscious thought.  Thus the Discourse and the Meditations transcend the 
problem of the dream by incorporating it within the larger movement of the Cogito’s search for 
truth. This is to suggest that the dream problematic becomes subsumed and historicized within 
the “fable” of the Cogito as it redefines itself and the world.
311
 Insofar as this is true, dreams are 
denied any share in reality, and therefore have no claim to truth. The implications of this are 
significant to say the least, and I would further suggest, can only be appreciated in view of a 
larger cultural-historical moment.   
In cultural terms, the ascendency of the Cogito, and its attempt to simplify reality by 
making it transparent, and thus its dismissal of the meaningfulness of dreams, perhaps holds the 
greatest significance for the question of self-conception. Indeed, the Cogito understood as a 
subjectivity places itself in opposition against the world, and thus denies itself the possibility of 
selfhood because it denies reciprocity between itself and its world. To this extent, the Cogito 
expresses a particular orientation to metaphoric possibility. Though it is vibrantly animated in the 
expression of its potential to assert itself upon the world (as its master and possessor), the 
dictates and conditions that the Cogito has set for itself through the method, nevertheless delimit 
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and even completely obstruct the dynamic between self and metaphoric possibility. The full 
range of potential as implied by Pico through his understanding of man’s indeterminate nature 
(indiscretae opus imaginis) becomes narrowly determinate through the Cogito. Within this 
metaphoric and worldly dynamic, which is delimited and compressed, emerges a culture of 
science. Such a culture, which Nietzsche broadly considered as an Alexandrian age, can only 
understand the one-dimensionality it has created for itself. Thus it restrains and denies the full 
range of artistic expression as made possible through the metaphor; as well as for those 
possibilities concerning self-conception and being fully human. Indeed, such a culture denigrates 
and even denies the metaphor itself, despite that the seemingly novel claims to the legitimacy of 
logic (with its various representations including science) are animated and empowered by the 
metaphor.   
The task before us, therefore, is to pose the question of the dream not so much as a 
problem to be overcome by the unassailable certainty of the Cogito;
312
 nor does it endeavor to 
explicate the dreams in reference to the occultist or mystical influences,
313
 or as a curious 
“retrospective scheme” that must be reconciled with the “model life” set forth in the 
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Path: Descartes’ and the Sixteenth Century, Renaissance Quarterly, 49 (1996): 30-76. 
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Discourses;
314
 but rather as a reflection of the cultural problem of the Baroque. To read the 
dream incorporated within the fable as deployed in the Discourse (or as defeated in the 
Meditations) is to deny the dream its cultural force. The dream account at Ulm, which Descartes 
never published, and yet retained until the end of his life, is somewhat telling. At one level, this 
is to suggest that the Olympic dreams of 1619 are in some way different than the dreams he 
described in the later texts. The earlier dreams suggest that Descartes possessed perhaps a larger 
vision that held both a mundane and a divine significance, and within which the many aspects of 
human possibility might achieve full actualization. It is perhaps lamentable that his reluctance to 
make the dream account more widely known has now become part of the familiar problematic as 
it unfolded during the 1620s-1640s, and from which the hegemonic formulation of the Cogito 
would emerge. An attempt to remove ourselves from a rationalist framework, the Olympic 
dreams, in many ways, reflect the existential angst so characteristic of the Baroque world; and 
perhaps all the more so for being an intensely personal gaze into the abyssal chaos of 
uncertainty.  
As one example within the rich array of oneiric phenomena to manifest during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Cartesian dream sequence, I wish to suggest, allowed for 
the reality of this uncertain, Baroque world to be experienced in a particular way. Within that 
moment, Descartes seems to have been struck by a deep feeling of misdirection and uncertainty 
despite the apparent resolution offered during the dream’s interpretive phase. This is not an 
attempt to psychologize
315
  the moment as if we’ve somehow penetrated into the depths of 
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 On this general approach, see for instance, Siegmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, trans., James 
Strachey (New York: 1965); Carl Jung, “General Aspects of Dream Psychology” and “On the Nature of Dreams” in 
Collected Works (Princeton: 1965); and as the psycho-historical approach pertains to Descartes, see John R. Cole, 
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Descartes’ thinking during a vexing moment, but it would seem that the young Descartes was 
deeply affected by moral inaction, and that the dreams somehow drew out this feeling. The 
dreams together with the awakened reflection and interpretation speak directly to a question of 
action in the face of uncertainty. Specifically, how does one act within this world, this mundus 
ambiguum? As the Ausonius text had suggested, all things are at once “Yes” and “No” [Est et 
Non cuncti]; and yet to a mind weaned on the metaphysical systems of Suarez and Scotus, the 
Ausonian expression of the primordial contradiction was unacceptable. With that utterance, 
Ausonius had expressed the Anaxogorean notion that all is in all, and from all comes 
everything.
316
 A systemizing mind as Descartes’ most certainly was must have simultaneously 
been paralyzed by this, and yet impelled to confront it.
317
  Yet, no matter how fictionalized or 
contrived the dream may (or may not) be as an apologetic for the new science, they nevertheless 
suggest a connection between a perceived chaos and a purported discovery deployed to 
overcome it. In this sense, the dream seems to retain its mediating status between uncertainty and 
truth, though now cast in predominantly mundane terms. The confrontation with uncertainty 
engenders the possibility to articulate a viable and aesthetic response to it. The ultimate response, 
of course, was the construction and deployment of an objective reality grounded in subjectivity, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
however it is cast—no doubt served as a counterpoint to the willful consciousness of modernity insofar as actions 
and motives in a civilized society are attributed to dynamics that diverge from the strictly rational or intellectualist. 
Yet in the attempt to circumvent a rational and willful consciousness, twentieth-century dream interpretation has at 
the same time reaffirmed modernity, especially in its appeal to some primordial ground of individuality from which 
these drives and inclinations took their cue (and in the most remarkably individual way). What is significant here is 
that the individual is that which has primacy—not life, not being, not even nature. The primacy of the individual—
even on the primordial level of instinct and drive—holds sway for Freud as the “reality” on which civilization 
depends, especially in view of the dynamic of intra-individual forces that shape society. He cannot see past the 
individual, and so dreams in all their complexity always refer inwardly to the dynamics of individuality. 
316
 Eclog., IV:3, “omnia in his et ab hi sunt omnia.” 
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in certain mathematical questions; and moreover his hope to offer an entirely new science in opposition to Ramon 
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which having been projected into the world as an ideal representation forces all phenomena into 
conformity with it.  
To pose this question in relation to the oneiric sequence, we seek not to offer a psycho-
historical explanation of the life of Descartes in relation to his thought; nor is the main objective 
of this treatment an attempt to establish the philosophical worth of the dreams, especially as the 
decisive moment in modern philosophy in securing the “essence” of a subjectivist rationalism; 
and lastly, established in the Discours. Even with the method in place and the search for truth 
initiated, it is perhaps not surprising that obscurity and confusion remained always for Descartes 
the counterpoints to clarity and distinctness; and he thus continued to consider himself as a man 
who “walks alone and in the shadows” (marche seul et dans les ténèbres), but always with 
resolution and circumspection.
318
 
 Thus, the dream sequence constitutes a type of contested “space” where several dynamics are 
brought to bear in a most significant way; and in a way that somehow reflects the dreamer’s 
nostalgic (and even reverential) position toward the tradition, but also a certain resolute 
disposition to overcome the tradition, if also to dispense with it entirely. The novel orientation to 
life that had typified the Renaissance, and especially its emphasis on the validity of the inner 
experience, had not so completely nor decisively dissociated itself from sensibility. There was as 
yet no clear-cut distinction between the inner and the outer life, nor a reflective, inner gaze 
through which to ground in some definitive way contemplation and adjudication insofar as they 
pertained to the nature of the truths that defined those relationships.
319
  And thus this “new life,” 
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 In terms of self-conception, Montaigne is perhaps the most striking example, and especially with respect 
to the role of the essay as a cultural form to mediate the unstable dynamic between self and world. As Jean 
Starobinski has noted, Montaigne played with the traditional scholastic notion of form (essentia) that transcended a 
notion of essence as something unchangeable or static. The counterpoint that Starobinski draws forth hinges on the 
“movement” inherent in the creation of a work of art, which is not only a movement to “perfection,” but also a 
dialogical movement between self and world. As Starobinski notes, “Are we, on the contrary [to a scholastic notion 
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as defined by its novel orientation to the world, still retained (if also in varying degrees of 
intensity) a longing for the old ways and the truths represented by them, which it still, in some 
deeper sense, felt intrinsically a part of; and which it expressed variously through nostalgic tones, 
or a stoic resoluteness, or even also a melancholic emptiness.  
  It is within this confused dynamic that we might point to some of its general features: 1) 
the tradition itself (as expressed most sharply through the interiore homine); 2) an uncertain and 
angst-ridden disposition toward the traditional notion of reality and its related truths; 3) an 
increasing adherence to a type of rationalist individualism, and 4) an orientation to Life that 
placed special emphasis upon the validity of the inner experience. With these factors, I would 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of form], legitimately entitled to participate in the constitution of our form? Are we allowed to ‘perfect’ ourselves? 
In that case, it is by giving form to a work in the external world that we gain the opportunity to give form to 
ourselves.” See, Starobinski, Montaigne in Motion, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1985), 96. Similarly, the English tragic drama in the examples of Shakespeare or Webster (but others as well) 
relates the problem to a dominant, traditional notion of truth. Working through the powerful metaphor of the 
theatrum mundi, the play forces us to reflect upon the relation of truth and illusion on not only an epistemological 
level, but an ontological one as well. The play is in “movement” in its opening-up to a broad array of imaginative 
possibilities that includes the spectators and well as the players on stage. The theatrum mundi metaphor, as Howard 
Pearce has noted, “partially reveals the structures to which we appeal in our efforts to understand and interpret our 
condition.” On this point and the theatrum mundi more generally, see Howard D. Pearce, “A Phenomenological 
Approach to the Theatrum Mundi Metaphor,” PMLA, 95 (1980): 42-57; 44. The partial revelation of these structures 
comes through the metaphor’s ability to “dimensionalize” categorical schema—e.g., hierarchies, strata, or other 
fixed relations—which is to say, the metaphor’s ability to temporalize and make concrete these schema and thus 
remove them from their “essentialized” status. Having done so, an opportunity emerges for reflection upon them—
and their relations—in an (authentically) existential way. Pearce sees the theatrum mundi as consistent with the 
interpretive world, or horizon of Dasein (which phenomenalizes in a particular way), though other bases for Pearce’s 
phenomenological interpretation are in some ways well established. On the theatrical experience, see Antonin 
Artaud, The Theater and Its Double, trans. Mary Caroline Richards (New York: Grove Press, 1958); on imaginative 
possibility vis-à-vis the imagination as a metaphorizing faculty, see Wallace Stevens, The Necessary Angel: Essays 
on Reality and the Imagination (New York: Random, 1951); on the “reflective” aspect of modern theater, see Lionel 
Abel, Metatheatre: A New View of Dramatic Form (New York: Hill and Wang, 1963). More recently, William 
Egginton, who also interprets the Baroque theater consistently with the Heidegger of Being and Time (i.e., Dasein), 
sees the theater as a type mediating structure. See, Egginton, How the World Became a Stage: Presence, 
Theatricality, and the Question of Modernity (Albany: SUNY, 2003). Indeed, theatricality is a “historically-specific 
form of mediation that structures the spatiality of Dasein’s experience in the modern world” (137). By defining a 
notion of theatrical space, which he opposes to a conceptual space, we are given to understand that theatricality in 
the Baroque theater, especially, is the experience of space as medium of interaction to reveal how the “world 
worlds.” Egginton thus offers a move against what he sees as essentialist notions of theatricality, whether they be 
notions of “personhood,” the political or social order, or other structures constitutive of the range of human 
existence. Egginton maintains that the structure of truth for the Baroque is theatrical (or the theatrical experience of 
space), which problemitizes the relation between truth and illusion as mediated by the stage. See, William Egginton, 
The Theater of Truth: The Ideology of (Neo)Baroque Aesthetics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).         
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like to add that the space is fundamentally metaphoric (in the sense suggested above); and 
because of the inherently unstable, though remarkably creative “essence” of the generative 
metaphor and the space that it opens, the dream space itself is also fundamentally creative and 
unstable. In it the dreaming Descartes met with a persistent, though fragmented tradition, which 
was also, in large part, meaningful. And despite what meaning the tradition had for him the 
visions he encountered in the dream nevertheless threw him back into himself, away from the 
tradition. Thus, at once acting under the powerful influences of the microcosm metaphor, and 
with the perhaps equally powerful impulse to confront, so as to guard against the uncertain vision 
of the first two dreams, the chosen response was to fall back into the perceived stability of 
himself, and to articulate ultimately a logical thematic designed to re-unify wisdom in terms of 
the new science. And thus that which emerged from that evening’s initial angst and subsequent 
realization of “les fondemens de la science admirable” becomes effectively an illusion to guard 
against an illusion.
320
 
On one level—and indeed, a broader, more inclusive level—the Baroque dream vision in 
its way represents a peering into a vibrant fullness of possibility, which manifests the unique 
dynamics at work within a particular cultural-historical moment. Not only does the Baroque 
dream represent a significant episode within the larger eidetic tradition to which a dominant 
notion of truth is linked, it is perhaps the relation of the dream to the sub-history of the interiore 
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homine that should call our attention. Here the dream becomes at once problematic and 
significant for the question of modernity. As we have seen with Augustine, the notion of the 
interiore homine assumes a crucial place within the history of metaphysics, which furthermore, 
manifested during the early modern period with decisive consequences for the modern notion of 
self. With this in mind, what we intend to show here is that the dream becomes especially 
problematic not only with respect to a new understanding of the interiore homine, and especially 
vis-à-vis a reconceptualization of the psychological faculties and their respective potencies, but 
also within a broader horizon of transformations where the validity of the inner experience was 
allowed to hold sway.  
This inner experience—broadly conceived—along with its conditions for validation 
thereby confronted a transforming, if not completely reformulated understanding of the cosmos 
and man’s placement within it. It must be stated that dream visions
321
 along with the worlds that 
emerged from them—in either antiquity or the Middle Ages—were not problematic in the same 
ways, as we shall see, as they would become during the early-modern period. It almost goes 
without saying that the general category of dreams, especially their placement within the broader 
metaphysical tradition and its emphasis upon a transcendent notion of truth, provided a rich 
characterization of dreams. Of the influential categorization of dreams articulated by Macrobius 
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 I distinguish here a dream vision from a dream world—a distinction that Nietzsche implied, if he did not 
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in the early fifth century, the medieval mind took the greatest interest in those dreams (somnium) 
that were the most ambiguous and obscure in nature. The somnium was a “true” dream, but 
nevertheless lacked the immediate awareness of the truths dispensed by a vision (visio). The 
somnium comports rather well with the vast array of mediating structures evident throughout 
medieval culture. The dreams thus occupy a “middle” realm. For within this middle realm, which 
Augustine had characterized in prognosticative terms, especially in relation to its obscure 
meanings and figurative utterances,
322
 nevertheless linked the mundane and the divine realms 
and imparted integrity to the cosmos as a whole. The dream realm for Augustine, and indeed his 
later medieval successors, was fundamentally a spiritual realm, and despite its darkness and 
confusion, was more “real” than the awakened state or the realm of corporeal action. We see the 
corporeal only to see past it—to envision the spiritual plane, as it were—and only then to make 
judgments upon the higher truths encountered there.
323
 Dante’s Commedia is perhaps the most 
striking example of this in its later medieval form. Indeed, the whole of the Commedia is a 
visionary moment—a dream—where the truths of the moral universe are revealed.     
Given its privileged reality, the medieval dream was largely unproblematic, at least in terms 
of any modern misgivings that would subvert its ontological significance. If the medieval dream 
was problematic at all, the problem directed to the determination of the verity or falsification of 
its purported prognosticative truths. Yet, such a concern was included within the larger 
significance of the medieval dream phenomenon as a cultural form, and was thus 
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 Augustine designates three types of vision, and in ascending order of significance they are: corporeal, 
spiritual, and intellectual. As he tells us (De Genesi, XII.24.51), the corporeal vision perceives bodies in the world to 
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likenesses. The soul is deceived by the images of things (De Genesi, XII.25.52), and insofar as dreams, whether 
somatically or psychologically inspired, occur at the level of the spirit, confused dreams are nevertheless higher-
order confusions because they deal with spiritual truths. 
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unproblematic.
324
 The dream was, to be sure, grounded in a larger cosmological whole, and the 
thoughts experienced as well as the knowledge gained in a dreaming state tended toward 
universal, overarching truths; and were thus implicitly unified with those truths. What is more, 
the dream (as a species of vision) participated in the larger cosmological vision.  
 By contrast, the early modern dream lacks this unity. In this sense the dream was no longer 
grounded in a meaningful whole, and thus the dream vision now emerges within a contested 
ontological space. Within this space, the nature of thought is brought into question as well as the 
whole edifice of reality and its undergirding truths. Though the medieval instantiations reveal 
certain attendant ambiguities of the dream image, and through which one must negotiate, the 
ambiguities themselves reflected the middle status of the dream, located as it was between the 
realms of the mundane and the divine, which by its nature was confused. Such ambiguity was 
coterminous with the fallen state of the world (and of nature), which in its misalignment from the 
ground of a transcendent truth was by definition opaque and obscure.
325
 The dreamer might here 
find himself on a spiritual pilgrimage directing himself upward to a fuller and truer 
understanding of the divine (citation); or the dream might prophesize the future through a skillful 
reading of its symbols; or it might offer a grander more inclusive vision of one’s proper moral 
conduct in the civic realm (Cicero/Macrobius) or within God’s cosmos (Dante) more 
generally.
326
 The early modern dream was an intensely private experience, and all the more so 
because for all intents and purposes the dream experience at become alienated from the 
meaningful whole of the cosmos. Dreams become intensely terrifying because this isolation now 
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 See Jacques Le Goff, “Christianity and Dreams,” in The Medieval Imagination, trans. Arthur 
Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
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 Foucault is especially good on this point. He notes that the realm of Nature is that thin, dark “space” 
between the sign and the interpretation of them. This is a condition of Nature’s falleness, which is to imply that 
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couples with an ambiguity that directs nowhere but to itself. The early modern dream 
problematizes—and in a deeply existential way—the modern historical moment together with its 
angst and frightful confusion; which is to say, its gaze into the abyss.
327
 The rawness of the 
Cartesian dream in particular—even despite the editorial niceties, annotations and glosses
328
 to 
which it has become known to the world—forced Descartes to confront the shambles of a 
collapsed tradition; to approach an edifice of truth that no longer held; and perhaps to lament a 
structure of meaning that was not only ambiguous, but in certain respects utterly meaningless. 
Cultural Angst and the Deception of Dreams 
The dream is in many ways integral to an appreciation (and perhaps only then, a nascent 
understanding) of the rich array of possibilities that lay before the world—both creatively and 
morally. The dream phenomenon thus bears a crucial relation to an understanding of the Baroque 
notion of self, which with the increased emphasis on the validity of the inner experience shaped 
the self’s moral orientation to its world as well as determined the aesthetic possibilities within it. 
The dream image not unlike its medieval and antique predecessors assumed many different 
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forms in the Baroque world, and thus related to a host of moral actions that included inter alia 
the religious, political and the uniquely personal.
329
  
The early modern dream commentary also followed tradition, especially in regard to its 
fundamental adherence to an Artemidorian or Macrobian categorical and interpretive 
structure.
330
  As Stuart Clark has recently suggested, the manner in which the commentary here 
took shape—in both its Artemidorian and Macrobian contexts—effectively entailed a rethinking 
of the oneiric experience, which implies a rethinking of the structures of meaning through which 
the dream derived its force.
331
 Given his work on the history of demonology, Clark wants to 
show how deeply enmeshed were discussions of demonology with respect to concerns about the 
workings of nature, religious purity, political and religious authority etc.
332
 Along these lines, 
Clark observes a particular and dominant type of dream interpretation emergent in the latter 
sixteenth century, which moreover hinged upon demonic delusion and deception. His emphasis 
                                                          
329
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stems from his pervious (and magisterial) Thinking with Demons: The Idea of Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). See also, Robert Muchembled, Popular and Elite Culture in France, 
1400-1750, trans. Lydia Cochrane (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985), and Muchembled, 
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 Thinking with Demons, viii.  
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upon these aspects has forced him to take an epistemological approach to demonology and 
witchcraft to probe into the dissembling effects exerted by evil forces on contemporary 
interpretation and knowledge of the world.
333
 Macrobius designated an apparition (visum) or a 
waking dream (insomnium) as false, and was of no prognosticative significance. The “true” 
dreams within the typology include the prophetic vision (visio) where the prophesy comes to 
truth; the oracular dream (oraculum) where the possibility of right moral action is revealed by a 
parent, priest, revered man or god; and the enigmatic dream (somnium) in which the true 
prophetic meaning is ambiguously masked or veiled and must be interpreted. III.1-11. In the 
Commentary, 
The reality that Clark wants to describe is a confused one, which reveals the varied 
threads in a complex fabric of belief, which bear heavily upon the epistemological concerns at 
the core of his study. For the reason, his approach has taken him away from specific concerns of 
demonological practice or its relevance within more traditional domains of inquiry.
334
 Though 
Clark is not attempting a cultural-historical approach to demonology, or for that matter the early 
modern dream phenomenon, the question of an epistemology of dreams in direct relation to a 
widespread concern with demonology is of considerable importance. Indeed, the problematic 
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 On the point of epistemology, Keith Thomas’ thesis remains influential, if also contested. See, for 
instance, Religion and the Decline of Magic (New York: Penguin Global, New Edition, 2012). In terms of a 
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334
 The scholarship on demonology and witchcraft is notably vast. See for instance, Brian Levack, The 
Witch-Hunt in Early Modern Europe (London: Longman, 1987). As one of the reigning authorities on the subject of 
European witchcraft during the early modern period, Levack approaches his subject within familiar interpretative 
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surrounding the “demonic” dream that he has observed in the later sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries carries with it distinctive and penetrating theological features of the late medieval 
world, which we will address more fully below. 
  The demonic dream is particularly apt given the broader question of the Baroque, which 
reflected the general concern of the dream state—namely the extant ambiguity between reality 
and illusion. Again, as Clark has recently noted, the commentary of the demonic dream allowed 
an interpreter to pose the question of epistemological ambiguity without a moral or ethical 
risk.
335
 This is to say that by rendering interpretation into a category of dream traditionally 
designated as false, the oneirocritic was not violating or putting into question the natural or 
divine order of things, especially as it related to God’s total vision (nunc stans), and within 
which all prophesy was rooted. At least from late antiquity when dreams were first formerly 
classified,
336
 the question of the verity or falsity of dreams was always a concern, and the 
placement of the demonic within a broad array of dream contexts was very similar. Since dreams 
are largely imagistic, the significance of the demonic dream, as with all dreams, derives from the 
power entrusted to it by the whole of the eidetic tradition in which truth is grounded.
337
 Though 
the Devil could not create or place new images within the imaginative faculty of the dreamer, he 
or his minions could manipulate and distort images already there in the imagination or memory, 
and thus induce a delusion. This is, of course, nothing less than an altering of reality, or at least 
the perception thereof. In the transforming relation of man to nature, this could not be before 
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 Clark, Vanities of the Eye, 309-10. I agree with Clark’s approach to go beyond the interpretation of 
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reaffirmed belief and increased solidarity. Yet, the epistemological aspect he discusses—together with its 
ontological implications—is certainly a rich avenue down which to explore witchcraft in both idea and practice.    
336
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more significant. With Burckhardt’s incommensurably artistic descriptions of Pius II in the 
Tuscan countryside as given in the Civilization of the Renaissance, we find that nature had value 
in itself, as something beautifully expressive of which man was an intrinsic part, and it of him. 
Though Italy was in many ways exceptional, the forces shaping these transformations were by no 
means unfelt in the more northerly reaches of Europe. To this extent man did not wholly shun 
nature as a status defectus, and though it was understood as a complex and difficult network of 
signatures to be interpreted through a combination of skill and blessedness, nature nevertheless 
possessed intrinsic value as part of God’s cosmic order. Even as Augustine reminds us, nature 
was an integral part of man’s recollecting of himself; as through the dynamic of memory where 
he became newly familiar to himself while reaffirming his placement within the continuum of 
God’s created order and the ascent into beatitude. And though Augustine could affirm a 
connectedness that intimately and meaningfully linked—through an act of will—the states of 
fallenness and blessedness, what had for so long been deemed as fallen was not so easily 
redeemed, even through eyes more focused on the ends of this world—and not the next. And so 
older medieval notion of nature, sin, and the Devil himself (as their axial point) understood as the 
three cardinal instantiations of fallenness retained their significance, but in a newly confused 
way. Could it be that nature so lush and beautiful on the outside was merely a deceptive rouse. 
Here was the devil’s playground.  
 Within the Macrobian dream typology the apparition (visum) and a waking dream 
(insomnium) were from a prognosticative perspective deemed as false.
 338
 Because of their 
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 Macrobius, Commentary, III.1-11. The Commentary remained the dominant categorical source for 
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falsity, and because they possessed no true relation to destiny or man’s individual fate, they were 
in a particular way outside of God’s purview and providence, and thus more easily manipulated. 
Indeed, the concern of so many of these early modern dreams, as Descartes’ experience certainly 
attests, directed less to one’s fated placement within the divine framework, and more to the 
fundamental question of whether one’s perceived reality was an illusion. In general, these false 
dreams, as Macrobius tells us, present at the moment “between wakefulness and slumber” where 
the dreamer would think he was fully awake, though he be nevertheless within the first cloud of 
slumber.
339
 The danger emerges in that the dreamer, thinking himself fully awake, might concern 
himself less with decipherment of portents or divine announcements should they appear, as in the 
somnium. Rather, the dreamer’s immediate sense that he was awake would make his encounter 
with the apparitions—either terrifying or delightful—seem more on the order of a prophetic 
vision (visio) or an oracular dream (oraculum). This is not to suggest that questions pertaining to 
the fate of one’s immortal soul were any less significant, but it certainly raises questions as to the 
nature of the reality in which an individual destiny was to take shape. And, if the reality itself is 
called into question, so might destiny, and so might any individual easily play into the hands of 
the Devil. 
 Certeau’s observations of the demonic possessions at Loudun in 1634 in many ways 
illuminate these fears. What we find in Loudun is that diabolically induced delusions—perhaps 
on the level of the Macrobian lower order of dreams—resembled the dreaming state to such an 
extent that the two were almost undistinguishable. Certeau observed that the possessions 
manifested within a heterogeneous structure of belief with religious, medical, or administrative 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
revered man or god; and the enigmatic dream (somnium) in which the true prophetic meaning is ambiguously 
masked or veiled and must be interpreted. 
339
 Macrobius, Commentary, III.7. 
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dimensions. Within such heterogeneity, there was no consensus as to how the possessions should 
be approached, which ultimately (and significantly) raised the question of the meaningfulness (or 
lack thereof) of language.
340
 What did it mean to be possessed? Was it a question of cause; and if 
so, were those causes visible or hidden; and what was their provenance? The question of power 
is also raised, which problematizes authority vis-à-vis a notion of cultural “otherness,” but more 
than anything, the possessions themselves accentuate the problematic interrelation of 
psychology, theology and the application of the art of medicine (or exorcism for that matter) with 
a contested framework of meaning. And though mediated through language, the meaning of 
these various domains along with their tensioned interrelations reveal how thoroughly 
disconnected these domains were from each other as well as from the traditional ordering 
structure of reality. Indeed, the meaningful structure that united and sustained the cosmos (and 
especially the moral action within) no longer cohered. The very real danger of diabolical 
delusions and what they meant vis-à-vis salvation seems to suggest that the traditional reality—
even if in question—still maintained within a cultural “reality” while certain of its assumptions 
were in danger of impending collapse. The traditional medieval concerns of justification and 
temptation further complicated this, which were increasingly coming into line with a conscious-
centered morality—and the increased validity of the inner experience—as believed to be the very 
basis on which to work through the dynamics of the inner struggle.
341
  
  In the case of witchcraft where the possessed were thought to be in a sort of dream state, 
the ambiguity of the experience could extend quite powerfully from the individual dreamer to the 
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 On this point see Heiko Obermann, Luther: Man between God and the Devil (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2006), 102-6 et passim. 
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dreamer’s community.
342
 Through spells and imprecations an entire collective could be included 
within the confused delusion of the initial dreamer (i.e., the one possessed). Even in an age 
tinged by the new learning and thus an increased emphasis upon the wonders of the natural 
world, we need not remind ourselves that the manipulative transformation of species and 
similitudes (as by some demonic agency) was still a question of “spiritual” significance.
343
 As 
the Stoic doxographer Äetius tells us demons were “psychic entities” (ουσίαι ψυχικάι),
344
 and it 
was through the spiritual regions (of which the dream was integral) that they would affect the 
most power and influence. And though God was for the most part hidden (and the “experience” 
of him largely a concern of faith), the divine power could still be revelatory and direct. Yet, the 
Devil could in a variety of ways distort faith as much as he could distort a sign, and perhaps even 
distort reality itself on which dreams stood and derived their significance. Descartes is still 
within the clutches of this older structure of meaning, as his references in the Meditations to the 
malin génie would seem to suggest.  
The significance of these developments was widespread; and because of the conflicted 
currents of meaning through early modern European culture, the question of the dream was 
almost by definition a question fraught with difficulty and confusion. What I have attempted to 
suggest thus far is that the “source” of this confusion derives from a fundamental orientation to 
the life, which in profound ways relates to a newfound meaningfulness in the experience of this 
world. What may be seen a tentative or hesitant, if not a critically suspicious stance toward 
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dreams was at one level a questioning, especially in relation to their traditional importance as a 
prophetic medium (and all that it implied).
345
 Yet, on a more profound level, the general 
orientation toward dreams called into question their ontological status, and with it the foundation 
of truth and the entire reality on which that truth depended. Truth claims in relation to dreams no 
longer hinged upon a notion of prophecy or revelation, nor did questions relative to the 
acquisition of truth depend upon the knowledge of the proper, divinatory art (technē) through 
which to detect truth, especially in its more enigmatic manifestations.
346
  
Though a range of influential oneiric taxonomies had regarded the dream as both a 
mysterious and a meaningful realm, the rationalist currents of the later seventeenth century saw 
fit, and with an ever-increasing vigor, to view with suspicion the dream’s claim to truth and 
meaning. Newly formulated metaphors of light and vision—themselves rooted in the late-
medieval world—identified truth with transparency, and while the opacity of the dream ran 
counter to this understanding, the clouded realm of the dream state was, quite simply, something 
that must be steadfastly overcome, especially if the new conditions of truth were to prevail.
347
 To 
be sure, questions regarding the mysteries of this earth, which concerned less of the heaven 
beyond, could no longer rely upon a matter of interpretation—articulated as they were—through 
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 215 
dims and obfuscations. In other words, these faint, oneiric moments just like the larger, 
meaningful framework of which they formed part, offered no definitive demarcation between 
what was obscure and confused and that which was clear and distinct. That the mind/soul dwelt 
among enigmatic images (and were even subject to them) was to offer no basis for truth and 
knowledge. Truth must be seized, and the realm of the mysterious must at once be brought 
within the ambit of reason—subjected, as it were, to the active powers deployed now by a fully 
conscious faculty of the understanding (intellectus). To the extent that consciousness supplied 
the very capacity for true knowledge, so also was truth—and by extension, reality established on 
the conditions of conscientia, which was understood increasingly as a unified, rational faculty 
that defines the object of its knowledge, and is not in any way defined or affected by that object 
as the Aristotelian model had in large part supposed. As a culture of rationalism, modernity has 
no place for dreams, and had exiled them with ever greater suspicion and disdain to the realms of 
the strange and fantastical. Indeed, the “canonical” Descartes of the Discourse and Meditations 
is uncritically placed within these larger currents, if also viewed as their instigator; yet a deeper 
probing into the dream phenomena of the earlier modern world as well as a general openness to 
the peculiarities of a transforming structure of meaning, may perhaps present the Olympica in a 
new light.  
Cosmological Uncertainties 
What I mean to suggest through this brief treatment of the demonic dream is this: if we 
adhere for interpretive purposes to the Macrobian dream taxonomy, and thus the relegation of the 
demonic dream to the lower orders within that taxonomy, we are by extension addressing the 
broader question of falsities and deceptions. What the demonic dream had done was not merely 
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to call into question the dream, but the whole of the reality that sustained the dream phenomenon 
itself. This is a significant cosmological concern to which we should now briefly turn.  
The vibrant debates surrounding the meaning and significance of the potentia absoluta 
that grew up within the nominalist and voluntarist theological discourse of the late-medieval 
world is by now firmly established in the scholarly literature.
348
 Emergent questions within these 
nominalist debates contributed powerfully, if also frighteningly to a culture of skepticism where 
concerns pertaining to salvation as well as the natural order (potentia ordinata) were increasingly 
brought into doubt. To be sure, demons fell within the ordered structure of the cosmos, and were 
perfectly consistent with the medieval understanding of nature. So also was the understanding 
that though God executed his power within the ordained frame, given the fact of absolute will 
(potentia absoluta) he could just as easily have acted otherwise so as to violate his own laws, and 
thus to render effects from disconnected, non-correlative, or even contradictory causes. It should 
also be noted that this omnipotent, voluntarist God was also a hidden God (deus absconditus); 
yet at the same time, he was everywhere for no one or no thing was outside God’s will or power. 
And though creation always remained present to him—as again, a condition of his omniscience 
and omnipotence—by contrast the human condition as it pertained to the rational, moral, and 
physical realms was ultimately one of complete alientation. Indeed, the existence of the deus 
absconditus would occasion Pascal to utter “Le silence éternel de ces espaces infinis m'effraie” 
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for how could man determine either his limit or his measure in the absence of God?
349
 For all 
intents and purposes, God lay beyond the impenetrable veil of revelation and was thus 
unreachable and unknowable to the human mind. To this end the prose of the world that had 
sustained a meaningful communion between creator and creation was left unanchored and a 
whole of angst-ridden possibilities emerged in its wake. To be sure, the departure of the creator 
from creation did not negate the divine order or render it unreasonable. Yet, demons as entities 
that were far from unnatural or in violation of the cosmos were, in God’s seeming absence, 
allowed to walk more unrestrictedly about the earth, to manipulate and to dissemble, to make 
God even more inaccessible; and to jeopardize one’s eternal soul.  
What emerged in the midst of this problematic was the ongoing attempt to reconcile this 
notion of God’s omnipotence with that of his created and perceived order, so that man in his 
limited knowledge might make sense of his place within a transforming cosmos, and to find his 
way. Yet, such a reconciliation—namely that of preserving God’s transcendent uniqueness 
without alienating completely his creation—had been resolved previously. The resolution in 
question was the doctrine of the analogia entis, which perhaps only temporary, and articulated in 
decidedly different terms, found vibrant and meaningful expression within the intellectual 
currents of late Scholasticism.
350
 The myriad and complex concept of the analogia entis—at least 
as it pertained to the “imitative” and “attributive” relation between beings and essence—was 
constructed fundamentally, and certainly in its Thomist formulation, on the assumption of the 
unity and totality of Being. As such, the medieval cosmos depended upon two metaphysical 
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doctrines: a metaphysics of causality and a metaphsyics of participation.
351
 From the point of 
view of created beings, the question of imitation and participation was part and parcel of a via 
ascensus. The analogia imitationis thus allowed beings of imperfect similitude to relate to (or 
participate in) the most perfect Being (ens perfectissimum) according to the determination of 
their form and the limit (or measure) of their capacity to actualize fully that form. What is 
effectively a metaphysics of participation unites the various (and multiple) modalities of being to 
a primary instance (ens perfectissimum) to preserve the univocity (or full essence) of Being 
within the totality and unity of a theological (and ultimately Neoplatonic) frame.
352
 What is 
more, the analogia imitationis served as the mediating dynamic or via media between univocity 
and equivocity (i.e., the existence of beings in multiplicity in both matter and form). By 
admitting into the medieval cosmos a “common form” (i.e., univocity), which was mediated 
through analogy, medieval theologians overcame a serious theological problematic. In particular, 
the participatory dynamic of the analogia imitationis preserved the full and unique essence of a 
transcendent God without distancing him from the variegated forms within his creation.
353
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 The twin notions of causation and participation are complex, and discussion of them here would take us 
too far afield. Suffice to say that causality in metaphysics presupposes a specific dynamic with respect to reality and 
especially to beings vis-à-vis that reality. The science of nature (ϕύσις/physis), for example, is effectively a science 
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Meta., I.981a.28-30. That privation is intrinsically a part of this moment, for Scholasticism the realization of the 
form is integral. Aquinas’ introduction to the four causes of an ultimate cause was done under the influence of 
Neoplatonism to which participation and causation became inextricably linked. The basic notion of participation—
that is the sharing or taking part in a metaphysical simple, or transcendental—is fundamentally Platonic. See, for 
instance, Protagoras 322a; Symposium 208b; Parmenides 132d; Republic VI.486a; and Timaeus 77b.   
352
 Nota bene: the analogia imitationis is one aspect of the dialectic; the other the analogia attributionis. 
The two analogiae are thus constitutive of a metaphysics of causality and participation which is not only central to 
the dynamic of the medieval cosmos, but allowed it cohesion and unity with respect to the univocity and equivocity 
of being.      
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 The three types of semantic analogy—or how analogies are said, dicitur) are analogia proportionalitas, 
analogia attributionis, and analogia imitationis. These analogies were especially useful in Scholastic discussions of 
metaphysical and logical problems, all of which to a greater or lesser extent derived from Aristotle. See for instance 
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With the collapse of the medieval cosmos and with it the emergence of the epochal 
understanding of a deus absconditus, meaning and truth became disjointed from the world along 
with the mediating structures that once connected and unified it. Only with this in mind can we 
fully appreciate Donne’s expressed angst in the “Anatomy of the World”—“tis all in pieces, all 
coherence gone.” Descartes who still operated very much within a late-medieval world—despite 
the cultural pull that increasingly drew him inward—could still adhere to the idea of a 
cosmological totality, even if the structure itself lacked the manifold range of meaningfulness 
that had once so fully characterized it. It is not difficult to see that the Cartesian texts,
354
 and in 
particular those most significant for the solidification of the epistemology during the years 1628-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
E.J Ashworth,“Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic: Aquinas in Context,” Mediaeval Studies 54 
(1992): 94–135 and Ashworth; and “Analogical Concepts: The Fourteenth-Century Background to 
Cajetan,” Dialogue 31 (1992): 399-413. The classic study of Thomistic analogy is still Bernard Montagnes, La 
doctrine de l'analogie de l'être d'après Saint Thomas d'Aquin (Philosophes médiévaux 6, Louvain: Publications 
Universitaires, 1963); See also Ralph McInerny’s nuanced readings of the analogia in Aquinas and Cajetan in “The 
Analogy of Names is a Logical Doctrine,” in Being and Predication: Thomistic Interpretations, Washington, D.C.: 
The Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 279–86; “Aquinas and Analogy: Where Cajetan Went 
Wrong,” Philosophical Topics, 20 (1992): 103–124; and Aquinas and Analogy (Washington, D.C., The University 
of America Press, 1996). 
The analogia proportionalitas—the most straightforwardly logical of the three—asserts a ratio of 
simititude between two different proportions, e.g., as a point is to a line, so is a spring to a river. For more expressly 
metaphysical questions as those, for example relating to medieval cosmology, the analogia attributionis and 
analogia imitationis were more central to those discussions, especially the former. The analogia attributionis, which 
Aristotle called pros hen predication, and Aquinas, analogy per prius et posterius. Both speak of the ordered relation 
between things vis-à-vis a “primary thing.” The example that Aristiotle employed (Meta.,IV 1003a.33-1003b.18) 
concerns “health” (as the primarly analogate) with respect to the various ways health can be attributed of a being, 
i.e., preservation (food); production (medicine); symptom (urine); and capability (inherent nature to attain health ). 
The medievals who spoke in terms of analogy per prius et posterius could say, like Aristotle, that health is the 
primary analogate  (per prius), which is something in the subject (de re or in subiecto). The various ways that health 
may pertain to or be said of a subject (de dicto) are attributive are thus posterior (posterius) to the primary analogate. 
In the Sentences, Aquinas speaks of this in relation to the true: Verum per prius dicitur de veritate intellectus, et de 
enuntiatione dicitur inquantum est signum illius veritatis; de re autem dicitur, inquantum est causa (Sent., I d. 19. 
Q.5. a.1. s.1, p 184). The analogia in the sense Aquinas speaks of it is not only a formal relationship, but causal as 
well, which further corroborates the dictum: omne agens agit sibi simile (Sent., IV., dist.1, q.1, a.4, ad.4; and Sum. 
Theol., I, q.19, a.4) 
The analogia imitationis is as the name suggests a semantic relation of similitude; or in other words, how 
one essence reflects and/or participates in another essence, i.e., between creator and creature.  
354
 Regulae (1628) and the Discourse (1637). 
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37, stilled assumed a medieval orientation vis-à-vis the pursuit and attainment of truth; and 
especially in relation to the medieval meditative tradition. It is the gradual disjunction of 
meaning from the traditional cosmological truths that occurred within the late-medieval world, 
and from which the nominalists had in many ways taken their cue.   
A major point that Heiko Oberman has made (and with which I wholeheartedly agree) is 
that in the reform of and revolt against the Church through what were perceived to be medieval 
excesses, the emergent “new piety” came to advocate strongly for personal experience (if 
perhaps on the model of the Devotio Moderna),
355
 in articulating their understanding of Jesus’ 
life and suffering. Indeed, it was such experience that legitimized and designated a true 
Christian. As a widespread cultural phenomenon, the emphasis on experience extended into other 
knowledge domains with transformative, and sometimes revolutionary consequences.  
Medieval science is one such domain. Medieval natural philosophy as cast primarily in 
accordance with the critical function of faith had allowed for “imaginative thought experiments.” 
These experiments explored certain conceptual possibilities with respect to natural and celestial 
phenomena, as experienced or possibly experienced. The medieval thought experiment found 
expression most famously through the Quaestiones disputatae, and thus gave shape to the 
increased tendency to find conformity between possibilities as expressed in the thought 
experiments themselves [e.g., whether (utrum) the universe is infinite; or whether there exists a 
diurnal movement of the earth etc.,] and the specific models or predictive mechanisms to which 
the experiments relate. What is more, the quaestio allowed for a dynamic engagement with the 
authority, namely Aristotle, to probe the boundaries of what was known and accepted given the 
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 Gerhard Grote (1340-84) was perhaps the most influential of the primary figures of this movement, 
especially through his founding of the Fratres Vitae Communis in the Netherlands. Also the movement was strong 
in Germany as with, for example, Thomas à Kempis, the probable author of the Imitatio Christi. 
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established body of natural knowledge.
356
 Though the thought experiments may have revealed 
exceptions or contradictions to the established doctrines, they ultimately served to reaffirm the 
faith and indeed the dynamics of the medieval cosmos itself.   
And yet, it was also within the context of the quaestio and Aristotelian natural philosophy 
that Buridan would pose the question (among others) regarding the possibility of whether God 
could move the heavens faster than they actually move [Utrum sit dare maximum in quod 
potentia est].
357
 Unlike the standard move to probe the boundaries of the God’s ordained frame 
(potentia ordinata); but not to transgress it, Buridan engaged the possibilities through the text to 
accentuate not what Aristotle hadn’t said; or could have said; but what he should have said. This 
is a major shift in the nominalist discourse, which points also to the fundamental orientation man 
had to the cosmos. As Oberman has pointed out, and to which the Buridan example thoroughly 
attests, this late-medieval conception of the potentia ordinata increasingly conceived of the 
notion in terms of the “present order;” or in the words of Nicole Oresme, “le cours de nature.”
358
 
With Buridan’s move, and others as well, we see the seeds of a not-so-distant movement that in 
its influences will transform what were previously formulated in terms of “expectations” as to 
how natural phenomena manifest to become formulated hypotheses and later into principles that 
not only predict, but answer absolutely for the infinitude of possibilities that lay in the universe; 
and thereby brought within an increasingly perfected (and indeed actualized) representation of 
the human intellectens.  
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Oresme had suggested this in the Tractus de commensurabilitate vel 
incommensurabilitate motuum celi. The text presents a technical matter regarding the proper 
proportionality between heavenly motions, which to the later medieval mind extended, almost as 
a matter of course into the domain of the reality of heavenly phenomena. The attempt here was to 
discover the ratio motuum machinae mundi in accordance with certain geometric and 
arithmetical precepts, which Oresme ultimately was hesitant to do because it traversed beyond 
the potentia ordinata. The interesting aspect of this problem is that Oresme, rather than working 
toward a conclusion in accordance with the systematic tractus, appeals to the dream. In the end, 
Oresme resigns himself to the fact that God’s mysteries shall remain as such. What is noteworthy 
is that the dream as set within a nominalist context reveals the interplay, if also the tensions, 
between a humanity searching for truth and an enigmatic and mostly hidden cosmos. And though 
these hidden depths are forbidden on the grounds of vanas curiositas, it is a self-asserted human 
reason that finds itself increasingly impelled to traverse the limit.
359
  
Though the Oresme of the Tractus was reluctant to traverse the limit, the Oresme of De 
causis mirabilium was quite different. In that text, the author proposed to show the causes of 
some effects, which only seem to be marvels; and to show that the effects occur naturally, as do 
many other effects at which we commonly do not marvel.
360
 There is no reason, says Oresme, to 
appeal to the heavens, to demons, or to God. He proceeds to show by appeal to a number of 
notabilia, the causes of certain marvels as contingencies of vision [causis mirabilium circa visum 
contingentium], as demonstrated by the likes of Alhacen, Roger Bacon and Witelo. The 
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demonstrations allowed Oresme to surmise, if not to conclude absolutely, that certain optical and 
visual theories can explain the marvelous in terms of the natural. The significance here is that the 
boundary into the potentia absoluta—as the ground of possibility as affected through the action 
of the divine will—has already been crossed. With Oresme, the “explainable” is already 
admitted, if not fully drawn into the conditions established by reason and its operative 
(mathematical) framework. The function of the medieval thought experiment as articulated in the 
Quaestiones had provided the general structure to probe these boundaries, if not crossing them 
entirely. It seemed only a matter of time before what was explainable, known, and ultimately 
truthful would depend upon the conditions of a rational framework, which emphasized with an 
ever-greater demand for certainty, the correspondence between it and the phenomena 
experienced. 
With the angst and uncertainty that accompanied a collapsing, medieval cosmos, a whole 
range of incongruities and violations, if not yet complete contradictions had began to shine forth 
within that structure. The mediating discourse had begun to break down, and bringing with it a 
whole host of uncertainties.  As with Buridan and Oresme in their attempts to probe more deeply 
into the realm of the deus absoluta, and to loose a range of theological and moral concerns on 
account of it, we find in the late medieval world an increasing epistemic demand to reconcile 
physical and celestial phenomena with the principles that endeavored to explain them. In a 
general sense, we see in the nominalists a modification of the notion of conformity (aedequatio) 
between understanding (intellectus) and thing (res) so as to give way to a more exacting notion 
of equation (aequatio) between understanding and thing. In other words, we observe a demand 
for an increased degree of certitude between phenomena and explanatory principle. The 
redefinition of this relation was striking enough, but more so the presumption behind it, which 
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effectively constituted a redefinition of reality. This is to say that the point of reconciliation 
between intellectus and res, whether through general conformity (adequatio) or equation 
(aequatio), is of only secondary significance. The nominalists in various ways had already 
broken with the resplendently meaningful totality of the medieval cosmos within which 
conformity was always concordia adaequatio, and which entailed an intrinsic harmony not only 
with the ens perfectissimum, but with all of creation and the cosmos as a whole. The reality that 
the nominalists had abandoned was, as Heidegger suggests, a realitas actualis.
361
 As a reality of 
actuality this did not entail per se a reality of things actualized, but rather it entailed 
fundamentally the possibility of actualization, and to the fullest possible extent that the “real” 
within any given entity or thing could be actualized. The significance of the nominalist move to 
emphasize a realitas objectiva, which Descartes himself will privilege in the Meditations, and 
especially on the basis of the proofs deployed in the Third Meditation,
362
 hinged primarily on a 
question of truth; and, specifically that truth from which epistemological realism descends—
namely that a thing is an entity insofar as that thing exists in the idea.
363
  
Inasmuch as truth can be said to give to the world Beauty, such can also be said that the 
true gives to the understanding the knowledge of that Beauty as it relates to the totality of the 
medieval cosmos and man’s placement within it. In this sense, the Scholastic (and specifically 
Thomistic) definition of the relationship between res and intellectus extends in a more general 
sense to characterize the relation between world and man, and indeed the cosmos as a whole. In 
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the Thomistic understanding of the knowledge of the cosmos, which is an almost complete 
inversion of the Cartesian understanding of the same, the knower (following an Aristotelian 
precedent) always assimilates to the thing known.
364
 This is to say that the essence of knowledge 
does not reside in the mind, as in a Cartesian, subjective sense where objects are made to 
conform to a representation in the understanding, which in turn is projected into the world. 
Rather, the essence of a thing (i.e., a thing’s formal reality or its real content)—understood 
especially insofar as that thing may be fully actualized in potentia—is prior to its truth in the 
understanding. The understanding, in its assimilation to the thing-to-be-known, presupposes its 
placement within a larger cosmological (and by extension ontological) whole in which it seeks to 
be more fully integrated within that whole. What does this mean? Such a statement has a 
distinctively alien import to the modern mind, and yet nevertheless forcefully bespeaks an 
entirely different orientation to reality. The act of assimilation (assimilationem) is effectively the 
mediating dynamic that conforms the intellect to thing, so as to fully and harmoniously integrate 
within the cosmological whole.     
The assimilation of the intellect to the thing known, which St. Thomas understood in 
terms of the intellectus agens, or active intellect, implied an act of formal determination between 
the understanding and the thing. Within this dynamic the entity communicates a species of itself 
(which is to say, the formal specification of itself as a subject), which the knowing power 
(intellectus agens) subsequently assimilates to (formaliter ratio) within the understanding. Once 
the intellectus agens assimilates to the thing (res), which again, is a formal relation, the 
similitude (or likeness of the thing) forms the basis of knowledge, which in its determination is 
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subsequently realized in the passive intellect (intellectus possibilis). The realization of 
knowledge, or its perfectibility in the intellectus possibilis, implied for Aquinas, a type of 
movement. In a more immediate sense, the movement originates with the assimilation to species 
in the understanding, but more importantly, movement originates ultimately in the formal, first 
cause of the divine intellect in which the transcendentals (i.e., the Good, the True and the 
Beauthiful) and all their similitudes are grounded.
365
 The basis of relation, or rather, the 
harmony—the concordia adaequatio—implicit in knowledge (and the subsequent perfection 
thereof) hinges in the first instance (per prius) upon the common term “truth” in expressing the 
harmony between being and the intellect.
366
  
Though the true may not give to being in some fundamental ontological sense, the 
“whatness” of a being is nevertheless presupposed by a perfect and full sense of truth in its 
adequation, or conformity to the understanding. Within this conformity (adequatio) is the perfect 
form of the true.
367
 What is more, the formal (formalis) constituent of the true effectively 
mediates between being and the understanding in its giving to the understanding of a particular 
(and true) notion of thingness, which moreover, exists truthfully between them because of the 
verity of the similitude in the first instance. As Aquinas tells us, knowledge is an effect of 
truth,
368
 which is also to say that knowledge is the gift of being to the understanding through the 
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expression of truth in adequation. The crucial significance of the Scholastic formulation is in fact 
the concordia adequaetio, which must be understood in terms of the totality of the medieval 
cosmos. And moreover, that the perfectibility of knowledge in the intellectus possibilis is also a 
harmonious movement toward Being in its fullest and truest form, God.  
The nominalist emphasis to reconcile principle with phemomena in presuming (the as-
yet-articulated) conditions of a new reality—which is to say a steadfastly Cartesian reality—was 
nevertheless mediated through a novel conception of truth, and especially as that truth was 
reflected by a novel orientation to life. The nominalist understanding of realitas objectiva, 
despite its emphasis upon the “reality” of the phenomena as increasingly identified—in truth—
with the principles deployed by the understanding, does not in any way equate to the notion of 
the true as expressed within the Thomistic dictum: verum per prius dicitur de veritate 
intellectus.
369
 The point being that the reality in which celestial and physical phenomena were 
said to exist (including the moral realm of human action) was increasingly thought to equate 
identically (and not merely conform) with the reality articulated by theoretical knowledge.
370
  
The problem surrounding the Osiander Preface to De Revolutionibus, and Copernicus’ 
ensuing outrage is a case in point.
371
 Copernicus had insisted not only on the reality of the 
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phenomena described, but the truth of the descriptions. In addition, the well-worn assumption 
regarding the experimentalist program in England during the later seventeenth century—i.e., as 
steadfastly Baconian and inductive—was in Newton both corroborated and betrayed. Such was 
Newton’s achievement in the Principia that it no longer sufficed merely to penetrate into the 
dark reaches of nature to learn her secrets piecemeal, and to replicate the experience of natural 
phenomena through a working hypothesis.  In the “General Scholium” of the 1713 edition of the 
Principia, Newton famously expressed his “hypotheses non fingo.” This was the culminating 
moment of the late-medieval demand for certainty as it emerged from the attendant angst of a 
deus abscondita; and specifically its aequatio of the understanding to the phenomena. With the 
Principia, the question of pertaining to terrestrial and celestial physics was not merely that the 
“experience of the phenomena”—i.e., the force of gravity (vis gravitates)—could both be 
explained and legitimated by the schema imposed upon it; but perhaps more significantly that the 
mathematical schema itself (which Newton claims to have understood in an almost mystical 
sense) could claim with authority to have an unmediated access to reality, and thus no need for 
hypotheses. Newton was still sufficiently medieval that a cosmological totality for him was still 
possible. Even still, the supremeness of the Newtonian achievement was mediated and 
legitimated by the Cogito, and its assumptions of truth and reality. 
Just as the humanists had returned to the sources (ad fontes) in revitalizing learning and, 
indeed, articulating for the world the studia humanitatis to dignify human existence, so it was 
Copernicus who proceeded in the same spirit to revive the old astronomical observations 
(observationibus…restituit) in light of the new. Similarly, Newton endeavored to recover the 
ancient wisdom (prisca sapientia) not only to reinvigorate, but also to “re-deify” the cosmos in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
planetarum (1454) provided a systematic presentation of the various orb models in which the reality of the orb is 
assumed.  
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light of God’s active will—deitas est dominatio dei…dominatio entis spiritualis deum 
constituit—a concern that the “General Scholium” makes very clear.
372
 It seems, then, that the 
emergent problematic as it developed from the late Middle Ages to Descartes (and certainly as 
extended to Newton as well) depended not simply upon a question of sources (fontes), but on the 
very notion of a “source” itself, which we might dub the “domain of experience.” It is within this 
domain that the relationship of knower (man) and known (world) was redefined. As part and 
parcel of a nascent and creative historical moment, the domain of experience here understood 
equates in a very real sense with “possibility;” or perhaps even the “experience of possibility” 
(experientia possibilis), which is to say, in the modern world is the source of the imagination—
and especially insofar as that faculty acts in a productive and intuitive mode. It is here within this 
domain of experience together with its implied dynamic of possibility that dream itself must be 
encountered. It is not merely that the dream confuses the distinction between illusion and reality, 
but an entire cosmological dynamic. Indeed the dream represents the sine qua non of oneiric 
uncertainty in the early modern period, but also a certain fullness of possibility.  
The Olympic Dreams 
Descartes experienced his famous “Olympic” dreams on the night of November 10-11, 
1619. We know of these dreams primarily through Leibniz’ Cogitationes Privatae (1676), as 
well as from Adrien Baillet’s 1691 biography, Vie de Mr. Des-Cartes. As Descartes tells us in 
the Discourse (and which Baillet corroborates), he experienced a sequence of dreams while in 
Ulm, which moreover, marked the precise moment where he found a new direction in life; the 
famous “right path of truth” (rectum iter veritatis). For it was upon this path that Descartes found 
the conviction to pursue the foundations of a wonderful science mirabilis scientiae fundamenta; 
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the broad contours of which (if still mostly opaque) had appeared also during the course of the 
dream sequence. As the Discourse suggests, it was the dream and its revelation of a particular 
truth that righted his path, and allowed for him to establish the unshakeable foundation 
(fundamentum inconcussum) on which he would ultimately seek to ground the sciences. As 
intimated above I do not intend here to offer a close, line-by-line interpretation of the dream 
sequence, but merely to open the question of the Cartesian dream in view of a larger cultural 
problematic, which at the same time bore a direct significance on the perceived necessity to turn 
to the Cogito. Yet, for the purpose of what follows, it is perhaps appropriate to briefly outline the 
broad contours of those three dreams, so as to have common frame of reference. 
The first dream conveys a deep sense of confusion and angst.
373
 A whirlwind blows 
Descartes through the streets, and he is beset by a general sense of misdirection. He encounters a 
familiar man, whom he knows, but there is no exchange of greetings between them. The dreamer 
is indecisive as to approach the familiar man, or otherwise enter into a church to escape the wine. 
The angst in question seems to be a moral angst Descartes confronts face-to-face the problem of 
inaction. There is another man in the streets who claims he has something to give Descartes, who 
believes it is a melon from a strange land. As people begin to gather around him, Descartes takes 
notice that though they are standing upright, he is bent over. He awakens to a severe pain in his 
left side; and after praying to God to save him from the evil effect of the dream, he meditates for 
two hours and sleeps again. At the commencement of the second dream, he hears a sharp 
explosive sound (which he took for a clap of thunder) at which moment he was awakened to see 
many sparks scattered about the room (beaucoup d'étincelles de feu répandues par la 
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chambre).
374
 We are given to understand that such an experience was somewhat familiar to the 
dreamer, who having recourse to philosophy was able to calm himself and to fall back to sleep. 
In the third and final dream, Descartes encounters two books on a table—a dictionary and the 
Corpus Pöetarum.
375
 He finds in the poetry volume two verses, both from Ausonius: “Quod vitae 
sectabor iter;” and “Est et Non.”
376
 There appears a man in his dream, who in encountering 
Descartes inquires (among other things) as to where he had encountered the volume; a question 
to which Descartes replied with uncertainty. A variety of confusion ensues, with the books in the 
dream disappearing and then reappearing; a seeming incompleteness to the dictionary; and 
finally Descartes’ inability to find again the Ausonius verses that had posed to him the 
remarkable question. The dream account concludes with an interpretative act. Thus, the decisive 
moment in the third dream centers on two episodes of self-interpretation: one “while still 
asleep,”
 377
 and second, after the dreamer had awakened, to continue “along the same lines.” 
What is more, the account reveals the problematic and obscure boundaries between thinking and 
dreaming; but also the indication that the inherent difficulties can seemingly be overcome by 
conscious reason, even in a dreaming state. The interpretations suggest that the encountered 
mental agitations, or the vision itself, centered on a question of Enthusiasm, and from which the 
truth was revealed. The following textual extracts from both Baillet’s Vie and Leibniz’ 
Cogitationes Privatae convey the general sense: 
Baillet’s French:  
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Il attribuait cette merveille à la divinité de l'enthousiasme, et à la force de l'imagination, qui fait 
sortir les semences de la sagesse (qui se trouvent dans l’esprit de tous les hommes comme les 
étincelles de feu dans les cailloux) avec beaucoup plus de facilité et beaucoup plus de brillant 
même, que ne peut faire la raison dans les philosophes.
378
 
And Leibniz’ Latin:   
poetae per enthusiamum et vim imaginationis scripsere: sunt in nobos semina scientiae, ut in 
silice, quae per rationem a philosophis educuntur, per imaginationem a poetis excutiunture 
magisque.
379
 
 
The comments upon the dreams as revealed in the Cogitationes Privatae, and even in 
Baillet’s subsequent glosses, reveal a certain candidness and open humility that one finds only in 
the midst of their deepest and most private thoughts. The openness here, as in a confession, is 
decidedly striking and poignant, if difficult to formulate in precise and exacting terms. And aside 
from the broad parallels exhibited in the Cogitationes Privatae with those encountered in 
Baillet’s later account both texts nevertheless convey, and in a significant way, a sense of the 
author’s openness to the possibilities found within a vibrant and confused world. Such was this 
world, as Baillet’s account surely suggests, that it at once yielded promise and vexation, triumph 
and despair, and even truth and falsity. It is perhaps the crude richness of the accounts 
themselves—and this is not a detraction—that reveals the deeper forces arrayed within what I 
view to be a specific, cultural-historical moment. Such a moment, in its confusion, ambiguity and 
fantasticality, is thoroughly and altogether Baroque. The dreams convey a sense of a disjointed 
and dismembered world. The dreams at once harbors within it elements of the tradition in sort of 
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morphogenesis as well as an array of life affirming possibilities. Even in the interpretive 
moment, Descartes attributed his insights to a “divine marvel and the force of enthusiasm” 
(merveille à la divinité de l'enthousiasme).
380
  The divine marvel of enthusiasm is a rich notion 
vis-à-vis the tradition and, connotes what Cicero termed a divine afflatus/adflatus,
381
 which is 
likened to a possession, or an inspiration, and which furthermore, in terms of Descartes’ dream 
sequence, combined with the force of the poetic imagination. 
Descartes’ account of the dream adheres to a traditional notion of divination, and one that 
depended upon the inspirational moment (ἐνθουσιασμός/enthousiasmόs) whereby an individual 
in being quite overtaken by the divinity, was brought more fully into the truth of the divine 
vision. Within the larger interpretive frame, I would like to suggest that the dynamics of this 
enthusiasm work themselves out poetically, and in accordance with Pico’s breath of life motif as 
introduced in the Oratio. The traditional notion of the Imago Dei now takes the form of “seeds of 
wisdom” (les semences de la sagesse) and which are contained within the minds of all men 
(l’esprit de tous les hommes comme). This is why the Discourse becomes so significant, viz. 
insofar as it offers a method for conducting one’s reason well (pour bien conduire sa raison). 
The directive proceeds on the fundamental assumption of the now modified notion of the Imago 
Dei; and in accordance with the first sentence of the Discours, which reads: “Good sense (which 
Descartes comes to view as synonymous with reason) is the best distributed thing in the 
world.”
382
 It is not merely that the uniqueness of the divine afflatus is made common, but that all 
the creatively expressive potential of man is made subject to discipline. Creativity is deemed 
good only insofar as it is properly channeled. But, these are concerns beyond the ambit of this 
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dissertation, but nevertheless relate quite significantly to the dream sequence of November 1619. 
Having sketched these larger concerns it would seem that the problem of the Olympic dreams 
Descartes is less a curiosity within a larger rational movement than an originary moment within 
which the specific form of our modernity began to take shape. 
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EPILOGUE 
That Descartes assumed a particular prominence in the emergence of modern science is 
to suggest his historical timeliness. This is not a causal claim, but relates intimately to the 
conditions of possibility within which a particular historical moment was allowed to emerge. 
Such a statement applies not only to the closed history of metaphysics (of which science is part), 
but also to that of the cultural history of the West that subsumes metaphysics within it. To 
suggest timeliness is not to put forth the claim (again not in some causal sense) that he or his 
thought squares in some absolute way with notions of salvation or triumph any more than those 
of nihilism or despair. Both may be true (and perhaps both are) to varying degrees or orders of 
significance. Rather, in speaking of timeliness we proceed here, as Descartes himself did, in 
close regard to a notion of foundations, which pertains not only to the metaphysics that grounds 
the modern age (as Heidegger observed), but also, and perhaps most importantly, to a broader 
notion of culture where the very possibility of moral action dwells and thereby a culture 
manifests.  
Our concern here has thus been to attempt a possible definition of modernity—which 
powerfully relates to a designated cultural phenomenon. Baroque culture is not a cohesive 
totality as had been the cultures of Archaic Greece and Renaissance Italy; but it nevertheless 
constitutes a whole of various meanings, which harmonize, conflict and coincide. The question 
of the Baroque and by extension modernity hinges not so much on “what is the Baroque?” as 
“how does the Baroque generate meaning, and by extension truth?” Much of what we consider 
“true” in the modern world derives considerably from the Cartesian notion of subjectivity as 
fully articulated in the Discourse and the Meditations, though Descartes most certainly 
expressed, developed, and validated the notion (however inchoately) within other published and 
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unpublished texts. What I have sought to do here is to place in relief within a larger cultural-
historical dynamic the Cartesian notion of subjectivity as rendered famously in the dictum Ego 
cogito—ego existo. Not unlike the iconography carved in the principle doorway of a Gothic 
cathedral that one would find, for example, at Chartres, Amiens or Notre Dame, there is with the 
Cogito a centrality of focus, and if that focus is not part of some deep and perfect harmony, it 
nevertheless forms part of a whole. Within the culture of the Baroque—as within any culture—
there abound intrinsic analogies between disparate phenomena, which manifest as cultural forms. 
Furthermore, these forms can be read and interpreted hermeneutically against the background of 
culture as determined by a core-set of moral values (Sitten). These values, again, determine the 
horizon of meaning through which thoughts and actions manifest in a habitual and unconscious 
fashion. These cultural forms reveal the patterns of culture and its subtending truths as they exist 
within a particular horizon. The horizon of meaning, as well as the related forms, together 
provide a heuristic that allows us to comprehend a culture as a meaningful whole.  
The Cogito as it took shape, especially, in the Regulae, the Discourse, and the 
Meditations tends to a foundational role, and as such, it most certainly “gives to modernity the 
basis upon which it [modernity] is essentially formed.”
 383
 Yet, such a claim should come with 
qualification. When viewed within the closed history of metaphysics, Heidegger has disposed us 
to read that history as a sort of unfolding of the destiny of the West, and therefore we are given 
to understand that it is a history bound by necessity. The move to culture, as I have attempted to 
show, forces us to raise questions regarding the foundational role of the Cogito beyond the 
history of metaphysics; and to suggest that the move to the Cogito was not a foregone 
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conclusion. And if not bound entirely by an assumption of necessity, the turn to culture 
nevertheless adds dimension to a marked episode within the history of being that Heidegger has 
defined primarily in terms of the Seinsvergessenheit of modernity.  
The necessary and closed history of the “unfolding” of western metaphysics in view of a 
cultural-historical approach now yields to new questions pertaining to the cultural conditions of 
possibility. Indeed, it is was these conditions that allowed for the emergence of the Cogito in the 
unique form that it ultimately assumed as both a cultural form of the Baroque and a motivating 
force within it. These questions occasion a deep reflection regarding the privileged place of the 
Cogito, which it enjoys largely at the denial of other, inwardly directed, conceptions of self; and 
which were thoroughly present during the early modern period. These vibrant and expressive 
avenues for self-conception—the Cogito included—were opened by the cultural phenomenon of 
the Renaissance and extended themselves into the Baroque, and in a way that would have 
profound and enduring transformations for Europe. Within the dynamics of Baroque culture, 
these varied avenues towards self-expression were delimited and defined by an increasingly 
well-developed discourse of the subject that either claimed hegemony (as with the Cogito), or 
were otherwise cast to the margins, if not relegated to utter obscurity. Though the history of 
metaphysics is integral to this story, it obscures the richness of human possibility during a 
sublimely creative and formative moment in the history of the West. 
As I have set about to show in chapter 3, the vibrant energies of the Λόγος were drawn 
into the boundaries of the microcosm to form the very heart of the creative moment that was the 
Renaissance; and indeed also, the Baroque and modernity as a whole. In this sense, Heidegger’s 
observations on the poem by Stefan George, “The Word,” are particularly apt. As he tells us, the 
“Word,” or Λόγος, gives us occasion to think about the total experience that is language and our 
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submission to it.
384
  Yet, perhaps more poignantly for the question of the microcosm and the 
creative moment that it ushered forth, the total experience—i.e., the event of language—as 
occasioned by metaphorical possibility allowed for the powerful poetical act to define (or 
redefine) the relation of the world to the Λόγος. As Heidegger’s analysis makes very clear, the 
Λόγος is that by which the whole of things (i.e., the world) is upheld and kept from sinking into 
obscurity.
385
 Language—in its essence (i.e., Λόγος)—can never be known directly; and yet we 
are always within its power and are shaped by it; and yet humans are an integral part of that 
dynamic, which occurs through the mediating action of the metaphor.  
By moving away from a definitively philosophical approach or one otherwise cast in an 
intellectualist vein, a cultural history can open the question of modernity as a poetical moment. 
The microcosm metaphor of the Oratio is a generative or fresh (as Ricoeur calls them) metaphor; 
and insofar as it was enmeshed within a novel orientation to life it also reinvigorated language 
and extended its creative possibilities into any number of spheres of human action. The poet thus 
redefined the relation of world and man, but so also was this redefinition intrinsically one of 
discovery (in the broadest semantic sense). It is within the profound, poetic experience of 
language that one may be touched by it, if only fleetingly and at a distance. In this moment, 
language is the most creative, and thus the microcosm as a generative metaphor had the ability to 
transform profoundly the relation of world to the Λόγος. And though this metaphoric possibility 
expressed itself in a unified and total way during the Italian Renaissance, it was no less dynamic 
in it extension to the Baroque. As an event of language, the microcosm metaphor is integral—
and indeed foundational—in rethinking the emergent possibilities of the modern world. This is 
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especially the case when considering the manifested possibilities for thought and action before 
they are expressed as inviolable “truths,” as they would later become, for example, with the 
entrenchment of the natural sciences. With this in mind, the significance of Pico’s text is oriented 
less toward a question of Renaissance self-fashioning, as cast within a Neoplatonic or mystical 
framework, than a setting in which to rethink the fundamental structure of man’s thought and 
action as it transformed at the threshold of the medieval and modern worlds.  
The Cogito’s emergence within a distinct historical moment presupposed in a profound 
way this metaphoric possibility, which came to translate into a specific manifestation of the 
modal action of invenire—now relatively narrowly defined. The Cogito in its equation to science 
(and a mediating method) becomes in an interesting way both the ground of possibility as 
defined within the narrow confines of theōria, as well as an exceedingly expressive cultural 
form. As a cultural form, the Cogito thus assumes less a foundational status in the overall 
cultural phenomenon of the Baroque than a status that is qualitatively representative of it. It is 
only foundational in its application to science and as a metaphysical ground. As the dynamics of 
the Baroque unfolded historically, the Cogito became integrally representative only within a 
specific moment of that unfolding, and in such a way that the history of metaphysics becomes 
hegemonic. At the most basic level, this heuristic of culture—and specifically the cultural 
horizon—allowed for the cultural form (the Cogito) and the dynamics of culture that informed it 
(the surroundings) to remain integral to one another, and in such a way as to delimit the 
possibility of superficial abstraction and objectification.  
Yet, this is not to contextualize the Cogito. Contextualization in the conventional sense 
seems to reduce historical significance to a network of causal relations and interrelations, 
whereby historical meaning—though seemingly expanded and enriched—is nevertheless limited 
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to what we may call the “context of the context.” In other words, the problem here is that the 
context itself becomes an objectified phenomenon within which causal explanations—
themselves the conditions from which the significance is allowed to emerge—are imposed upon 
historical phenomena in a closed, causal frame that is ultimately ahistorical. This is why 
Gaukroger’s intellectual history of Descartes, though rich in details, ultimately fails as a cultural 
history.  
The objectification of the context—which is to say its abstractedness (and closed-ness) 
moves away from the full possibilities of historical thinking—and not only hinders the 
possibility of an open past and an open present, it also disallows for an authentic historical 
interpretation to emerge in the space that this openness occasions. The past is a living past, and 
we engage with it in a living present. Thus, again, the cultural-historical approach, as I have 
discussed above, is a movement away from a linear, causal explanation of certain decisive 
developments in the early modern period. By raising the question of culture, I have sought to 
examine the emergence of modern science (and the Cogito within) as a complex cultural form, 
which as I maintain, is an accretion not only from a dominant claim to truth, but also the 
underpinning value structure that conditions those claims and shapes that truth.  
As we have seen, the move beyond a network of causation and context is to reorient 
altogether the question of the Cogito and its significance for modernity. That being said, the 
dissertation has emphatically not set out in a quest for “origins” as they may relate to exact 
essences, purest possibilities or an instituting activity (Entstehung);
386
 yet the overarching task in 
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the dissertation (and as it evolves henceforth) nevertheless hinges upon questions pertaining to 
an “originary” moment (Ursprung).
387
 As they pertain to the world of the Baroque—whose 
image we have attempted to “phenomenalize” if only in outline—it perhaps goes without saying 
that these originary moments are historical grey areas, which is to say, rich, elusive, raw and 
unpredictable. In that sense, the Olympic dreams of November 1619 are especially apt. The 
dream, along with the culture of the Baroque of which it formed part, is alien and queer to our 
modern, rationalist predispositions. Their characteristic strangeness is unsettling, being perhaps 
very much akin to Freud’s depiction of the dream landscape as das Unheimlichkeit, or the 
“uncanny.” The feeling of being-not-at-home is by definition unsettling—and attendant to it is 
the characteristic angst-ridden-ness along with the elusive array of striking peculiarities, which 
for better or for worse, force the realization that the world is somehow different. This is the 
“world,” the mundus ambiguum that Descartes encountered in the dream—at once strange and 
familiar. And yet, in confronting it, he somehow felt the perhaps inexplicable desire to guard 
against its uncertainties and confusions. A moral existence, and with it the possibilities for right 
action in determining one’s path within the world, could not depend upon the interpretation of a 
confused network of signs and signatures. The truth could no longer subordinate (as it could for 
Augustine or Dante) to various layers of meaning and significance, which comprised the world 
and the cosmos as a whole. Rather, the truth, even in questions of moral action, must be always 
certain, lucid, and literal; and thus the door is opened to a tyrannizing form of theōria.  
The Olympic dreams thus bring into relief the originary moment of the Baroque as a 
whole, and in a way that nevertheless proved decisive for the direction to which the culture was 
then oriented. With this in mind the dreams must not be confronted under the uncritical sway of 
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the Cogito insofar as they are subsumed within the fable of modernity as articulated in the 
Discourse and the Meditations. An authentic historical sense, which hinges on the fact that the 
past is open and thus shares a common corridor with the present, allows for inquiries into the 
swirling eddy of the originary as represented by the dream, but also with any cultural aspect of 
the historical Baroque. The past is still very much the present.  
It perhaps goes without saying that such queries into the originary do not constitute a 
sustained attempt to find any sort of a decisive break from modernity’s ancient and medieval 
past, any more than the miraculous appearance of a formative genesis as revealed by the truths of 
modern science. At the very heart of these assumptions, it would seem, are the fully incorporated 
(and indeed legitimatizing) presuppositions of modernity itself, which prides itself on 
distinctness and novelty. Yet, there can be no question that there is continuity between the 
originary moment and what preceded it; and in the case of Descartes, continuity exists, if only so 
superficially as his employment of the technical apparatus and terminology of the Schools. Even 
where the influences of continuity are deep, as with the marked strands of Augustinianism, 
Thomism, Scotism, and Stoicism etc., and which pervade extensively the Cartesian corpus, it is 
not sufficient to claim merely a continuity of the tradition.  
A close reading of Descartes’ works reveals that he employed the effects of an array of 
very influential, traditional texts—sometimes consciously, sometimes not—but he employed 
them always in creative and innovative ways. This should be our concern. Is there, for example, 
a “spirit of Augustinianism” in Descartes’ writings? There is, most certainly, as chapter 4 would 
seem to suggest. And yet, though there may be striking, core similarities—which is perhaps the 
obvious result of a shared tradition—the path that Augustine followed toward an intellectual 
knowledge of God [Deus summa pulchritudo] was no more that of Descartes than the move to 
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the Cogito was that of Augustine. The point to be made here insofar as researches pertain to 
Descartes is that one must perhaps incorporate within their analyses the distinctive and 
influential aspects of the tradition, yet with the proviso that we constantly raise the question as to 
why certain theologico-philosophical elements inter alia may have found appeal with Descartes 
and his contemporaries; and moreover, how the transformations therein shaped the tradition we 
have inherited in marked, profound and enduring ways. The core concern here hinges upon those 
aspects of which Descartes may have been less conscious—the familiar aspects of the tradition 
serving as a dress and a livery of something more vital—yet were nevertheless incorporated into 
his thought no less forcefully. It is perhaps impossible to know the “forces” directly, but we can 
know significances through the patterns by which they are expressed. And thus, we may gain 
some insight into the human condition and its orientation towards its world along with the 
shifting edifice of meaning set about during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  
We have attempted to show (and at best only superficially) the array of linguistic and 
cultural forces that at once comprise the centerpiece of our research and its peripheries. Again, as 
viewed in relief, the Cogito is something of a monadic totality, and thus possesses definite, 
singular and unique characteristics; yet at the same time, bears a striking reflection of the cultural 
totality of which it is part. And, as it is part of the history of metaphysics, which again is 
subsumed within the cultural-historical whole of the West, the Cogito forms an integral part of 
the grand, cultural continuum, which shall always make relevant Descartes’ appeals to 
Augustine, Aquinas, Bonaventure, Cicero and others. Tracing the significance of the Cogito is to 
necessarily raise the significance of the whole, which as Burckhardt said in regard to the Greeks, 
is to deal with a “gigantic continuum which might be best symbolized by the map of the stars; 
the attempt to trace it is continually confused, as the single object appears now on the periphery 
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and easily accessible, now more remote, and now in the very centre.”
388
 This is to say, we seek to 
understand the dynamics of emergence (Ursprung) amid a process of shadowed confusion 
(Verwirrunghen) and raw possibility when after at least two millennia the ancient cosmos was 
abandoned.
389
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